Hormuz After the Strikes: How Iran's Small Boats Disrupted American Naval Superiority

Washington's Message

Washington – Said Arikat – 4/18/2026

On Saturday, The New York Times published a lengthy report on what it called Iran's "mosquito fleet," referring to the small, fast boats of the Revolutionary Guard, which continue to pose a real threat to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz despite extensive American and Israeli strikes that sank Iranian warships and destroyed large parts of Tehran's traditional naval infrastructure. The report reveals that Iranian power no longer relies on classic naval confrontation, but on a low-cost, highly disruptive war of attrition.

Along the Gulf coast, small, high-speed boats are deployed, capable of maneuvering, hiding, and rapid assault. These boats are the backbone of the Revolutionary Guard's naval force, an institution separate from the regular Iranian navy. These small vessels can launch missiles and drones, or operate in coordination with camouflaged land platforms that are difficult to detect, making them an ideal weapon for disrupting shipping and confusing larger fleets.

According to the report, Iran had threatened to keep the strait closed until a ceasefire was reached in Lebanon. However, Iranian officials issued conflicting statements about its reopening, before the Iranian army announced on Saturday that the waterway had "returned to its previous state" and was "under the strict administration and control of the armed forces." US President Donald Trump was quick to welcome the news, declaring that the Hormuz crisis was "over," while reaffirming the continuation of the naval blockade on Iranian ports until a broader political agreement was reached.

However, the military interpretation does not seem so simple. Naval experts point out that the mission of closing or threatening the strait does not require a massive fleet, but rather a limited number of drones, coastal missiles, or naval mines. Therefore, despite Washington's announcement of destroying more than 90 percent of the regular Iranian navy, the real danger has not been completely eradicated, because its tools are scattered, difficult to count, and quickly replaced.

The roots of this doctrine date back to after the 1979 revolution, when the Islamic Republic established the Revolutionary Guard parallel to the traditional military establishment, which the new regime did not trust. After the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran became convinced that directly confronting the United States was military suicide, so it turned to building a force that would not defeat the adversary, but rather exhaust it, disrupt its calculations, and impose a permanent cost on it. From this, the model of small boats, midget submarines, and naval drones was born.

The report indicates that commercial vessels remain the weakest link in this scenario. American warships possess advanced cannons and defense systems, but oil tankers and civilian ships have almost no real protection against a rapid attack or an inexpensive drone. Therefore, American units tend to monitor the region from the Sea of Oman or the Arabian Sea, away from the narrow passage that reduces the margin of maneuver and multiplies the element of surprise.

The Hormuz crisis once again reveals the limits of traditional American power. Washington is capable of destroying bases, ships, and facilities, but it is less capable of ending asymmetric threats that rely on dispersion, camouflage, and low cost. This is a recurring military dilemma from Afghanistan to the Red Sea: overwhelming firepower does not guarantee political or security control. The more the United States uses its overwhelming force, the more it pushes its adversaries to develop cheaper and more flexible tools, making direct military victory closer to illusion than reality.

As for Trump, by declaring that the crisis is "over," he repeats a political pattern based on creating media victories before facts mature. Maritime passages are not secured by a tweet, nor do risks dissipate with a political declaration. Such statements may satisfy a domestic audience, but they confuse markets, allies, and the military establishments themselves. When the danger is later found to persist, Washington's credibility declines, and the difference between populist rhetoric and solid strategic realities on land and at sea becomes apparent.

The broader lesson is that the Middle East has become hostage to waterways that medium powers or even armed groups can threaten at limited cost. This means that the security system that Washington has led for decades is no longer sufficient. Instead of militarizing crises and mutual blockades, the region needs collective security arrangements that include both the Gulf and the Red Sea. Without that, global trade and energy prices will remain hostage to small boats igniting major crises.