Dr. Bilal Al-Shobaki: A threat that has a political rather than a military nature to send a warning message to Israel and international mediators without any intention of escalation

Dr. Omar Rahhal: Hezbollah has a large strategic stockpile of heavy weapons that ensures its continuation as an effective force in any future confrontation

Imad Moussa: The party is trying to reassure its audience that it maintains its strength and sends a message to Israel that it possesses military capabilities that enable it to resume the war

Dr. Abdul Majeed Suwailem: The region is on the brink of an escalation much greater than what we have witnessed in light of the regional and international contradictions that hinder any attempts at calming down

Hani Abu Al-Sabaa: The current equation in the region, especially with the internal situation in Lebanon, is pushing Hezbollah to wait until the end of the sixty-day period

Dr. Raed Nairat: The way the Lebanon front ended suggests that it is a preparatory phase for the outbreak of a new confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel

The Lebanese arena is witnessing escalating tension against the backdrop of the continued violations by the Israeli occupation of the agreement that led to the end of the war in southern Lebanon on November 27th. These developments prompted Hezbollah to threaten to respond, in a move that carries multilateral messages, amid warnings of the Lebanese front igniting again.

In separate interviews with “I”, writers, political analysts and university professors explained that despite Hezbollah’s threat to respond, the party prefers calm for now, given the internal Lebanese circumstances and regional changes. However, the continuation of Israeli violations after the deadline for withdrawal has expired may push Hezbollah to take more severe steps, which threatens to reshuffle the cards in the region.

They point out that in light of these violations, Israel is exploiting the American guarantees that were given to it prior to the conclusion of the agreement, to justify its continued violations of Lebanese airspace and territory, amidst the absence of any indications of the occupation’s withdrawal from the areas it controlled during the last confrontation, which reflects Israeli intentions to establish new facts, including the establishment of a buffer zone by force in southern Lebanon.

Writers, analysts and university professors believe that this situation has raised questions about the effectiveness of the five-member committee tasked with following up on the agreement and its ability to force the occupying Israeli state to abide by its terms.

An attempt to push mediators to pressure Israel to abide by the agreement

Dr. Bilal Al-Shoubaki, a professor of political science at Hebron University, believes that the Lebanese Hezbollah’s threat to respond to the Israeli occupation’s violations represents an attempt to push the mediators, who contributed to the conclusion of the agreement that ended the war in Lebanon, to pressure Israel to abide by what was agreed upon.

Al-Shoubaki explains that Israel showed from the first moments of the agreement’s success that it was not committed to it, relying on American guarantees that would allow it to carry out “security operations” inside Lebanon if it deemed that the circumstances permitted it.

He points out that Israel exploited these guarantees, which was reflected in the continuation of violations inside Lebanese territory, and the absence of any indications of its withdrawal from the areas it occupied during the last confrontation.

Al-Shoubaki points out that the five-member committee tasked with following up on the implementation of the agreement in Lebanon appears, so far, to be ineffective in forcing Israel to abide by its terms.

Al-Shoubaki explains that Israel seeks to portray itself as a party imposing new facts on Hezbollah and the Lebanese people, without making any significant concessions. This situation may have prompted Hezbollah to review its strategies, as the party believes that continued Israeli violations undermine any reason for its commitment to the agreement.

He believes that Hezbollah's current position is not inclined towards military escalation, despite the challenges it faces, while Al-Shoubaki points out that the internal circumstances in Lebanon, and the regional changes, especially in Syria, in addition to the Iranian position, make returning to military confrontation an unlikely option at this stage.

Al-Shoubaki believes that Hezbollah's threat to respond has a political rather than a military character, as it aims to send a warning message to Israel and international mediators without any actual intention to escalate.

Al-Shoubaki points out that Hezbollah entered the agreement under difficult circumstances, and the current situation does not seem better for the party, which makes the option of escalation less attractive.

According to Al-Shoubaki, Israel aims to impose a new reality in southern Lebanon, which is to create a buffer zone by force, exploiting international and regional circumstances to its advantage. There is also talk about Israel’s intention to exceed the 60-day time frame for withdrawing from the areas it has occupied, which could put Hezbollah in a difficult position.

However, Al-Shoubaki believes that Hezbollah currently prefers to resort to diplomatic steps rather than military escalation.

Al-Shoubaki points out that the Israeli violations are not necessarily an attempt to provoke the party and ignite the region, but rather part of a long-term Israeli strategy to impose its control over southern Lebanon.

Al-Shoubaki confirms that Hezbollah is still monitoring developments with caution, and that despite the pressures, it does not seem ready to escalate at the current stage.

Al-Shoubaki points out that the continuation of Israeli violations after the specified time limit may push the party to take more severe steps, which may reshuffle the cards in the region.

The truce is temporary and fragile due to the ongoing Israeli violations.

Dr. Omar Rahhal, writer and political analyst, explains that the current truce between the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli occupation state, which was sponsored by the United States and France, is temporary and fragile, due to the continued violations by the Israeli occupation that did not abide by its terms, in addition to the failure of the mediators to fulfill their obligations.

Rahhal points out that Israel has committed several violations of the agreement, including the assassination of Lebanese citizens and the launching of continuous bombing operations inside Lebanese territory, in addition to the continued Israeli military presence inside Lebanon, and the statements of occupation officials confirming the continuation of the occupation in some Lebanese areas, and the fact that Israeli aircraft do not leave Lebanese airspace, which reflects the insistence of the occupying state to thwart the truce and not abide by its terms.

Rahhal explains that these violations prompted Hezbollah to threaten and consider responding, and to emphasize its ability to resume fighting if Israel continues to violate the terms of the agreement.

He points out that Hezbollah agreed to the truce on the condition that Israel withdraws and ceases fire, but the party wants to send a message that it is ready to respond to any violations that may occur.

Rahhal points out the statements of the Chief of Staff of the occupation army, in which he claimed to eliminate Hezbollah and dismantle its military structure, which are considered misleading and unrealistic, as events have proven that Hezbollah still maintains its military capabilities and the ability to take the initiative and initiate.

Regarding Hezbollah’s seriousness in responding to Israeli violations, Rahhal asserts that Hezbollah historically links statements to actions, and if it says it will respond, it will do so. He points out that the party has demonstrated in recent confrontations its ability to strike deep inside Israel, including major cities, causing significant human and economic losses to the occupation.

Rahhal points out that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was forced to accept the ceasefire as a result of the painful blows that the occupation army suffered inside Lebanese territory, in addition to the heavy losses that the occupying state suffered in lives and infrastructure.

Dr. Rahhal touched on the regional situation and its impact on Hezbollah, pointing out that the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria poses a major challenge to the party’s military presence, which cannot be ignored in the future.

However, Rahhal believes that Hezbollah has other supply lines and a large strategic stockpile of heavy weapons, especially missiles, which ensures its continued presence as an effective force in any future confrontation.

Rahhal points out that Netanyahu is still seeking by all means to strike Iran, stressing that his moves in Lebanon aim to ignite the region and drag the United States into a regional confrontation.

Rahhal points out that the previous US administration, headed by Joe Biden, was trying to avoid a broad escalation in the Middle East in order to preserve its interests, and not out of sympathy for Arabs or Muslims. But Rahhal warns that Donald Trump’s return to power could mean a new escalation, as Trump is not a statesman, and does not possess any wisdom. He is a narcissist, a merchant, and at best a businessman who focuses on deals, including political deals with economic dimensions.

Rahhal asserts that Israel seeks to engineer the region in a manner consistent with its colonial aspirations, by striking Iran and igniting a regional war.

He points out that the fall of Syria is a political earthquake that will have violent repercussions and profound political repercussions on the region, especially on Palestine and Lebanon, and the normalization processes with the occupying state that will follow, and the division of roles and interests between regional and international players.

Rahhal points out that Iran today poses a threat to the interests of the United States and Israel, from both the American and Israeli points of view, so there will be two scenarios during the year 2025 and beyond: the first is confrontation, and the second is containment with Iran withdrawing within its regional borders, within a political deal that will have repercussions on Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Palestine.

Rahhal believes that Netanyahu is exploiting this situation to advance the interests of the occupation, in light of increasing American support, which indicates that what is coming may be worse if these Israeli moves continue.

Rahhal stresses that the region is facing a dangerous phase, where Israeli policies could lead to destabilization and ignite a large-scale regional conflict.

Two main messages behind the threat of a response

Writer and political analyst Imad Moussa believes that the Lebanese Hezbollah’s threat to respond to the Israeli occupation’s violations carries two basic messages. The first message is directed at the Lebanese interior, aiming to reassure its audience that the party still maintains its strength despite the challenges. The second message targets Israel and the region, stating that Hezbollah possesses military capabilities that enable it to absorb the strikes and resume the war if necessary.

Musa points out that the regional situation and geopolitical transformations, especially what happened in Syria, contributed to strengthening Israel's ability to move freely in the region. Targeting Syrian military bases, including airports and ports, led to reducing Hezbollah's margin of maneuver.

Musa points out that Israel's strategy of isolating the various arenas through destruction, genocide and displacement has contributed to weakening those arenas.

It is believed that Israel's expansion in using the strategy of isolating each arena of resistance weakened Hezbollah on the military and political levels, and stirred up the stagnant waters against it internally, which prompted it to adopt a discourse of threatening to respond to enhance its image as an effective force.

On the regional level, Moussa believes that Israel is now more prepared than ever to strike Iran with “mini-nuclear bombs,” which could set Iran back more than three decades of military and technological development.

Musa believes that the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, one of Iran's most important allies, and the erosion of Hezbollah's deterrent power, in addition to the comprehensive destruction of the Gaza Strip, are factors that contributed to strengthening Israel's readiness to implement its plans.

He points out that Israel, with American and Western assistance, may carry out a double strike targeting both Iran and Yemen, considering that the success of such a strike will pave the way for redrawing the map of the region, as Britain did during the last century.

Musa discusses Turkey's role in the regional equation, pointing out that it is no longer considered an independent regional power, noting that Turkey's expansion into Syrian territory is now contingent on Israeli approval within broader regional arrangements.

The party is fed up with the escalation of Israeli violations.

Writer and political analyst Dr. Abdul Majeed Suwailem believes that Hezbollah’s threat to respond to Israeli violations in southern Lebanon reflects the party’s frustration with the escalation of these violations.

Suwailem points out that these violations, which are carried out in a showy manner, reflect the Israeli government's desire to achieve internal political gains, especially in the north, where pressure from displaced settlers is increasing.

Suwailem explains that the recent Israeli behavior revolves around political parades aimed at compensating for what the Israelis consider a "lack of achievement" after Israel was forced to cease fire without achieving its military objectives against Hezbollah.

Suwailem points out that Hezbollah has undermined the Israeli narrative about the destruction of its capabilities, especially when it fired nearly 400 rockets at northern and deep Israeli areas during a day that the Israelis described as “Black Sunday.”

Suwailem points out that these missiles, which included precise and highly effective weapons, revealed the limited Israeli intelligence and military success, despite Israel’s claims of achieving successes in destroying infrastructure and assassinating prominent leaders in the party.

Suwailem points out that these facts prompted Israel to accept the ceasefire, under pressure from the United States and the Israeli army leadership, which saw that the army could not expand its ground operations to the third stage without great risks.

He believes that Hezbollah is fully aware of the dimensions of these Israeli shows, but it is committed to a policy of temporary patience due to internal Lebanese considerations. However, the party’s patience will not last long, as it will respond to Israeli violations when things reach a certain point, not with the aim of “saving face,” but to send a clear message to Israel that the policy of shows will not give it any advantage in the confrontation.

Suwailem stresses that the battle is not over yet, as several chapters are still on the agenda, including developments in Syria and Yemen, which could greatly affect the regional scene.

Regarding Syria, Suwailem points out that the Syrian crisis has not been resolved as some might think, but rather is in the stage of reshaping power and political equations amidst the contradiction between the allies who contributed to the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. This contradiction places the Syrian arena in a state of explosive stagnation, especially with Israel’s attempts to weaken Iran through Syria.

Suwailem believes that the Yemeni arena plays a similar role in heating up the atmosphere for upcoming rounds that may extend to Iran, making the Middle East a flaming mass that could explode at any moment.

On the Israeli side, Suwailem believes that Benjamin Netanyahu's government seeks to keep the region on fire through small wars or continuous provocations, as a means of ensuring the continuation of the fascist right in power.

He points out that this government realizes that the right's loss of power could be a decisive end for it, which prompts it to risk adventurous policies without long-term calculations.

Suwailem believes that the policies of the Israeli right aim to swallow the "liberal democratic" Israeli state, which may lead to an internal crisis that exceeds all previous crises. Suwailem explains that this complex internal situation may lead to opening new doors of escalation in the region, as Israel seeks to exploit any opportunity to strike or provoke Iran.

On the other hand, Suwailem confirms that Iran sees any potential confrontation with Israel as an existential battle and not just a passing political or military conflict.

Suwailem points out that the Iranian regime possesses great capabilities that exceed imagination, which makes it ready to use all means to defend its existence in the event of a direct conflict.

He points out that Iran's loss of some positions in Syria does not mean its complete retreat, but rather that it may rebuild the axis of resistance with new methods and means that are in line with the current challenges.

Suwailem believes that the region is on the brink of a much greater escalation than what we have witnessed in recent months, as regional and international contradictions continue to hinder any attempts at calm.

Suwailem asserts that the US administration's attempts to impose new arrangements in the Middle East will face resistance from the axis of resistance, making the Middle East a rolling mass of flames that cannot be easily controlled.

Dual messages ranging from warning to readiness

Writer and political analyst Hani Abu Al-Sabaa believes that Hezbollah’s threat to respond to Israeli violations in southern Lebanon reflects dual messages, ranging between warning and readiness, especially in light of the continued Israeli violations that have exceeded 300 since the signing of the agreement concluded more than a month ago.

Abu Al-Sabaa points out that these violations, according to the Lebanese army’s reports, varied between blowing up buildings and targeting with warplanes, in addition to targeting with drones that resulted in the deaths of martyrs, while Hezbollah was satisfied with a single response to the Shebaa Farms as an implicit message confirming its readiness for any possible escalation.

Abu Al-Sabaa believes that the current equation in the region, especially with the internal situation in Lebanon, is pushing the party to wait until the end of the sixty-day period specified in the agreement, after which any Israeli breach will be considered a crossing of the red lines.

Abu Al-Sabaa points out that the coordination between Hezbollah and Iran plays a role in controlling the rhythm in the region, especially with the losses that Iran has suffered in Syria and the collapse of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, which has reduced Iran’s and Hezbollah’s capabilities to secure supply lines. These complex circumstances have prompted Iran to try to ease tensions in the region, in line with its new policies seeking rapprochement with the world and rebuilding its relations with neighboring countries, as part of a strategy to ease international isolation and lift economic sanctions, in Iranian messages that it wants to avoid military escalation.

Abu Al-Sabaa stresses that despite these challenges, Iran is still seeking to maintain its regional influence through its various arms, especially in Yemen, where the escalation there is witnessing greater interest from Tehran than in the Lebanese arena.

In contrast, Abu Al-Sabaa points out that Israel believes that the current circumstances allow it to expand its operations against Hezbollah, especially in light of what it considers to be weakness in the supply lines and the disruption of the party’s military capabilities, after the Israeli strikes in Syria, with the aim of undermining Hezbollah’s capabilities.

Israel, according to Abu Al-Sabaa, is trying to provoke Hezbollah into an open confrontation, taking advantage of regional changes and the difficult internal conditions in Lebanon. With the return of US President Donald Trump to power, Israel believes that it has a favorable opportunity to carry out strategic strikes that may push Hezbollah back, or strike Iran, even though Trump is an economist and is trying to put an end to wars.

However, Abu Al-Sabaa believes that Hezbollah is aware of these calculations and is choosing to wait in order not to be drawn into an uncalculated confrontation at the present time, especially since Lebanon is still suffering from the consequences of its economic and political crises, in addition to the damage inflicted on southern Lebanon during previous rounds of escalation, and the remaining effects of the war in the southern suburbs of Beirut, which reinforces the logic of appeasement that Hezbollah is currently adopting.

Abu Al-Sabaa stresses that despite this, the equation of resistance remains strongly present in Hezbollah’s discourse, as it seeks to maintain its popularity among its popular base, especially if Israeli violations continue after the end of the sixty-day period.

Abu Al-Sabaa stresses that the decision to ignite the region again is not easy for any party, whether Hezbollah, Israel or Iran. International and regional changes, including the situation in Syria and the repercussions of the war in Gaza, constitute pressure factors that push all parties to reconsider their calculations. Although Israel is exploiting the current circumstances to strengthen its strategy in Lebanon and Syria, Hezbollah and Iran are adopting a long-term policy, waiting for more suitable circumstances to redraw the regional balances.

Questions about the ambiguity surrounding the Hezbollah file

Dr. Raed Nairat, writer, political analyst, and professor of political science, believes that there are several questions about the ambiguity surrounding the Hezbollah file after the end of the last confrontation with Israel.

Nairat points to three main issues that raise question marks: the first relates to the way the war ended abruptly, the second is the absence of any official funeral ceremony for Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, which raises many speculations, and the third is Israel’s failure to commit to withdrawing and implementing the terms of the agreement, amidst a conspicuous silence from Hezbollah.

Nairat explains that the way the Lebanese front ended suggests that this ending may be a preparatory stage for the outbreak of a new confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel.

Nairat believes that Hezbollah's threat to respond to Israeli violations may carry a political message to the Lebanese parties and international mediators, with the aim of pressuring the Israeli occupation to abide by the terms of the agreement.

However, Nairat sees a realistic possibility of war breaking out again, especially given the ambiguity surrounding the agreement and the abrupt manner in which the war ended.

Regarding the Iranian file, Nairat stresses that striking Iran will not be a mere confrontation between two countries, but will be considered a complex international file with strategic dimensions that affect major alliances including China and Russia.

Nairat points out that any major escalation against Iran could ignite the region and possibly lead to the outbreak of a world war, making the possibility of striking Iran on a large scale currently unlikely.