Israeli writer: A ceasefire in Gaza could accelerate the political process towards Lebanon

By Zvi Bar'el

US President Joe Biden's announcement of his decision to respond forcefully to the attack on the American base in Jordan on Monday, in which 3 American soldiers were killed, led to a practical response. Hezbollah militias in Iraq, loyal to Iran, have “officially” announced that they will stop attacking American targets “so as not to embarrass the Iraqi government.” 

For its part, the United States made clear that a response would occur, and that “the militias will be judged according to their actions, not their words.” Iranian Revolutionary Guard Commander Hossein Salami was quick to announce that his country is not seeking to expand the war, “but will respond to any threat against Iran.” He said against Iran, not against its arms, as if what is happening is a “private” confrontation between the militias and the United States, and Iran has nothing to do with it.

The Houthis in Yemen continue to attack ships in the Red Sea, and confrontations continue on the Lebanese front, as usual. This "routine" is now waiting for the kidnappers to agree and a long ceasefire, extending between 6 weeks and two months. This period of time is more than a humanitarian truce, during which political issues that go beyond the battlefield in Gaza could mature.

The “distribution of work” in each axis seems clear. Hezbollah is clashing directly with Israel, and the Houthis and Shiite militias in Iraq are dealing with the security belt that the United States provides to Israel, while Iran is not paying the price for operating its arms remotely. This distribution of labor is careful not to deviate from the limits of a low-power war, and thus allows organizations that do not belong to states to operate as a single front with Hamas, and at the same time, it does not provide an excuse for the United States and Israel to engage in a large-scale war on several fronts.

If these things were taking place in a computer game, where each side must collect points through tactical strikes, these skirmishes could continue at their current size without resolution. But as Hassan Nasrallah said in one of his speeches, “The speech is about the field,” but the field is not just raids, marches, artillery shelling, and casualties. Political pressures in Beirut, and in Jerusalem, Baghdad, Sanaa, and Washington, are mounting and demanding their share in managing the confrontations.

In the case of Lebanon, the front where there is the highest possibility of war, the pressure set links villages in southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut, between Christians and Shiites, between the effort to elect a president of the republic and the government, and between Hassan Nasrallah’s veto of any agreement, or Political negotiations, as long as the war in Gaza continues. In the previous truce that accompanied the release of kidnapped persons and prisoners, Hezbollah also ceased fire, then resumed it after the end of the ceasefire.

Since that time, the circle of confrontations has expanded, and Israel has deepened its attacks inside Lebanon, destroying many buildings in the southern villages, and hitting military and civilian targets deep in Lebanon, while Hezbollah brought into the battle precision missiles of the Falaq 1 and 2 model, which it has not used until now, and hit An air surveillance facility on Mount Meron, as well as attacks on Kiryat Shmona and other settlements. The firing equation still maintains the “agreed upon” border lines, and has not yet reached a large-scale war, intense attacks on all of Lebanon, and the firing of distant missiles deep into the Israeli home front.

Meanwhile, the political scene in Lebanon is waiting for a turn. On Tuesday, the ambassadors of the five countries - Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, France and the United States - which took it upon themselves to save Lebanon from the political and economic crisis, met with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.

There is unspoken tension between the ambassadors themselves, not only because of the substantive issues, but also because of who is leading the process. The new US Ambassador Lisa Johnson is competing with Saudi Ambassador Walid Al-Bukhari, who is acting as the owner of the house. In confronting them, French Ambassador Herve Magro is keen on the position of his country, which considers itself the first sponsor of Lebanon. Likewise, Qatar, a partner in the postponed Lebanese gas project, has something to say.

Apparently, the small glimmer of hope that emerged in previous meetings regarding reaching a political agreement has dissipated, and things have seemed less optimistic recently...

A ceasefire in Gaza could provide Nasrallah with the appropriate pretext to stop his opposition to taking political steps as long as the war continues, and would thus constitute an opportunity to reach a deal to elect a president of the republic. The truce could also constitute an opportunity to advance negotiations on the demarcation of the land border between Israel and Lebanon, and completing these negotiations would enable, at least in theory, the implementation of Resolution 1701, especially the part related to the Lebanese army deploying its forces along the border with Israel, a step that Lebanon has not yet implemented. Under the pretext that the international border line has not been agreed upon, and that the Blue Line that was demarcated with the Israeli army’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 is not the international border line.

The ceasefire will also have a calming effect on the Houthis, who have caused the greatest strategic damage, and whose repercussions can be felt well in a number of countries in the region. It will also help complete negotiations to end the war in Yemen. A long ceasefire lasting 6 weeks, or more, constitutes a sufficient period of time to allow political steps to be taken forward, and it will force the administration in Washington to exploit it in order to use its full diplomatic power to formulate with the Arab countries, primarily Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, mechanisms for a Palestinian administration in sector. 

The main ambitious goal of this step is to completely eliminate, or at least reduce, the need to resume fighting at its current level when the ceasefire ends. 

The challenge will move from the need to plan for the “day after the war” to planning for the day after the ceasefire.