Between two agreements... the temptation and seduction of comparison

Fifty days separated the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon (November 27, 2024) and the signing of a similar agreement on the Gaza front (January 17, 2025), which were enough to fall into the temptation of comparing and enticing the two agreements, and to pass judgments, and sometimes, to shoot down the first agreement, based on the merits of the second.

Some of what was said and written was objective and serious, and brought to mind the diversity and similarity of contexts, but some of it went in the direction of settling scores, and plotting against opponents and competitors, and in a few cases, it revealed an effort to “present credentials” for the next stage, and fill “leadership vacancies,” existing and potential.

The temptation to compare is completely legitimate, and even falls within the context of “human nature” and cognitive curiosity driven by a sustained instinctive tendency to make comparisons, projections, and analogies. However, if comparisons go beyond their contexts and cognitive aims, they fall into the forbidden and into the trap of “temptation”: “Your companion has neither strayed nor has he gone astray.” I think that the silence of the cannons, even though the possibility of them breaking the walls of sound and silence is still present, tempts us to open some pages of review and re-evaluate the position and assessment.

I begin by acknowledging, with the “reviewers,” that the Gaza agreement came with the scent of victory, more than the Lebanon agreement did. I do not want to reach what others have gone to, such as saying, for example, that the Lebanon agreement came with the taste of defeat. I will suffice here by repeating what the godfather of the agreement, who no one can accuse of sympathizing with Hezbollah and the Lebanese resistance, Amos Hochstein, said in his description of the November 27 agreement: Hezbollah has not been defeated, but it no longer poses a “strategic threat” to “Israel,” nor is it capable of providing “strategic support” to the Assad regime.

This was just before the fall of the regime on December 8. This is perhaps a more accurate assessment of the outcome of the support front and the battle to defend Lebanon: Hezbollah did not win, but it was not defeated.

Comparing the two agreements requires noting a number of fundamental differences in the environments, context, and circumstances surrounding the signing of each of them. We will suffice here to talk about some of them:

First: Unlike Hezbollah, Hamas launched the flood on October 7, on its own offensive initiative, even if it described it as a defensive-preemptive battle. It was the one who decided to fire the first bullet, it was the one who chose its timing, and it was the one who benefited from the element of “strategic surprise” and employed it to the fullest extent, before things got out of hand and developments in the field and politics went beyond control and beyond the limits of expectation and imagination.

Hezbollah opened the support front willingly, not under duress, but it was not consulted about the timing, and perhaps it was not fully prepared. Before and after, it lacked the element of surprise, and it did not have the opportunity to prepare its incubators and bases for the repercussions and shocks that awaited it.

Here we open parentheses and ask, as a call for review and evaluation, whether the decision of “gradual support”, governed by previous and established rules of engagement, was a sound decision, or whether it was necessary to open the front wide open, to avoid the scenario of “the white bull that was eaten on the day the black bull was eaten”, or - and this is something that is being strongly raised these days, especially in Lebanon - to be satisfied with support, politically, morally and logistically, as much as possible, and not to go to open fire?

In the context of the review, it is necessary to take into account the consequences and repercussions of each of these three options, and how they would have been reflected on the party’s position, image and status, and its leadership role in Lebanon and the region, and what effects would have been received by its incubating environment in particular, and Lebanon and Lebanese society in general. This article is not intended to address this topic, but pointing it out seems unavoidable.

Second: Hezbollah opened the support front in an unfavorable Lebanese and regional political and social environment. The decision to open fire was not “popular,” at least among other Lebanese components, and perhaps among some popular circles of the Shiite component. What made matters worse was that prolonging the war played against the interests of the resistance, not only in Lebanon, but also in Palestine and in various support axes as well. Moreover, the Israeli barbarism, supported and covered by the United States and Europe, doubled the bills of the war and its humanitarian cost, so the party and its leadership were suffering under a torrent of pressures.

Here too, we open parentheses to point out, in the context of review and re-evaluation, the question: The impact of Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian crisis on the party’s status, popularity, cohesion, and the strength of its security defenses in the face of breaches and targeting, especially after all the information that was revealed following the fall of the regime in Damascus, specifically in terms of the extent of the intelligence breaches, Western, Arab, Turkish, Russian (and others), at the top of the security-military-political pyramid in Syria.

Hamas did not face such a situation. It fought among its people, with the support of its social environment, and with overwhelming support from the Palestinian people in all places where they live. Even its local opponents were swept away by the flood into the narrowest corners.

Hamas fought an unjust occupation and siege that weighed heavily on its people. As for Lebanon, the battle was a battle to support a brother, and not a war to liberate an occupied homeland or parts of it. This explains, at least in part, the party’s behavior on the ground, and its tendency to avoid escalation and adhere to the rules of engagement that “Israel” has violated time and time again.

Third: Hamas lost a group of its influential political and field leaders; it lost them over separate stages, unlike the party, which lost most of its first and second-tier leaders, both political and military, in a short period of time, which left a huge leadership vacuum.

Hamas's leadership is distributed between inside and outside, while the party's leadership is centered in Beirut and its suburbs. "Israel" has been preparing for war on the party since the end of the last round in 2006, as it is the greatest strategic threat, in contrast to a view of Hamas and Gaza that is blinded by arrogance and haughtiness, and misled by the greatest strategic deception, which Hamas managed with all efficiency and competence. The leadership gaps in Hamas were quickly bridged and filled, despite the enormity of the loss. The leadership gaps in the party still exist, and the matter has not been resolved by filling the gaps in the chain of command, control and command, as it is unlikely that anyone will fill the void left by the absence of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.

Fourth: Hamas had the opportunity to seize a card that would have the greatest impact in determining the course of the battles, the direction of the war, and its outcomes. It would also have a strong presence at the negotiating and mediation tables for a ceasefire, and I mean the card of prisoners and detainees, which the party did not have in this war.

Despite some attempts to downplay the importance of this paper, the Hamas leadership was the most aware of its importance. And here we see the impact of this factor, not with regard to the terms of the agreement and the details of its stages, but with regard to the structure of Israeli society and its cohesion, and the “social contract” that has regulated the relationship of the settlers with their “state” since its establishment, and even before its establishment. Comparing the two agreements, while ignoring the impact of this pressing paper, is an unfair comparison, and not objective.

Fifth: Hamas managed the negotiations on its own behalf and on behalf of all the Palestinian resistance factions. This situation was not available to the party, which negotiated on behalf of others, including its allies and rivals, as well as the official Lebanese establishment. The party’s priorities were not necessarily identical to those of the mediators and negotiators. It is true that the party accepted, under the circumstances we know, the agreement, and its ministers in the government ratified it, and it cannot evade responsibility for it. However, it is also true that the outcome will inevitably be determined if the negotiator is the resistance fighter himself, or if someone else volunteers or is asked to play the role on his behalf, even if he is one of the closest associates.

Sixth: The enormity of the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, the historical status of the Palestinian “injustice,” and the strength of the Palestinian “narrative” generated a regional and international momentum pushing toward an agreement.

As for the Lebanese support front, sympathy, both internationally and Arab, was directed towards Lebanon, the “victim of its resistance,” as they say, and not towards Hezbollah. It is true that part of the global solidarity movement with the Palestinians was not directed towards Hamas and Jihad, but it is also true that the chapters of heroism written by the resistance were always in its interest, as a liberation movement and fighters for freedom, at least at the level of peoples and some governments. This situation was not available for Lebanon, nor for Hezbollah, where sympathy was conditional on the party’s compliance with the requirements of the state. As for Palestine, sympathy was focused on the demand to enable the Palestinians to have their own state, and none other than “Israel” stands as a major obstacle in the way of its embodiment.

Comparing the two agreements is permissible, and even necessary, to understand the differences and similarities in the contexts. However, it becomes fishing in troubled waters, settling scores and settling disputes, if it ignores the differences in the circumstances surrounding each of them. It becomes “dipping out of the box” or a case of “necessitating what is not necessary.”