The controversy of victory and defeat

Our people have the right to celebrate the cessation of suffering and the cessation of the war of extermination, and what was stated in the Doha ceasefire agreement - despite its many shortcomings - of an Israeli commitment to withdrawal, relief, reconstruction, the return of the displaced, and the release of prisoners, including most of those sentenced to life imprisonment and those with long sentences. Israel must be pursued to hold it accountable and hold it responsible for crimes that do not expire with the passage of time, especially the war of extermination and comprehensive destruction.

The ceasefire agreement reached in the formula that was in May was a surprise. The Netanyahu government had rejected this formula and insisted on continuing the war to achieve the declared and undeclared goals. It agreed to it without achieving its goals, even though what it did exceeded all expectations. This is due to the following reasons:

The first reason: US President-elect Donald Trump insists on completing the deal upon taking office, and it is said that his envoy threatened Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he would lose his position if he did not pass it.

The second reason: A shift occurred in Israel, as there is now an Israeli majority demanding an end to the war, after the great political, military, human, economic and moral losses, and after it became impossible to release the Israeli prisoners due to military pressure.

The third reason: The resistance’s steadfastness and bravery, its continued infliction of tangible losses on the occupation forces, and its ability to foil the generals’ plan.

The fourth reason: It is related to the gifts that Trump promised to give to Israel, which are related to the following: First, normalization with Saudi Arabia and other Arab and Islamic countries and their integration into the region. Second, addressing the situation in Iran, especially the nuclear file, whether through maximum pressure, siege and negotiation, or by directing a strong military strike against Iran if the carrot and stick policy does not succeed. Third, giving a green light to Israeli policies and measures in the West Bank. Fourth, removing some restrictions on the supply of American weapons and ammunition to Israel.

The question that arises is: Will the agreement be implemented in its three stages? The answer is not easy, and it could be yes as long as the reasons that led to it still exist. If we go deeper, the first stage will almost certainly be implemented. As for the second and third stages, they will be implemented, but with a risk of non-implementation that could grow or shrink according to events and the behavior of the players; that is, with postponement, tension, small and large violations, and things may even reach the point of resuming the war, albeit in new forms.

Whether the agreement is implemented or not, it is a battle and a new round in a long conflict that began more than a hundred years ago, and will continue no matter how long it takes until rights are returned to their owners.

Accordingly, the Netanyahu government or any future Israeli government, if the current government falls or its coalition changes, will continue to work to achieve the goals that were not achieved, whether by resuming the war later, after the first stage or later, or by using the human suffering and the need for reconstruction and continuing the aggression, under the pretext that Hamas still controls the Gaza Strip.

This title (Hamas control over the Gaza Strip) will be used by the Israeli government to continue assassinations, arrests, demolition and destruction, especially since the agreement does not include any clause that talks about the next day, and who will rule the Gaza Strip. We will be facing the possibility of deepening the Palestinian division, and perhaps turning it into Palestinian fighting despite the Israeli rejection of the return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip for fear that it will embody the national identity and unity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which keeps the establishment of the Palestinian state open. The matter becomes more complicated in light of the failure of the Palestinian leadership and forces to reach an agreement on a unified formula, whether by returning the current government to the Gaza Strip, or after amending it, or forming a national consensus government, according to what was stipulated in the Beijing Declaration (and this is the best formula), or forming a community support committee according to the American, Egyptian and Emirati proposals.

There is a heated debate among the Palestinian, Israeli, and Arab ranks, and across the world, about assessing what happened, and whether it constitutes a victory or a defeat, or somewhere in between, because the war has not been completed and has not been decided with a knockout blow in favor of this or that party, and the assessment of the war will not be decided until the war ends and the three stages are implemented, and then we will see whether it stopped without achieving its Israeli goals, without diminishing the importance of what it achieved or somewhere in between, although what Israel did not complete achieving during 470 days is difficult for it to achieve now or in the near future at least, after the resistance was able to benefit from the repercussions of the agreement on the Israeli, Palestinian, Arab, and international levels.

There are those who consider what happened a crushing defeat for the resistance, as evidenced by the fact that Netanyahu’s government was able to make a comprehensive change in the Middle East region, especially in light of what happened in Syria, and it has become closer to imposing its hegemony over the region, and by virtue of the genocide and turning most of the Gaza Strip into an area uninhabitable for humans, and not achieving most of the goals set by the commander-in-chief of the Qassam Brigades on the day the Al-Aqsa Flood began.

There are those who saw what happened as a clear victory for the resistance, as evidenced by the failure of the occupying state to achieve the goals it declared, and the losses it incurred on various levels, including the weakening of Israel’s strategic position and its functional role and its moral downfall, and in light of the well-known rule in history that the weak wins when it stands firm, and the strong party is not enabled to achieve its goals, and vice versa.

There is a third opinion, which sees the legendary steadfastness, valiant resistance and unparalleled courage embodied by our people and their resistance, and the occupation’s failure to achieve its declared and undeclared goals, as an important step on the road to victory, and can be considered a form of victory. It also sees the qualitative change that could happen in the Middle East, especially with regard to Israel’s integration into the region, as well as the humanitarian catastrophe and the heavy losses suffered by our people in the Gaza Strip, which the resistance incurred, and which made it demand a ceasefire, without achieving most of the resistance’s goals. The best that could happen is for the resistance to remain and for things to return to what they were before October 7, with its strategic significance not being a victory, but rather the victory of the weak over the strong; meaning that it is not able to achieve its goals, which is the fruit of legendary steadfastness and valiant resistance.

The mere survival of the resistance, and even its continued control of the Strip, despite its importance, is not considered a victory and is not the goal. Rather, the goal was and will remain the liberation of the land, because it is a return to what existed, especially since in light of the current circumstances, its survival and rule will be used as a pretext to continue the aggression and prevent relief and the return of life to the Strip through reconstruction, lifting the siege, and stopping the aggression. This will serve to perpetuate the division and prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. If this happens, the Gaza Strip will become a repellent area, not an attractive one for its residents.

If what happened was not a victory, was it a defeat? Of course not, but rather an Israeli failure with the taste of defeat. Whoever does not believe will see the anger, sadness, crying and disparity in Israel between those who consider what happened a victory and those who consider it a defeat, because the decisive criterion for victory is achieving the set goals, and they have come a long way on the road to achieving them, but they did not complete achieving them due to the reasons mentioned at the beginning of the article.

What happened is not a defeat for the resistance, because the resistance was determined and preserved itself under compelling circumstances, and did not acknowledge or act as if it was defeated, and this is the decisive factor, as defeat becomes so if it is acknowledged and if it leads to surrender.

It is not consistent to talk about a Palestinian victory in light of the horrific suffering, heavy losses and genocide, but the occupying state and with it the entire global colonialism did not break the will of the people and the resistance, and did not lead to the recognition of defeat and the raising of the white flag. Rather, according to the enemy and the US Secretary of State, the resistance fought until the last moment, and is able to continue fighting, and reorganized its ranks, and was able to recruit thousands of new resistance fighters.

If the resistance was not defeated and did not win in the literal sense of victory, that is, liberating the occupied land and raising the Palestinian flag on the minarets and churches of Jerusalem, then this is in the immediate term, but in the medium and long term, the Al-Aqsa flood and its repercussions will be one of the reasons for the future victory of the resistance. The legendary steadfastness, valiant resistance and unparalleled courage that took place from October 7 until the ceasefire agreement came into effect on January 19, 2025, will be just as the Paris Commune was a prelude to the victory of French wealth.

What to do?

In order not to waste the valiant heroism and the precious and great sacrifices, there must be a Palestinian initiative that is up to the challenges and risks and is able to exploit the available opportunity. This is possible, either through - and this is better, faster and less costly - the leadership taking the initiative or responding to numerous initiatives by calling for a comprehensive national dialogue that results in:

First: An irreversible decision to implement what was stated in the Beijing Declaration, whether by forming a national unity government with a national reference, activating the temporary leadership framework of the PLO, and preparing for comprehensive elections at all levels, where we achieve the unity of the institution, leadership, and decision-making in peace and resistance, and thus we remove the pretexts from the hands of the occupation and its partners to continue the aggression even through new forms, such as assassinations and concentrated and continuous bombing operations that prevent stability, relief, and reconstruction and push financiers and investors to flee.

Second: Continuing the dialogue to formulate a comprehensive vision and strategies capable of achieving direct national goals, foremost of which is the right to self-determination and ending the occupation as a condition for achieving the independence of the State of Palestine on the 1967 borders, considering this a step on the path to achieving the full national goals.

In the event that the leadership does not respond to the call for unity, as is the case so far, the forces and figures who agree on common denominators should take the initiative to form a national meeting or a national front aimed at pressuring the leadership to respond to the national interest and the decisions of the national consensus to achieve unity and a true partnership, as a national priority and necessity, unity that preserves and develops pluralism, provided that this front presents models of unity in words and through joint actions that prevent the emergence of a vacuum that enables the occupying state to achieve its goals, or facilitates the era of guardianship, containment, and Arab and international alternatives.

If we look at the experiences of the Palestinian national movement since the birth of the Palestinian cause until now, we will find that the Palestinian struggles, sacrifices and heroism, despite their enormity, did not achieve achievements commensurate with them. Rather, the gains were much less. Moreover, the Palestinian resistance was able, on several occasions and at historical stages, to achieve achievements in the struggle and military battles (for example, but not limited to: the 1936-1939 revolution and the first intifada). However, the political leadership lost these achievements either because of its division, or as a result of rushing to reap the political fruits for fear of losing the opportunity, or refraining from investing with flimsy pretexts such as achieving the goals all at once, or as a result of submission to Arab, regional and international parties and interventions, or because of giving priority to individual and factional interests over national interests.

We must remember that we concluded the Oslo Accords after the first Intifada, and despite some of its achievements and positives, it was ultimately a disaster in every sense of the word. We must not forget that after the glorious second Intifada, the Palestinian political ceiling fell below Oslo, to the level of unilateral commitment to the Oslo commitments, in addition to the occurrence of political, geographical and institutional division.

Despite the challenges and existential risks that it entailed, the Battle of the Flood of Al-Aqsa and its repercussions brought the Palestinian cause back to the forefront, to the point that various parties became convinced of the futility and possibility of bypassing the issue and skipping over it, which provides an opportunity to reach a solution that could be national or liquidationist, accumulating on what happened or aborting it.

Therefore, the path must be changed and a new national democratic path must be adopted that gives priority to unity of struggle so that the political ceiling is not repeatedly lowered and a bad formula such as the Trump deal is not accepted, which could be proposed in the comprehensive deal that he is expected to propose, where normalization and the integration of Israel into the region are in exchange for a “serious and reliable” path that leads to a state without the components of states and 30% of it is deducted as stated in the deal of the century.

Without unity based on a national, democratic, and combative foundation and true partnership, we will be faced with the loss of what was achieved after the legendary steadfastness and valiant heroism, the deepening and generalization of division, and the loss of Palestinian rights and the unity of Palestinian representation. In order to defeat this, we must adhere to a realistic national program far from indolence and recklessness; a program that preserves rights and is capable of achieving goals and soaring regionally and internationally. Will we learn a lesson before it is too late?