Hebrew Newspaper: Iran feels that it is immune, but it made a big mistake in confronting Israel

Tamir Hayman

Hamas launched its surprise attack in the south on the Simchat HaTorah holiday, and committed a “mass massacre,” and the movement’s fighters found in front of them a routine security squad that was not prepared for such a scenario. Although what happened was not directly carried out by an Iranian commando squad, the offensive doctrine and armament were Iranian, and the available intelligence information was provided to them by Hezbollah, in coordination with Iran, and under its inspiration.

The support provided by Tehran is able to explain Hamas' self-confidence. Sinwar ordered the attack, assuming that he would only deliver the opening blow, while Iran and those in its orbit would be the ones who would deliver the crushing blow. Sinwar was wrong. Fortunately, Iran and those with it are participating in the campaign, but without crossing the threshold of war, through Hezbollah, the Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.

1. The erosion of deterrence and the exaggerated self-confidence of the resistance axis

This unexpected behavior surprised Israeli intelligence twice (the first time, on October 7, of course, and the second time on April 13, when Israel downplayed the possibility of an Iranian response to Mahdavi’s liquidation), and this leads us to the conclusion that we do not understand The behavior of Iran and the resistance front. Where does their self-confidence come from? How has Israeli deterrence eroded?

Iran is a country on the threshold of possessing nuclear weapons. It has survived the extreme pressure exerted on it by America: the latter’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement brought Iran to the threshold of nuclear armament. The reality today is that Iran understands very well that the entire world in general, and the United States in particular, recognizes its right to enrich uranium to 60%, and as long as it does not enrich it to the military level of 90%, the situation is fine. Iran has been able to achieve its strategic goal: apparently, it planned to reach the current state, and not go all the way to the nuclear bomb, and such a position provides Iran with great self-confidence and allows it to be more daring, even at the level of attacking with conventional weapons.

The response of Western countries to violations of the nuclear agreement (yes, this agreement is still officially in place) was an economic and secret battle. This battle collapsed completely before October 2023, when Iran sold oil by up to 2.5 million barrels per day. This quantity is equivalent to the volume of Iranian oil exports during the period when Iran was exempt from economic sanctions, at a time when the nuclear agreement was at its best. Meaning that Iran is also no longer bound by the treaty, nor is it paying the price for it. As is known, the reason for the Israeli government’s refusal to return to the nuclear agreement is that lifting sanctions will lead to a recovery in the Iranian economy, so that the money will be directed to building military and “terrorist” capabilities. In fact, this is what also happened without the agreement. This has led to building the terrorist capabilities of both Hezbollah and Hamas. In the end, Israel found itself exposed from all sides. It's a complete failure!

2. The success of the multi-year strength accumulation program for the Shiite militias:

Hezbollah: Since the end of the Second Lebanon War, Iran has decided to restore the military capabilities of the organization stationed on our northern border, and has allocated resources to that end. The program was published over several years. Despite the economic pressure, Iran succeeded in completing its plan. Iran believes that Hezbollah has been able to possess the capabilities required to fight Israel, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Syria and Iraq: The Shiite militias, led by General Qassem Soleimani, succeeded in achieving military victory in the war against ISIS. In the context of these militias being unofficial elements of the forces that fought ISIS, both Iran and Yemen succeeded in reaching a ceasefire agreement between the Houthis on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other hand in the year 2020. The Houthis, who maintained their control in the most important In the regions of Yemen, they took advantage of the calm to return to building and strengthening their military capabilities with the help of Iran, which armed the Houthi rebels to fight Israel (long-range missiles and drones, and surface-to-sea missiles capable of hitting shipping lanes in the Bab al-Mandab Strait).

In Gaza: Iran took advantage of the calm period resulting from the truce between Israel and Hamas in order to build Hamas' power. Over the period of two and a half years that followed the “Keeper of the Walls” campaign, Iran succeeded in building enormous capabilities in Gaza, the strength of which we witnessed, unfortunately, on October 7th.

Iran has also succeeded in building a network of Shiite militias throughout the Middle East, the same militias that are fighting Israel today.

The bottom line is that Iran has succeeded in building a ring of militias that besiege Israel to bring it to its knees, according to its vision. Completing the construction of this ring of fire provides Iran with confidence in its ability to confront Israel.

3. Practical control over all the countries surrounding Iran: Iran sought to replicate the Lebanese model in other Middle Eastern countries. The idea is to control the countries behind the scenes, by building a military force that threatens the government and controls it. This model has been repeated in Syria and Iraq. In Yemen, the situation is more complex, but even there, coordination with Iran is maintained.

4. Building the resistance front and Nasrallah’s role: The assassination of Qassem Soleimani led to a leadership vacuum at the head of the “Quds Force.” Soleimani's successor, Ismail Qaani, a weak and low-profile man, weakened the position of the corps that controls, practically, the entire Iranian network of fighters: the Shiite militia network. This leadership vacuum is filled today by Hassan Nasrallah. The man became the most powerful figure in the Quds Force, and the advisor closest to Iran's leaders. The Secretary General of Hezbollah, unlike Soleimani, knows the “Palestinian resistance organizations” well. This knowledge allows him to link the Sunni Hamas organization to the Shiite axis of resistance: he is aware of the extent of the movement’s ability to harm Israel. Hezbollah shares intelligence information and combat doctrine with the Hamas movement, and in practice it reproduces the idea of a large-scale invasion of Israeli territory.

5. Iran becoming part of the bloc that forms the new world order: The world is witnessing a competition between the West (which is based on laws) and the East (which challenges these laws). Iran occupies a high position in this competition: it sells weapons to Russia and oil to China. Iran, as an Asian superpower, also has geopolitical importance for China and Russia. This means that Iran's awareness that it is a member of the new emerging global axis, compared to the "degenerate, dying, and dying" Western axis (in the eyes of the Iranians), creates in it a feeling of victory and achievement.

 Iran's mistakes

The weakness of the Quds Force's leadership does not allow it to effectively control the militias. This happens when the Houthis, for example, fire on Chinese ships, and despite Iran's lack of desire to involve the United States in the war, the militias in Iraq continue to attack American bases.

Returning to the previous events, Iran's Supreme Leader is likely to conclude that the shooting of Israel this month was a mistake: the attack contributed to improving "Israel's global legitimacy" for a brief, but fateful, moment, precisely at a time when Israel's legitimacy was taking a turn for the worse. A stage, especially when the Rafah invasion was about to come into effect completely. At that very moment, Tehran granted Jerusalem the right to transform its sharp, justified response against it into a symbolic response that would preserve international legitimacy for it to move towards Rafah.

The biggest risks lie ahead, and change is needed

Iran believes that Israel has lost its military superiority, and this is a dangerous assessment. Iran is interpreting past events, but there is a question related to the future: Has the continuation of direct friction between Israel and Iran changed the balance of deterrence?

Deterrence cannot be measured, which can only be measured by its failure. When the enemy attacks, this means that your deterrence has failed, and when he does not attack you, there may be many reasons for this other than your success in deterring him. Whatever the case, it is reasonable to assume that what will happen in the coming days will provide us with the answer. If Israel refrains from attacking Iranian forces in Syria, it will be possible to assume that Jerusalem will be deterred. If we move in Syria, and Iran refrains from responding, perhaps we can assume that Tehran is deterred, but, as we mentioned previously, we must remember that refraining from responding is not conclusive proof of the presence of deterrence.

Israel's real problem with Iran is that we do not have a strategy that guarantees improving the strategic balance facing the Islamic Republic. Jerusalem's policy toward Tehran, so far, resembles that of the United States: "No treaty, no war." This strategy may be good for the United States, but for Israel, this is the worst that could happen.

Iran, without a nuclear treaty, is a deterrent state on the threshold of nuclear armament, and is capable, if it decides to do so, of achieving nuclear capability within a few months. Without a real American threat, Iran feels immune to any military attack. The result here is to postpone the collapse of the regime and the social revolution in Iran. This time limit allows Iran to consolidate its power and control over its citizens, it strengthens its economy, and it proves to the people of the republic that the Supreme Leader's policy is working.

The bottom line is that the war is not over yet, and ending it will likely require a war with Hezbollah as well, which will upset the entire balance. If this does not happen, the policy towards Iran must be changed. This policy should address Iranian lessons learned from the war, and it is plausible to assume that these lessons will include three components that are dangerous for Israel:

Iran will deepen its presence as a nuclear threshold state, while strengthening its ability to achieve a nuclear bomb within a short timetable.

Tehran will strengthen its conventional capabilities, both in terms of improving its air defenses and its ability to directly attack Israel.

The Islamic Republic will work to strengthen Hezbollah's capabilities and restore the capabilities of Palestinian organizations.

Israel will have to adopt policies opposite to those currently in place: either reaching a nuclear agreement that restores Iranian capabilities, or an attack that eliminates the Iranian nuclear threat. The basic condition for such a strategy is strong American support and an effective regional alliance. Israel cannot remain alone in facing such a challenge. There is a need for a security perception that sees the alliance, security agreements, and the establishment of defense alliances as essential components of Israeli national security.