The General and the Politician: Sinwar and Abu Ammar

By Ghassan Charbel

Are we headed towards a new Palestinian Nakba that is more horrific than the first? Are we standing before a new chapter in the long bitter conflict when Yayha al-Sinwar replaces Yasser Arafat and Hamas replaces Fatah?

Is Hamas banking on claiming the right to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people and imposing its positions and choices on the Palestine Liberation Organization? Was the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation all along aimed at putting an end to the Oslo Accord and Palestinian and Arab normalization efforts?

Hamas has raised many questions by naming Sinwar as its new politburo leader as the region awaits the Iranian and Hezbollah responses. It often happens that a man takes a difficult choice that leaves its mark on his people and region.

Sinwar was six years old when a freedom fighter called Yasser Arafat changed the course of the Palestinian resistance and turned it into a regional priority. It was March 1968. The Israeli government decided it would discipline the fighters who were infiltrating from Jordan and carrying out attacks. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan thought it would be a cakewalk, especially in wake of the defeat of Arab armies a year earlier.

Jordanian intelligence received word that Israeli forces were preparing to carry out an incursion into the village of al-Karameh. Jordanian Lieutenant General Mashour Haditha Al-Jazy relayed the information to the leaders of Palestinian organizations in the country, including Yasser Arafat. It was highly unlikely that the organizations, with their weak weapons, could repel the incursion. The logical solution would be the withdrawal of the Palestinian fighters from al-Karameh to avoid losses.

Arafat, however, chose to take the risky option. His political prowess helped him realize that the Palestinian revolution needs a baptism of fire to impose its legitimacy. So, he decided to keep the forces in al-Karameh. On March 21, Israel made landings on the surrounding hills. Dayan would have almost achieved his goal had Jordanian artillery not intervened and dealt his forces losses in lives and machinery. Eighteen hours later, Israel called for a ceasefire and withdrawal of forces.

I recall what Ahmed Jibril once told me. He said that he bluntly told Arafat that the battle was a lost cause. Arafat, however, refused to withdraw and his choice led to the death of nearly a hundred fighters. Arafat described the battle as an epic, added Jibril.

The al-Karameh battle roused the Arab street. Thousands volunteered to join Fatah and the movement was showered with aid. Arafat had taken a costly decision, but he succeeded in creating a landmark moment for the Palestinians. The battle opened the doors to Gamal Abdel Nasser, who took Arafat with him to the Soviet Union. Arafat would become one of the region’s prominent figures.

In the beginning, Arafat shared the same dream that Sinwar now does: Restoring every inch of Palestinian land. However, the statements Abu Ammar heard in Moscow, Cairo and several capitals, and the many long battlers and numerous sacrifices, made him realize that the Palestinians needed to face the truth and balances of power. So, the dream of the establishment of a Palestinian state existing side by side with Israel came to light.

Has Sinwar found his own epic in the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation? Was the operation originally aimed at reaching a prisoner swap with Israel or was it aimed at sparking a war that would return the conflict back to its roots and beginnings?

In 2011, Hamas agreed to release Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit after holding him captive for five years. The ensuing prisoner exchange with Israel led to the release of 1,027 Palestinians, including a stubborn one called Yahya al-Sinwar.

The obvious question now is: Why didn’t Sinwar plan to kidnap a handful of Israeli soldiers to force the Netanyahu government to release thousands of Palestinian prisoners? The abduction of one or more Israeli soldiers would not have given him the opportunity to launch a destructive war and commit genocide. Did it escape Sinwar that the Al-Aqsa Flood would certainly lead to war or was he seeking a major shakeup regardless of the consequences?

Was he hoping the shakeup would lead to a rapid intifada in the West Bank that would eliminate what remains of the Palestinian Authority that was born out of the Oslo Accord? Did he believe the shakeup would rapidly lead to a broad war on the Lebanese front that would demand Iranian intervention?

Did the instigator of the Flood predict that it would quicken the launch of the “major blow” - the raining down of rockets on Israel from several countries, including Iran? Was the Flood aimed at sparking a long war of attrition with the help of the allies in the “Resistance Axis”? Is concern about this war leading Netanyahu to threaten to spark a regional war to impose a ceasefire on all fronts after the destruction of Gaza, which is the Palestinian part of the Axis?

In Abu Ammar, the politician had taken precedence over the general. It is evident that in Sinwar, the general takes precedence over the politician. Moreover, the Flood took place in a world that is vastly different than the one in which the al-Karameh battle was waged. The American destroyers are on alert to repel any attack on Israel. Iran doesn’t want a regional war. How will the Hamas general back down from the war knowing that a ceasefire can sometimes be more painful than firing the first shot?