Israeli Pessimism Regarding Peace Agreements with Lebanon: A Revival of the 1983 Experience and Conditions for Army Reform

A state of cautious anticipation is escalating in Israeli political and security circles with increasing American reports about imminent direct negotiations between Lebanon and the occupying state. In this context, Israeli analysts recall the bitter experience of 1983, when a peace agreement was signed but never truly materialized, raising fundamental questions about the maturity of current conditions for concluding a sustainable settlement.

The orientalist and Middle East affairs expert, Haim Golovnitzky, considered the launch of direct negotiations in Washington, which led to a limited ceasefire, a historical event in itself. He noted in an analysis published by the occupation press that this shift is a direct result of the radical changes that have swept the region and Lebanon since the events of October 2023.

The Israeli analyst recalled the collapse of the Lebanese state in the aftermath of the 1975 civil war, and how that conflict led to the rise of Shiite forces and the subsequent establishment of Hezbollah. He explained that this era witnessed Syrian infiltration and intensive activity by the Palestine Liberation Organization, making Lebanon an open arena for regional and international military and political interventions.

The analysis touched upon the May 1983 agreement, signed during Amine Gemayel's presidency and with the support of the occupation, emphasizing that it remained ink on paper until it was officially canceled. Experts believe that the historical failure to implement that agreement was due to the absence of internal Lebanese consensus and the dominance of armed forces that rejected any rapprochement with the Israeli side.

The war of October 7, 2023, brought about a dramatic shift on the northern front, with Hezbollah engaging in a prolonged war of attrition that resulted in heavy losses among its leadership. Observers believe that the assassination of the party's Secretary-General and the destruction of large parts of its military infrastructure placed the party in an unprecedented strategic predicament before its public and within Lebanon.

Israeli analysis indicates that the Taif Agreement of 1989, which ended the civil war, contained a major loophole by allowing Hezbollah to retain its weapons under the guise of resistance. This exception enabled the party to later impose its political will, as happened in May 2008 when it militarily controlled Beirut in response to attempts to reduce its influence at the airport and in the communications network.

Golovnitzky believes that the slogan 'army, people, and resistance' is now facing a fateful challenge in light of the massive destruction inflicted on southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs. Lebanese public opinion, even within the Shiite community, has begun to question the feasibility of continuing an open confrontation that has led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands and the destruction of basic livelihoods.

The occupation authorities are currently pursuing a strategy aimed at expanding the buffer zone in southern Lebanon through systematic destruction of infrastructure in border villages. This policy aims to prevent the return of displaced persons in the short term and to impose a new reality on the ground that pressures the Lebanese government to accept stricter security conditions in any future agreement.

Israeli analysts affirm that the demographic and political reality in Lebanon has changed since the 1980s, with a decline in Syrian influence and a shift in Christian power balances. However, the biggest obstacle to any stability remains the weakness of Lebanese state institutions and their inability to fully assert their sovereignty over all territories, especially in border areas.

Israeli circles believe that the Lebanese army, despite being an institution with popular support, its field performance remains modest and unable to confront Hezbollah's influence. These circles cite the army's failure to implement previous international resolutions, especially Resolution 1701, which failed to prevent the party from strengthening its military arsenal south of the Litani.

Israeli analysis suggests the necessity of a radical and comprehensive reform of the Lebanese army as a fundamental condition for the success of any peace agreement or long-term calm. This proposal includes transferring the responsibility for rebuilding and training the army to the United States and Saudi Arabia, to ensure its independence from partisan and regional influences loyal to Iran.

The Israeli vision emphasizes the necessity of 'purging' the ranks of the Lebanese army of elements loyal to Hezbollah at all leadership and service levels. Without this step, Israeli sources believe that any weapons or support provided to the army could end up as a tool in the hands of the party, thereby emptying any security agreement of its true meaning.

Hezbollah is currently suffering from severe financial and moral crises as a result of the financial blockade and successive military strikes that targeted its supply lines. Despite these setbacks, the party still relies on its ability to recover and adhere to its political positions, based on its remaining missile arsenal and continuous support from Tehran.

In conclusion, the Israeli reading concludes that signing a new agreement with Lebanon without strict implementation guarantees would be a repetition of historical failure. The issue is not about legal texts, but about the ability to change the reality on the ground, which requires firm international and regional will to reshape the balances within the Lebanese state away from the dominance of illegal weapons.

Without a radical change in the structure of the Lebanese army and its purification, any new agreement will remain ink on paper, similar to the 1983 agreement.