As a Hamas official, Saleh el- Arouri, was assassinated in the suburbs of Beirut, the risk of an extension of the conflict between Israel and Hamas has never been closer. 

Decryption with Pierre Razoux, academic director of the Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies (FMES) and author of Tsahal, history of the Israeli army (Perrin)

By Henri Clavier

After the strike against Saleh el-Arouri in the suburbs of Beirut by the Israeli army, should we fear an escalation and a conflagration in the region?

The risks of tension and escalation are higher today than at the start of the war. We see that Benjamin Netanyahu and his supporters are tempted to take advantage of the situation to weaken Hezbollah. In addition to Saleh el-Arouri, four Hezbollah executives were killed by the Israeli strike and an Iranian general was assassinated in Damascus the previous week. For Benjamin Netanyahu, pushing Hezbollah to get involved in the conflict could make it possible to permanently weaken one of the main threats to Israel and prolong the war. The Israeli Prime Minister knows well that when the war is over he risks being targeted by a commission of inquiry, losing the support of the Knesset, having to leave power and facing new legal proceedings.

With this assassination, has the Israeli army crossed Hezbollah’s red lines?

Netanyahu's strategy consists precisely of moving closer to this red line and pushing Hezbollah and Iran to the fault to justify a massive Israeli military intervention against Hezbollah. For Tehran, the red line would be crossed in the event of a strike on Iranian soil; Israeli air force incursions into Syria or Lebanon will not be enough to plunge Iran into the conflict, unless Israel massively attacks Hezbollah's vital infrastructure north of the Litani River, which is not yet the case. Benjamin Netanyahu wants to take advantage of his advantage and push Iran and Hezbollah to cross the Israeli red lines which are the firing of missiles towards the major cities of Israel and the infiltration of opposing commandos into Israeli territory, which goes beyond the framework current very limited fighting on the southern border of Lebanon.

Do Iran and Hezbollah have an interest in an intensification of the conflict?

Not really, and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has called on Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards to be patient and not give in to the temptation of direct reprisals that could take the conflict to a new dimension. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has also been cautious since the start of the conflict and does not wish to expand the fighting. The red line is still far from being crossed on the side of Hezbollah to the extent that even in the event of targeted assassinations on other members of Sunni militias (such as Islamic Jihad) or Shiite militias other than Hezbollah, they will not should not be enough for Hezbollah to cross Israeli red lines. Furthermore, without targeting large Israeli cities, Hezbollah, which has an arsenal six to eight times greater than that of Hamas (before October 7, 2023), could target strategic infrastructure such as the offshore gas platforms of the Katlan, Tamar and Tamar fields. and Leviathan. This could have a major political and economic cost for Israel, without directly attacking the Israeli population. Finally, Iran has already fulfilled most of its strategic objectives since October 7 by succeeding in stopping the normalization of diplomatic relations initiated by Israel with Arab countries and in particular Saudi Arabia.

Does the Israeli government not risk cutting itself off from the support of the United States in the event of new strikes in Lebanon?

For the United States, targeted assassinations in Lebanon are at the limit of what it can accept, as long as they are not likely to provoke regional escalation of the conflict. The question is whether they were consulted in advance regarding the strike in the suburbs of Beirut.

Can we imagine a situation in which the IDF would launch an invasion of Lebanon?

The whole question will be to know what the balance of power is within the Israeli government if this situation arises. Part of Israeli opinion is aware that the Jewish State must deal with its neighborhood and also knows that Israeli ground interventions in Lebanon have always been difficult for the IDF. This would mean taking the risk of entering into a war of harassment with daily deaths in the army and an even more degraded image of Israel on the international scene. And on the other hand, part of Israeli public opinion considers that their country is engaged in an existential war and that this is the moment to permanently weaken Hezbollah, whatever the risks involved.

Source: Public Senat