The assassination of the Iranian official poses a challenge to Iran's ability to stay out of the war

By Danny Citronovic

Since the start of the Battle of the Iron Swords, Iran has been receiving blow after blow in Syria. The frequency of attacks against its members and interests in the Syrian arena, which reached its peak with the assassination of Sayyed Rezaei, who was directly responsible for transferring military equipment to Hezbollah through this arena, constitutes a major challenge to Iran’s ability to operate in Syria. But Iranian responses to these operations were very deliberate and limited. This is due to the Iranian leadership's fear that a violent and direct response to these attacks could involve Iran in the battle.

But the events that took place in recent months in Syria in general, and in Damascus in particular, are not compared to the assassination of Hassan Mahdavi [Mohammad Reza Zahedi] yesterday (4/1/2024) in a building adjacent to the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital. In many ways, the assassination of Mahdavi is not just another step against Iranian concentration, but rather an important, almost unprecedented event in the battle against Iran. Mahdavi's high status, his relations with the Iranian leadership, and the place where the assassination took place (within territories under Iranian sovereignty) cannot allow Iran to remain silent on the issue and return to normal life, even using the previous method of response.

The assassination of Al-Mahdawi exacerbates the dilemma of the Iranian leadership, which is likely to be afraid of “involvement” in the battle of the “Iron Swords”. Therefore, the Iranian leadership needs to think and make a response that deters any party from carrying out similar attacks in Syria, or anywhere else, from Without involving Iran directly in the battle. Iran fears that any step would lead to an expansion of the battle in a way that would endanger its strategic assets in this Middle Eastern region (above all, Hezbollah), and lead to a direct clash with the United States, but on the other hand, a weak response could also indicate its weakness.

Operationally, Iran, which has not hesitated to send militias to respond to incidents directed directly against it, will be forced this time to think about the validity of involving its agents, led by Hezbollah, in the response alongside the direct response from Iran. It seems that the involvement of these agents could enhance the strength of the Iranian response, but on the other hand, it could expose them to the risk of a counter-response, and lead to an expansion of the battle in the northern arena.

In any case, the assassination of Mahdawi forces the Iranian leadership to rethink the way Iran is involved in Syria. The Syrian arena constitutes a strategic target for Iran for many and varied reasons, but the succession of attacks against its presence there, especially the assassination of high-ranking people entrusted with providing an Iranian foothold in Syria, certainly harms Iran’s ability to control what is happening in the Syrian arena, and may raise questions. About its effectiveness.

In conclusion, the assassination of Mahdawi is not “just an event” in the battle against Iranian concentration in Syria. Therefore, in light of the public statements made by the Iranian leadership after the assassination, Iran, which does not hesitate to respond, and also due to its diminished capabilities in the Syrian context (and continuing failures in the ability to carry out attacks from outside Iran), may be forced to consider a response from “outside.” The Fund allows it to build deterrence in the northern arena again without being drawn into war.

In many ways, we are not witnessing the end of an event, but only its beginning, and the Iranian response will directly reflect on the chances of the battle expanding.