The dangers of a truce without unity and a political solution

Since the end of the first phase of the exchange deal, we have witnessed a frantic race between reaching an agreement to complete the commitments of the first phase and implement the second phase, which is what Hamas is demanding; extending the first phase, which is what the Trump administration and the Netanyahu government are striving for; or renewing the war, which the Israeli government, especially Benjamin Netanyahu and the more extremist ministers, prefers. This is because they are betting on their ability to achieve the war's goals, ensure the government's survival, and avoid its collapse, in addition to facing the repercussions of the war on them, starting with the historic failure of October 7, and continuing with the ongoing failure to resolve it and achieve all of its goals.

Where could the negotiations go? It's impossible to say for certain. Reaching a formula for extending the first phase, while emphasizing the link to the requirements of the second and third phases, is the most likely scenario. It's important to consider the factors and variables that contribute to the realization of each scenario (renewal of the war, reaching a new agreement based on extending the first phase, implementing the second phase, or continuing the stagnation in the same place, as has been the case since the end of the first phase).

The implementation of the second phase scenario can be ruled out without too much risk, as the ongoing negotiations centered on extending the first phase have already made progress. These negotiations are centered on the formulas circulating, formally by US envoy Steve Witkoff and actually by the Israeli government, and have moved beyond the implementation of the second phase. This would not have happened were it not for the blatant bias of Trump and his envoys toward the Israeli position.

This is evident not only in the bypassing of the original agreement and the attempt to impose the issue of an agreement to extend the first phase only, but also in the support for the imposition of a stifling blockade, which constitutes a war crime and a form of renewed war.

The Trump administration is worse than its predecessor.

I point this out to warn against the frenzy of exaggerating the positivity and flexibility of Trump and his envoys, and the differences between the current administration and the previous one, especially after he abandoned his call for the displacement of Gaza as if it were the standard. Yes, Trump does not favor war, and this is what allowed for an agreement and what could allow for a new one. But he wants peace through strength—that is, peace that achieves American and Israeli goals. This should not be considered a virtue unless it is accompanied by a change in goals, specifically if Palestinian demands and rights are recognized. For example, recognizing Hamas, if it occurs, is not enough, especially if it is in exchange for changing Hamas and creating a new Hamas, by halting resistance through a long-term truce. What is required is recognition of Palestinian rights, at least at their minimum, as recognized by international law: the right to self-determination, the right of return, ending the occupation and independence, and holding the occupation accountable for its crimes, especially the war of genocide, mass destruction, displacement, and collective punishment.

What lends credibility to the above is that the American demands in the new era did not include any response to Palestinian interests and rights, even when Adam Boehler opened a negotiating channel with Hamas. This is an important variable that should not be ignored or exaggerated, as he claimed that Hamas had agreed to a long truce, to stay away from politics, and to disarm. Some forgot this and focused on his statement that they are good people and not devils with horns on their heads, and that America is not an agent of Israel (he retracted this statement after the Israeli reaction, but he was nevertheless relieved of his mission, which led to his withdrawal).

The Trump administration holds Hamas responsible for the failure to reach an agreement, in addition to Witkoff's recent, highly biased statements regarding Hamas's two-faced nature both inside and outside of the negotiations, and its threat to set a timetable for the conclusion of the negotiations, or else Washington would support the Tel Aviv government's preparations to resume the war.

Although Hamas denied Boehler's statements regarding its withdrawal from politics and disarmament, it confirmed that it had offered a long-term truce lasting 5-10 years, and perhaps longer. It expressed its willingness, as stated in statements attributed to its leadership, to provide all necessary guarantees for its commitment to the truce's continued implementation, including supervision of implementation by countries friendly to Israel and the United States, the non-training and arming of elite forces, and the establishment of a formula for the handover of rocket and mortar weapons.

Legitimate questions

The issue of a long-term truce raises significant questions, given the existence of a settler colonialism that seeks no settlement, and whose tools include occupation, ethnic cleansing, displacement, and annexation, and which is carried out by a single faction, without linking it to halting the plan to liquidate the Palestinian cause, particularly with regard to annexing the West Bank or ending the occupation and establishing a Palestinian state. This is a very dangerous matter.

It is true that the late Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Hamas's founder and leader, proposed the idea of a long-term truce, but only in exchange for the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders. This idea was reiterated by various Hamas leaders and spokesmen after him. However, this differs from what is being proposed now, as it is being proposed in exchange for a ceasefire, withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, reconstruction, and the continued existence of Hamas, albeit in a new form.

The first question: What will be the fate of the resistance under a long-term truce? What is meant here is not only armed resistance in the Gaza Strip, but also armed resistance in the West Bank and elsewhere. Israel will not agree to Hamas's commitment to the truce being limited to the Gaza Strip while it engages in armed resistance in the West Bank, even if a new Hamas emerges in a new guise (a new political party). This is a major challenge that opens the way for discussion of the fate of armed resistance at this stage.

The second question: What is the fate of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip? Will there be self-rule in the Strip under Arab and international supervision, completely separate from the West Bank, thus consolidating the separation? Or will there be some formal connection between the Strip and the densely populated enclaves in the West Bank, which the occupation plans to complete after annexing large areas of the West Bank?

The occupation, as is well known, prefers to seize the largest possible area of land with the smallest possible population. No one can imagine that the occupying state, backed by the Trump administration, would allow, through negotiations, the establishment of a sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or in the Gaza Strip alone. This would only happen if forced to do so.

The third question: What will happen to the unity of the cause, the land, the people, and the unified representation represented by the PLO? What will happen to national unity, which will be torn apart into further fragments if a long-term truce is reached by one faction without a comprehensive agreement that includes the establishment of a Palestinian state?

Fourth question: What is the fate of the Arab Summit initiative, which has gained almost universal support? This initiative is based on a series of pillars, including those related to a ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal, and prisoner exchange; those related to the implementation of the Egyptian recovery and reconstruction plan; those related to the return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip after a transitional period; and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Unity, unity before the destruction of Basra

Yes, Hamas bears some responsibility for the failure to achieve unity, because it has always prioritized maintaining its control over Gaza over all else and has not given the necessary central attention to the goal of ending the occupation and achieving independence. However, it does not bear this responsibility alone. Rather, President Mahmoud Abbas, by virtue of his legitimacy, capabilities, and powers, bears the primary and greatest responsibility. This is because he has closed off all possibilities for achieving partnership, whether through national consensus or elections, relying on the weight of Fatah, the PA, the PLO, and legitimacy. He "wants unity" that does not affect his absolute authority and control over decision-making. This does not achieve unity, but rather perpetuates hegemony, monopoly, and exclusivity.

Existential challenges and few opportunities

We are well aware of the importance and historicity of what has happened since the Al-Aqsa Intifada until now, and that it was a reaction, but what has resulted has been a catastrophe, heroism, grave and existential challenges, and few opportunities. The conclusive evidence of this is that the options available to the Palestinians now, and to Hamas in particular, are very limited. Negotiations revolve around returning things to the way they were, and preventing displacement, starvation, thirst, and the renewal of the war of extermination. Hamas is required to surrender or hand over everything gradually or all at once to an authority that does not believe in unity and partnership and does not take the initiative to do so, as it expects the gains to fall into its lap without real effort or a comprehensive vision. It can either disarm and save its head by leaving the Gaza Strip, or it can remain, but in a new guise and without resistance, and under a long-term truce agreement, after it releases prisoners and provides security in the Gaza Strip, as it is the de facto authority that has no alternative, at least for a long time. Or it can renew the war of extermination with a greater American partnership than before.

In this regard, it makes no sense to ask what the occupying state will achieve by resuming the war, as it has unfulfilled objectives awaiting an opportunity to realize them. These objectives include completing the genocide and displacement, eliminating the resistance, releasing prisoners, destroying Hamas's governmental capabilities, reoccupying the Gaza Strip, settling it, and annexing parts of it. If it receives an American green light, it will not hesitate long to launch a war.

Yes, there are factors hindering the renewal of the war. Among them is that the US administration does not favor it, as it has other priorities in the region that require stability to maximize investment and profits. The occupation army is also depleted, to the point that 50% of reservists are not responding to the call to join the army, after having responded at the beginning of the war to over 90%. Furthermore, the majority of Israeli public opinion favors the release of prisoners and an end to the war now, with each development to be discussed later.

A very important factor is that the Palestinian people are steadfast despite the heavy losses, and the resistance is prepared to continue the struggle and inflict further losses on the occupying forces. This factor has multiple regional and international implications, including the renewal of the Yemeni support front, and the possibility of the situation collapsing in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and even a confrontation with Israel from Egypt and Jordan.

All of the above makes the scenario of reaching a ceasefire the most likely, but the possibility of renewed war should not be completely ruled out, especially since it has begun to loom large in the form of the stifling blockade and the shelling and gunfire that are leading to a number of Palestinian martyrs daily due to "Israeli violations."

There was and still is one option that reduces risks, challenges and losses and increases opportunities, which is Palestinian unity in the face of common existential threats. It would have been more effective (and still is necessary) to form a national consensus government based on a realistic national program, with a national frame of reference represented by a single and unified PLO, in addition to forming a single Palestinian delegation to negotiate not only the war and its repercussions, but also by linking this to the political horizon, ending the occupation and embodying independence. In this case, the issue of resistance, forms of struggle, the truce and the political horizon would be part of a comprehensive national vision subject to a single strategy and leadership.

Barter between the West Bank and Gaza

It is extremely dangerous for the division to persist, deepen, and become widespread, as we observed in the angry, irrational, and even stupid reaction of the official leadership to the opening of a US-Hamas negotiation channel. Instead of using the Hamas-US negotiation to overturn the US-Israeli veto on national unity, we found the fear of bypassing the leadership if it led to US recognition of Hamas, which would destroy the unity of representation. Even if matters did not immediately reach this point, reaching an agreement on Gaza, separated from the rest of the issues and from what is happening in the West Bank, would be a kind of barter between the West Bank and Gaza, without real freedom and independence in Gaza. In other words, we would be facing the loss of the Palestinian cause, and this is something Hamas would find difficult to agree to, as if it did, it would prefer its survival over the cause for which it is fighting.

Will the curtain fall on the Palestinian national movement?

Is there a glimmer of hope before the axe falls on the head, or has the contemporary Palestinian national movement, with its various components, reached its final chapter? This is evidenced more than anything else by the looming specter of guardianship and alternatives, as is evident in the exclusion of the Palestinian state from the negotiating table, the exclusion of Palestinian participation several times from meetings and summits discussing the Palestinian issue, and from discussing new formations that would deepen the separation between the West Bank and Gaza and block the path to establishing a Palestinian state. This will happen unless something positive happens suddenly in the last moments, but despite its gravity, it will pave the way for launching a new national movement capable of completing or achieving what the previous movement failed to achieve. There is the Palestinian people, the people of giants, determined to regain their rights and rise from the ashes, as they have always done for more than 100 years until now, and as long as this is the case, the banner of their struggle will remain raised.