Hamas achievement

Far from political bias towards Hamas, or taking a pre-emptive stance against it, against the backdrop of what the October 7 initiative caused, the unprecedented courageous operation, with its results and cruelty, on the Palestinian people who paid a heavy price because of the operation, Hamas nevertheless achieved a state of presence for itself, represented by several titles:

First: The October 7 operation was an unexpected surprise and a moral military shock to the colony, its army and its apparatuses, and it is credited with planning, cunning and secrecy.

Second: Despite the assassinations and the loss of many of its leaders, it has stood firm in the face of the occupation forces for the entire fifteen months since October 2023.

Third: It imposed itself as a deciding party, as indirect negotiations were conducted by the colony and the United States with the movement, and the agreement was signed with it, and not with any other Palestinian party. The one who fought and stood firm on the ground and in the field is the one who sat at the table as a negotiating counterpart.

Therefore, what Hamas has achieved for itself will open the gates to all possibilities:

First: Forming an administration in the Gaza Strip independent of the Fatah and Hamas movements, which is an unlikely and weak option.

Second: That the authority in Ramallah return to the Gaza Strip, as it was before Hamas’s decision to take sole control through a “military decision” in 2007. This option requires agreement and understanding between the two parties of the authority, Fatah and Hamas, and both of them have failed to reach the implementation of all the unification initiatives: Algeria, Moscow, Beijing.

Third: Hamas’s authority and continuity in the Gaza Strip are acknowledged and recognized, and its preliminaries are clear, through the ongoing negotiations that took place with it, leading to the “calm deal,” and it may be an introduction and a basis for what comes after it.

The Gaza battle is a qualitative shift in the political and field paths, and it will enhance the hidden Israeli planning and programming that targets the two-state solution: 1- The colonial state on the entire map of Palestine, including the Palestinian West Bank and Jerusalem, 2- The State of Palestine in the Gaza Strip.

The Israelis failed to achieve their goals in the Gaza Strip, although they were able to kill tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians and destroy about two-thirds of the Strip’s buildings, institutions, facilities and homes. However, they failed to know the locations of the Israeli prisoners, and failed to release them without an exchange, just as they failed to end the Palestinian resistance, and were forced to reach a ceasefire agreement with it based on: 1- prisoner exchange, 2- the return of sustainable calm to achieve a permanent ceasefire, 3- a partial or complete qualitative withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

The Gaza battle is a qualitative shift, yes, but if it does not achieve national unity and coalition between the various factions within the framework of the PLO and its institutions, including the Authority, and the unity of the West Bank with the Gaza Strip geographically and politically, Hamas will have continued the option of the ongoing sin of exclusivity and unilateral monopolization, and thus it will swallow the Israeli bait and programming based on continuing the Palestinian division and feeding it.