Iran and Operation Al-Aqsa Flood: Sacrificing the Pawn to Save the King

By IBRAHIM BA MATRAF and ASSEM ALKHADHAMI

Despite Iran’s persistent denial of any involvement in the Hamas attacks on October 7, many international observers remain skeptical.

Aclose examination of the map of the Middle East shows how Iran has projected its power across the region through militia groups and armed factions, united in their animosity toward Israel and the United States. These groups converge not only ideologically but also financially, with Iran as their primary backer. Official statements from Iran, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza affirm the existence of a so-called Axis of Resistance, and Hamas' military wing commander, Muhammad al-Deif, has explicitly urged his fellow Iran-backed groups to join the conflict in Gaza.

Whether or not Iran had prior knowledge of the October 7 attacks, it is evident that Hamas anticipated support from its allies in the region. As affirmed by Abu Marzouq, a Hamas leader,  the group was "expecting a lot from Hezbollah and from our brothers in the West Bank…[and was] surprised by the shameful attitude of our brothers in power." Others in Hamas believed that Iran and of the Axis of Resistance would intervene in the event of Israeli ground invasion of Gaza. In October, Ali Baraka, head of Hamas' National Relations Abroad, was confident that “the allies of the resistance will not leave Gaza up for grabs by the Zionist entity and the American administration."

The American narrative continues to strongly associate Iran with Hamas, insisting that without Iranian support, Hamas would not have been able to carry out these attacks. But today, more than three months into the war and despite the large number of causalities, Iran does not seem willing to intervene directly in the war. In November, Reuters reported that Khamenei told Hamas that Iran would not enter the war on their behalf. Although Hamas denied the veracity of this report, it still seems very plausible for several reasons: 

1. The strong reaction from the United States: The deployment of aircraft carriers and the explicit threats to any parties contemplating involvement in the conflict have served as forceful deterrents.
2.  Iran’s lack of prior knowledge about the attack: despite conflicting reports and varied accounts maintaining that Iran was privy to the attacks, we believe that Tehran did not possess information about the timing of the operation—either because Hamas wanted to maintain secrecy to capitalize on the element of surprise, or because Iran had no involvement in planning the attacks.
3. Domestic problems and divisions: in addition to Iran’s economic woes, there is an apparent schism between moderates, who advocate non-intervention, and hardliners, who push for active engagement. Former Iranian minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, for instance, has suggested that adopting a more extreme stance on Gaza might spark a deadly conflict with the United States—a scenario which Israel would welcome. 
4. Risks of regional escalation: Tehran is aware that any intervention on behalf of Hamas may greatly harm its interests, especially in the absence of favorable international conditions, and could trigger a major regional conflict that would be difficult to control. In the context of current global geopolitics, with China busy trying to reclaim Taiwan and Russia still mired in Ukraine, Iran understands that it might find itself confronting the United States without the support of key allies.

These realities suggest that the Islamic Republic is more deliberate and moderate than what appears in the media—and what it projects through its own messaging. It is no exaggeration to say that Iranian propaganda is simply a means to convince Muslim nations of their ability to attack Israel and “liberate Jerusalem.” But unless directly attacked by Israel, all indications show that Iran’s entrance into a regional war is highly unlikely. Although this might result in a significant decline in its popularity, particularly among citizens of Axis of Resistance countries, it is still a safer alternative to entering a war that could jeopardize the stability of the ruling Iranian regime.