On the issue of governance in Gaza

With the approach of reaching a long-awaited ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, which will lift part of the enormous suffering that the Palestinians there are going through, the issue of what has become known as the “day after,” related to the upcoming arrangements for governance in the Strip, has resurfaced. This agreement organizes a temporary ceasefire, accompanied by a rolling process for exchanging hostages and detainees, which will take place in three stages, and which it is hoped will ultimately lead to a permanent ceasefire and an end to the war. Although the goal of ending the war will require reaching understandings on many field details during the period of the temporary agreement, ending the war is also organically linked to reaching a prior agreement on the arrangements for governance in the Strip in the next stage.

Many parties, international, regional, Palestinian and Israeli, each with different starting points, visions and interests, have been busy, shortly after the outbreak of the war, with paying attention to this issue and interacting with each other on it. This interest and interaction has generated an incomplete set of framework points. 

The first two points enjoy broad agreement among the parties: First, ending the war requires reaching a security situation in the Strip that prevents the possibility of a recurrence of what happened in "Operation Al Aqsa Flood". 

Second, preventing a recurrence of "Operation Al Aqsa Flood" requires the exclusion of Hamas from governing the Strip. As for forming an alternative government, it is a matter on which no general agreement has yet been reached. While Hamas acknowledges that the facts indicate that it is unable to regain its sole and direct authority in governing Gaza, and seeks to reach understandings that do not completely exclude it from it, the goal of the Palestinian Authority revolves around restoring its lost rule in Gaza, without diminishing it or sharing it with Hamas. However, Israel, which currently occupies the Strip with its military forces, categorically objects, through its current right-wing government, to the Palestinian Authority having any role in the arrangements for the future government in Gaza. Some parties in the government even go so far as to demand continued Israeli control over the Strip, and even the return of Jewish settlement there.

The United States and the Arab countries preoccupied with the file oppose the continuation of the Israeli military occupation of the Strip, and want Israel to withdraw from it, and do not object to it being gradual, ending with the complete evacuation of the Israeli military presence there. In return, these parties support, in principle, the Palestinian Authority’s demand to return to the Strip, but in practice they do not support a direct return to the Authority’s rule, as they have reservations about it and demands that it must fulfill before handing over full authority to it. They demand that the Palestinian Authority carry out structural reforms in its structure, and a real distribution of powers within it. This was represented by these parties’ demand that the presidency of the Authority be separated from its government, and that a government be appointed with the power to rule effectively, bearing clear exclusive responsibilities. However, in light of the Palestinian Authority’s failure to respond to this demand, on the pretext that it constitutes blatant interference in its internal affairs, external parties have moved towards finding an alternative that takes into account Israeli and Palestinian considerations, with both sides of its division. The result was a proposal for a governing system whose core would consist of a committee to manage the affairs of the Strip and supervise its reconstruction process, enjoying the powers of self-government, but within the framework of its general subordination to the Palestinian Authority, on the one hand, and Hamas’s approval of it without participating in it, on the other hand. To enable this committee to carry out its tasks, and to ensure that its formation and the handover of its tasks by Israel would not be obstructed, the committee would be supported by international and Arab supervision, and would be backed by the financial resources necessary to begin the reconstruction process, and by the possibility of the presence of forces from Arab countries whose mission would be to maintain order. 

Over time, and after the Palestinian Authority fulfilled external demands, gradual expansions would be made in its control over the Strip, ending with its complete restoration, so that this would be within the Arab vision calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state and an end to the conflict. With the difficulty of forming a national consensus government, Hamas agreed to form a committee to manage the Gaza Strip, imposed on it by the repercussions of the ongoing war in the Strip and the developments that affected the region as a result, and because it would not lose much by agreeing, as it is still the actual Palestinian force on the ground, and in reality enjoys the continued possession of the "disabling ability" to manage its affairs. As for the Palestinian Authority, after hesitation, it announced its refusal to this arrangement on the basis that it not only diminishes its powers, but also because it is consistent with the permanent Israeli effort to consolidate the separation of the Strip from the West Bank, and to prevent the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state. In return, the Authority continued to demand that its rule extend to include the Strip, but without agreeing to external demands to form a new government with authority, reinforced by internal national consensus.

Now, with the approach of reaching a temporary ceasefire agreement in the Strip, and the intensification of external interventions to reach arrangements for governing the Gaza Strip that contribute to the effort to end the war, the Palestinian Authority will face a wave of pressures exerted on it from all sides. It will have two options to choose between: either to go towards forming a government that enjoys external and internal acceptance, which will strengthen its demand to quickly extend its gradual control over the Strip, or to agree to form the proposed administrative committee, despite legitimate fears that its formation will result in legitimizing the separation of the Strip from the West Bank. The underlying problem in this matter is that the Palestinian Authority has no third option if it continues to reject the two proposed options, except to be bypassed by the other parties forming the administrative committee without its approval, and to begin taking successive measures regarding the Gaza Strip independently of it. The prevailing belief among the Authority’s circles that it cannot be ignored or bypassed, and that entrenching itself in its rejection will force the other parties to change their positions, is an exaggerated belief to say the least. What can the Authority do that would have an effective outcome if the other parties decided to bypass it, and proceeded with appointing the committee and began taking actual measures in the Strip?

This brings us back to the need to choose between the two options. The first option, i.e. forming a national consensus government with authority, although it is not the magic formula that will solve all the problems facing the extremely complex Palestinian situation, remains the best national option to confront them and cross this dangerous phase that is ravaging the Palestinian future. This option ends the long-standing political division, imposes on others the necessity of respecting Palestinian political unity, and qualifies its extension to Gaza, which prevents facilitating the achievement of the Israeli goal of separating the Strip from the West Bank.

As for the second option, which is forming a committee to administer the Strip, with the authority’s demarcation, it is the worst option of the two options, as it opens the possibility of consolidating the fragmentation of the Palestinian geography, which is already fragmented. However, if the formation of a national consensus government remains rejected, the Authority will have no choice but to agree to the formation of the administrative committee. In this case, it is worth noting that the matter of fortifying it by issuing a presidential decree to form it is a good thing, but it is not enough on its own. Rather, as an additional precaution, its membership must consist of Palestinians from all places of Palestinian presence, from Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the diaspora. With an expanded formation with its regional choices, it is possible to overcome, at least, the fact that the administrative committee is not regional, and is formed only of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to manage the Strip, which facilitates the possibility of getting the impression about it and claiming that it is independent in its region, and considering it a means of division, and exploiting it in the future to establish this division. With such representative membership for all Palestinians, the committee becomes a unifying framework, not a fragmenting one, for Palestinian geography.