Lessons of the "Flood" and its repercussions (2) The political confuses the cultural

The worst thing about writing about the "lessons" of an experience is to consider yourself a "teacher" and others as students. This state of "teacherism" usually afflicts theorists (ideologues) of all types and orientations, in which one of them assumes the character of a messenger whose only duty is to convey the message, and places himself in the position of a sender only in front of students who receive, thus eliminating the state of interaction between the two sides, which is the state most needed in the atmosphere of anxiety in which we live.

But the nature of the dialogue and interaction required of Palestinian intellectuals and elites in general is more complex than that required of any other people. While others have a clear, agreed-upon goal, and the dialogue takes place around the ways and means to achieve that goal, and here it is natural for it to be an ideological, partisan and political dialogue, in the “unique” Palestinian case, where there is a fundamental difference around it, the required dialogue will not be useful unless it is based on “unifying” the goal and agreeing on it. It is a dialogue around “truths” and “givens” that are no longer the case in the Palestinian case. The problem here is that the confusion of the goal that afflicted politicians has unfortunately been transferred to intellectuals, although in Palestine culture is supposed to become more cohesive, solid, clear and certain as political “bumps” and political ambiguity increase.

In this case, what is required of the Palestinian interlocutors, intellectuals and other elites, if they want a fruitful dialogue, is to transcend ideology, parties and policies. This is not the time for that because it is related to the methods of achieving a goal that we do not agree on in the first place and that is not specific. The real and serious dialogue between the Palestinians is that which is related to the goal, defining it and agreeing on it.

We must agree on what we want and then look for how to achieve it. It may seem strange to ask what we want after a hundred years of the issue, but this is the reality, because politicians (and they may be right) and intellectuals (and they certainly are not right) have linked what we want with what we can, and since what we can is a variable subject, what we want has also become variable, so we have entered a state of confusion that we should work to ensure does not last long because it hinders any “takeoff” towards what is to come.

This situation is what made the numerous attempts at Palestinian national unity that the Palestinians made - although our topic is not related to that - not achieve results, and in our opinion they will not achieve results no matter how sincere the intentions are, how high the tone of the discussion is, and how the personalities of the delegations, the places of the meetings and the sponsors of the talks change, as long as the Palestinian goal is vague and unclear. All the attempts that were made dealt with the type of bus that would take us without us agreeing on determining our destination, so the talk was about the techniques and mechanisms of governance, and this, despite its importance in normal circumstances, is not relevant in the current Palestinian situation.

The Palestinian Cultural Scene...More Confusion

The strange thing about the Palestinian cultural scene is that after all this clarity regarding Palestine, which has never been as clear and real as it is today, as well as Israel, the West, the Arab state, the world order, friends and enemies, the Palestinian intellectual has become increasingly confused and hesitant, in our estimation due to the enormity of the pain caused by the Israeli crimes, as well as due to the ambiguity of the goal and perhaps its absence.

I am not discussing here the correctness or lack thereof of the Palestinian intellectual’s positions, but rather his “loss” and loss of his compass, sometimes due to its absence and sometimes its multiplicity. This does not apply to everyone, of course, but to a segment that seems not to be simple. When you try to find a specific explanation for his positions, you get lost with him. You find him against the Islamists in Gaza for ideological reasons, but he is not against them in Syria. You find him against the secularists in Syria because of “tyranny,” but the tyranny of others does not concern him, if he does not admire it in some cases. His position is determined by the situation, and if I were not somewhat unfair, I would say that his position is exactly like the position of the West. The difference between them is limited to the fact that we are able to understand the position of the West, while we are not able to understand his position.

If you look at his position on the war in Gaza, you will find him a fierce critic of Sinwar because he initiated the attack and took Gaza into the unknown, and a great critic of Hezbollah whose response was “not up to the occasion,” as well as Iran because it chose to have a “theatrical” response and did not go directly to a comprehensive war. He is against one because he fought, against the other because he did not fight as much as was required, and against the third whether he fought or not. (Again, I am not discussing the position here, but rather its multiplicity and hesitation.)

When we look at the position of those who stand in solidarity with Palestine or are friends of Israel, we find him questioning any solidarity, as it is either not "real" or "formal" or "implicatory". But when discussing any position, no matter how clear it is for friends of Israel, we find him "academically" discussing "rationally" the positions of a certain administration because of its fear of a prospective president or a global competitor "pushing" it to take that position. Even further than that, when he discusses Israeli crimes, he "condemns" them, but in the end he justifies them, because "what do you expect from a country that was attacked in this way, and against which such and such was committed?"

This type of intellectual insists on distorting the model, symbols and “beliefs” without thinking for a moment about what might result from that, and exerts himself to thwart the “projects” or “cultural” initiatives of others without thinking of any initiatives or proposals to move forward.

When that intellectual is forced to talk about anything related to the future of the conflict in the region, he immediately transforms from a “thinker” (a nag) into a “neutral” political analyst who weighs things “objectively,” talking about possibilities and scenarios and whether so-and-so succeeds or so-and-so fails, without thinking even for a moment about the subjective factors that should be activated.

If any of these people - which happens rarely - takes the initiative to put forward proposals that address what the Palestinians should do to get out of the problem, we find that they are summed up after holding the Palestinians responsible for what happened to them due to their "bad" assessments and choices in two matters: "advising" to surrender, and to break ties with friends and join the enemies. What can be inferred from these proposals gives the impression that these people believe that we are in an "exhibition" to choose friends and enemies, and all we have to do is choose wisely.

Occupation and the choices of the intellectual

The intellectual has knowledge and a sense of responsibility. When he is under occupation, like the Palestinian intellectual, his options are limited and his ability to maneuver is narrow. He must go directly to embody the conscience of his people, their hopes and dreams, as well as their fears and pains. The “flood” and its repercussions have opened up broad horizons for a major intellectual struggle. Whether the intellectual likes it or not, he is an essential part of this struggle. He must be clear in his alignment with his people and their aspirations.

Certainly, the intellectual must believe in freedom of opinion, but at the same time he must know, especially during the heat of conflict, that what is important is not only what is said, but also how it is said, when it is said, and to whom it is said. He must be a lever for the efforts of his people, reassuring "history" and reassuring his people even if the moment is dark, for the intellectual does not stop at the moment because he is the one who realizes more than others that history is a path and a process, and that he should not be frustrating or even neutral in that.

Many Palestinian intellectuals fall victim to the ambiguity of the goal and the enormity of the sacrifices. Instead of Palestine being their compass on the strategic level and major options, they become immersed in the dark moment and the ways out of it, thus increasing the confusion of the scene. If the goal regarding Palestine cannot be unified now due to the "illegitimate" superiority of politics over culture, then standing up to Zionism culturally and working to dismantle it before a public opinion that has become more prepared for that is what all Palestinian intellectuals must unite on.