The deal is on the doorstep unless Netanyahu sabotages it

Will the deal be concluded this time? Yes, there is a great possibility. Is it certain to be completed? No, so I warn against being overly optimistic and preparing for all possibilities, because Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could sabotage it. He has not completed achieving his goals, and he fears that the partial deal or the first stage will lead to a comprehensive deal, a cessation of war, and an Israeli withdrawal. This opens the door for the return of Hamas or its continued rule of Gaza, especially since the alternative to Hamas has not yet matured. The occupation army does not want to occupy Gaza and remain in it because the occupation is costly in terms of human and economic resources, and remaining in it requires the formation of a military government that undertakes the distribution of aid and the provision of water and electricity. His failure to do so has led to Hamas remaining in existence, despite the very severe blows it has received.

The formation of a local administration within a regional, international and American umbrella according to the Emirati, Egyptian or American proposal has not yet matured. President Mahmoud Abbas has not agreed to all the proposed formulas, waiting for the US President-elect Donald Trump to take office, to see what he has in store. This may be due to an understanding between him and Trump’s teams, or a token of love to facilitate the implementation of a new direction on his part that calls for weaving a Palestinian-American partnership in Trump’s second term, different from the boycott and hostility that characterized his first term, although it is possible to choose a policy of resistance that avoids boycott and avoids participation and integration in order to ensure obtaining the minimum level of Palestinian rights and interests.

The essential point on which the deal depends is the agreement to stop the war. Hamas insists on the necessity of agreeing on this at some point, and now it hopes that this will happen in the second stage after it was not possible to agree on it in the first stage, while the Netanyahu government insists on stopping the fighting or freezing the war and refuses to stop the war because it wants to keep the door open to resuming the war after the completion of the first stage, as well as after the release of all Israeli prisoners. If there is an intention to conclude a partial deal, the agreement could include general and loose formulations regarding stopping the war that each party interprets as it wishes.

Of course, if an agreement is reached to stop the war, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli forces will be a foregone conclusion, although the Israeli government will insist at a minimum on maintaining a safe zone (a buffer zone and areas that remain under its control, especially in the north), in addition to its “right” to enter any area in the event of a threat or if it finds it necessary.

One of the things that drives the Israeli government to insist on continuing the war is that stopping the war without a decisive victory with a knockout blow will lead to the fall of the government and open the gates of hell upon it, as official investigation committees will be formed into the historic failure on October 7, and old cases will be followed up and an investigation will be opened into the new scandals committed by Netanyahu and the ongoing failures since that date until now. It is true that the Israeli government has achieved many important accomplishments, but it has not achieved a decisive strategic political victory, and this is due to the legendary steadfastness, valiant resistance and the commission of several Israeli political and military mistakes.

For example, if the Netanyahu government had agreed to open a political horizon and return the authority to the Strip, there would have been a ready alternative to Hamas rule. If, as Haim Ramon wrote, it had launched a ground war from the north and south at the same time, the results would have been much better. If it had taken the advice of the American generals (especially Charles Brown, the senior general) who advised their Israeli counterparts to remain in the areas they occupied to cleanse them completely, because the tactic of repeated occupation and withdrawal enabled Hamas fighters and the rest of the factions to return and reorganize their ranks. In addition, the failure to form a military government to undertake the distribution of aid, water, electricity, and other matters enabled the Hamas authority to continue this work, control a certain amount of aid, and benefit from it to maintain its influence over the population.

If there is an intention to stop the war, Israel and the United States can use the Strip’s need for humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and the presence of Arab and international forces, including American forces, to impose that Hamas not remain in power and to arrange a transitional administration that Israel agrees to, as it wants an administration without Hamas or Abbas to ensure the continuation of the separation between the West Bank and the Strip and the continuation of the division; that is, it does not want Hamas’s authority to remain or the Authority to return, so the Administrative Committee, Local Administration, or Transitional Government Commission was invented until the Authority is renewed and reformed.

If the Trump administration adopts the approach of returning the Authority to the Strip, along with opening a political horizon that includes establishing a Palestinian state, to convince Riyadh to normalize relations with Israel, and this is a possible scenario because it is difficult for Riyadh to normalize relations in exchange for stopping the war only, especially if this is accompanied by the annexation of the West Bank or large parts of it, then if this happens, it will clash with the rejection of the current Israeli government, which raises the need to work to bring it down and go to early elections, or reconstitute it, whereby ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich exit, and Yair Lapid or Benny Gantz or both enter.

Here, we must ask about the content of the agreement that Netanyahu concluded with Ben-Gvir and Smotrich in exchange for their not withdrawing from the government, and merely opposing it, if the deal is concluded. Does it include his approval of the annexation of the West Bank or only parts of it, where the retreat in Gaza is in exchange for progress in the West Bank? Was this agreement made under the auspices and approval of Trump or in the hope of obtaining this approval?

In this context, the Netanyahu government may be forced to accept the continued rule of Hamas, which will be weak, exposed, and subject to continuous attacks and boycotts by Arabs and the international community. This is not the best scenario for it, but it is better than others. It fears that it will be forced to return to the unified authority, even after a while, which will open the door to the unity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to launching a political process that could include the establishment of a Palestinian state according to Trump’s specifications, and perhaps more or less than what was stated in the Trump deal. This, despite its badness for the Palestinians, is rejected by the Israeli extreme right, which considers the establishment of a Palestinian state an existential threat.

Trump’s readiness to re-propose his deal, which includes the establishment of a Palestinian state in name but without the components of a state, and with the deduction of 30% of the West Bank and its annexation to Israel, along with part of the Gaza Strip, may lead to acceptance or adaptation by the official Palestinian leadership, which believes that the time is different now from Trump’s first term in office, and that it is better to accept any deal that Trump proposes while trying to improve it. This is better than nothing and may encourage Saudi Arabia and a number of Arab and Islamic countries to normalize relations with Israel and integrate it into the region, to be a major step on the path to establishing the new Middle East that has been worked on for decades.

Hamas did well to agree early on after October 7 to the formation of a national unity government with a national reference without participating in it, in order to remove pretexts from the hands of the Americans, Israelis, Arab and European donor countries, and others. However, it should not deal with this issue in a formal manner and give priority to its return to power at the first available opportunity, because any quick direct return or role will give the current Israeli government, its partners, and any future government an excuse to continue the plan of the war of extermination, displacement, and annexation, and to seek to liquidate the Palestinian cause from all its aspects. This will also provide an excuse for donor countries not to fund relief, reconstruction, and reconstruction.

It is true that Israel will proceed with its plans under all circumstances and conditions if it is not deterred, but there is a difference between doing so at very high rates or at normal rates, as there is a difference between expanding settlements and displacement and annexation, and this is affected by the Palestinian position and the extent of its unity, strength, effectiveness and wisdom.

If there was an agreed upon Palestinian plan entitled the PLO, the common denominators program, a single authority, and true partnership, through a national consensus government made up of competent people, and the formation of a unified Palestinian delegation to negotiate on behalf of the PLO regarding everything, including the exchange deal, the road would be cut off to the various hostile scenarios that are being prepared for the next day, which undermine the PLO’s singular representation of the Palestinian people, infringe upon rights, and bring back the era of mandate, guardianship, and alternatives.

But as they say, if the devil's work opens up and instead of reaching an agreement and putting the Palestinian house in order after the genocide and making a comprehensive structural and political change, the old remains as it is and the division deepens, and it may turn into the beginning of fighting, as what is happening in Jenin indicates. If the strife is not nipped in the bud, the matter threatens to spread and cause great loss to the cause, the people, the land, and the national movement.

Trump’s vice president, J.D. Vance, has made clear what his boss means by opening the gates of hell on the region if the deal is not completed by his inauguration day: Hamas will pay a heavy price, the terms of the deal will be much tougher for it, the administration may give full authorization to the Israeli government to liquidate the remaining Hamas battalions and leadership, and will impose very severe sanctions on individuals who support terrorist groups in the region.

This shows that there is no room for betting on the new Trump and what he will offer, as he will in any case be bad for the Palestinians. The question is to what extent and how can he be thwarted, his damage reduced or improved?