Assassination Policy.. Messages and Goals

The two assassinations that took place in the southern suburbs of Beirut and in Tehran on 30 and 31 July 2024, targeted two major military and political figures, the head of the strategic military systems in the Lebanese Hezbollah, Commander Fouad Shukr "Hajj Mohsen", about whom America announced in 1983 a financial reward of 5 million dollars for anyone who provides information about his location, because it accuses him of planning and leading the bombing of the Marines headquarters in Beirut in 1983, and Brother Ismail Haniyeh "Abu Al-Abd", the political leader and first man in the Hamas movement and head of its political bureau. These two assassinations appear to have been arranged, planned, prepared and intelligence collected for a long period. Assassinations of this magnitude require a decision in closed circles and American approval and ratification, given the repercussions that may result from these two operations, which may push the region and the region towards a regional war.

Therefore, it is likely that in Netanyahu's meeting with Biden in Washington after his last visit and his speech before the US Congress, the global slander forum, agreement was reached on these two operations, and a pretext was chosen to be used and employed to carry them out, and the killing of the children of Majdal Shams was "manufactured", and the Lebanese Hezbollah was accused of being responsible for it, and what followed was the Israeli employment of it, and Biden and the US administration said that Israel has the right to defend itself. After the assassination of Commander Fouad Shukr, America said that this assassination should not lead to a comprehensive war, but rather is part of the rules of engagement that Hezbollah and the axis of resistance must coexist with, or go to a comprehensive war, while the place of Haniyeh's assassination in Tehran, and not anywhere else, one of its goals is to fuel the Sunni-Shiite sectarian strife, and create a rift and a state of mistrust between Tehran and the Hamas movement.

Netanyahu also wanted to show that Israel is technologically and intelligence-wise superior and is able to strike anywhere and reach the target it wants, and to show Iran as a state that has been penetrated by security and is unable to provide protection even for its guests. He also wanted to use it to escape forward to get rid of the predicament of his impotence in the Gaza Strip, and his inability to achieve the extreme strategic goals of the aggressive war he launched in the Gaza Strip, and also his inability to return the settlers of the north to their settlements. What is most important for him is to use the tactical achievement to restore his image and regain his popularity with the Israeli public, and to ease the political and popular pressures on him, and to settle scores with his political opponents, especially with his Minister of War Galant, his Chief of Staff Halevi, and the head of the Shin Bet, Bar.

Assassinations are a fixed approach in Israel’s strategy and supremacist mentality. It sees them as a deterrent and intimidating factor for the resistance forces and the resistance fighters. It believes that they contribute to weakening the resistance forces and disintegrating them in terms of leadership and organization, and work to disintegrate the base and popular incubator around them. However, experience and history teach us that these assassinations have expanded the presence and popularity of these organizations and forces, and increased popular and public support for them. Evidence of this is that the occupation has carried out more than 237 assassinations against the resistance forces, including influential leaders in these forces. For example, the founder of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, and a number of its early leaders, including Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Saeed Siam, and Ismail Abu Shanab, and its field leaders, including Yahya Ayyash, al-Jaabari, and others, were assassinated. Likewise, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Jihad Movement, Fathi al-Shaqaqi, Baha Abu al-Ataya, and others were assassinated, as were the Secretary-General of the Popular Front, Abu Ali Mustafa, Khalil al-Wazir Abu Jihad, the most prominent leader of the Fatah Movement, and Salah Khalaf “Abu Iyad,” and others. The former Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Abbas al-Moussawi, was assassinated. These assassinations did not contribute to weakening these organizations or their disintegration and dissolution. Rather, we found that their conditions, capabilities, military, armament, technical, technological capabilities, presence, and popularity, had made qualitative leaps from what they were previously several times.

There is a consensus among former ministers, heads of research centers, former heads of the Military Intelligence Directorate "Aman", and heads of the National Research Center such as Nitzan Horowitz, former leader of the "Meretz" movement and former minister, as well as Tamir Hayman, head of the National Research Center, Colonel (res.) Kobi Merom, former Chief of Staff, Colonel (res.) Dan Harel, and the famous journalist Ben Caspit, that these assassinations do not have tangible or significant effects on the strategic term. They give a sense of satisfaction in the short term, but they do not have significant effects on the strategic goals. Rather, they are entering Israel into a long war of attrition, a war on seven fronts, and they did not contribute to achieving the goals of the war. Rather, they are bringing a regional war closer. It is true that Hamas may be temporarily harmed somewhat by the assassination of its leaders, but it will emerge stronger politically and popularly, and become a tough number locally, Arab, and regionally.

Finally, and in a condensed manner, it can be said that the assassinations of the leaders Fuad Shukr and Ismail Haniyeh, and the attack on the fuel tanks in Yemen and the power station there, will not enable Israel to disengage from the support fronts and the Gaza Strip front, nor will it enable it to recover its prisoners in Gaza, nor win the war of attrition that has been ongoing for ten months, nor force Hamas and the resistance to surrender, nor will it enable it to return its displaced settlers in the north to their settlements, nor will it open the Red Sea to commercial ships carrying goods to Israel, meaning that it has failed to lift the economic maritime blockade on its ports by the Yemeni Ansar Allah group.


Assassinations are a fixed method in Israel’s strategy and supremacist mentality. It sees them as a deterrent and intimidating factor for the resistance forces and the resistance fighters. It believes that they contribute to weakening the resistance forces and disintegrating them in terms of leadership and organization, and work to disintegrate the base and the popular incubator around them.