US is looking for an authority to manage Gaza, and Abbas wants a state

By Zvi Barel

Yesterday, the Saudi ambassador to Britain, Prince Khalid bin Bandar, said in an interview with the BBC that “normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel will not take place without the establishment of an independent Palestinian state,” and he added: “We cannot live in peace with Israel without a Palestinian state.” The words of Bin Bandar, the son of the former head of Saudi intelligence, reflect the turn in the Saudi position since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, and the freezing of normalization negotiations between the two countries. These negotiations were frozen, but not cancelled, according to the hint of US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken this week, who said after his visit to Saudi Arabia that he “saw an opportunity” in establishing a better network of relations between Israel and the countries of the region.

Until the outbreak of war, the formula, which formed the basis for normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, was based on 3 pillars: American approval to assist in the Saudi nuclear program; A defense alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia; An understanding to "improve the living conditions of the Palestinians." Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman phrased the third clause in a less binding way when he said in an interview with Fox News: “We hope that the normalization agreement with Israel will advance the alleviation of Palestinian living conditions.” “Easing” is not an independent Palestinian state, and “hoping for easing” is not a political plan of action. At that time, it seemed that the “Palestinian condition” in the Saudi position was, in general, aspiring to put a V on the “Palestinian issue.” What is meant today is a policy that imposes on Washington, and on Israel and the Palestinians, a realistic plan, even if it is not achieved soon, which indicates the beginning of a new political strategy.

Saudi Arabia does not want to interfere in formulating the plan. “This discussion must take place between Israel and the Palestinians,” Bin Bandar said. But when he was asked whether Hamas could be a partner in the new governance structure, he did not reject the idea categorically, and said: “This requires a lot of thought and a lot of work. In Ireland, for example, the largest party there was recognized, even though its members Most of them, in the past, were considered "terrorists."

Saudi Arabia is not among the club of countries supporting Hamas in the Middle East. It is a full partner with Egypt and the UAE against the Muslim Brotherhood movement, and against its descendants, including Hamas and other religious-nationalist movements in the Middle East. But it also understands well the political dialogue taking place between the PLO and Hamas regarding the issue of “the day after the war.” It is a dialogue that seeks to form a “renewed” Liberation Organization, and not just a “renewed” Palestinian Authority, as President Joe Biden demands.

The Palestinian leaders who have been running the race for the presidency for some time have made it clear publicly that Hamas and other Palestinian organizations that are not members of the PLO, such as Islamic Jihad, are forced to be part of this new organizational structure that will result in a “renewed” Palestinian Authority. It can manage Gaza, with the support of the United States. Without this partnership, there will be no legitimacy for the Palestinian Authority, or for any other Palestinian entity that wants to rule Gaza. The gap between the political view regarding the character of the new Palestinian leadership and the urgent need to find a solution to the problems of Gaza administration is currently being attempted to be bridged by leaders of Arab countries related to the United States.

In the last week, efforts have intensified to develop a practical framework for Palestinian administration of the Gaza Strip. On Monday, Mahmoud Abbas “jumped” to Egypt in order to coordinate positions with President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, ahead of his negotiations with Blinken. Yesterday, Abbas met with Blinken, and according to reports in the media, the conversation was tense and angry, in which Abbas asked that Israel release the money it has [the taxes on the crossings that Israel collects on behalf of the Authority], which is used to pay the salaries of employees in the Authority, and in Gaza, Part of it is paid to the families of the "saboteurs." 

Abbas also demanded an immediate ceasefire and pledges that the United States would obtain from Israel not to expel the people of Gaza from the Strip. Apparently, Blinken requested such pledges from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and spoke about it publicly. In this way, he made these pledges a commitment to the United States itself, and not just to the Palestinians, Jordan, and Egypt.

However, it is clear to all parties that implementing these pledges requires ensuring reasonable living conditions for more than 2.3 million Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip. 

The return of residents of the northern Gaza Strip to their homes; and begin reconstruction work in order to alleviate the terrible distress that could push residents to storm the border into Sinai. In addition to the efforts made to create decent living conditions, even in a situation where the majority of the population of the Gaza Strip has become homeless, the US administration seeks to create a framework for managing civilian lives the day after the war and transferring civilian authority to a Palestinian entity.

However, the administration itself has not crystallized the frameworks that would allow the transfer of such authority to the Palestinians. For example, it is not clear what the plan to “renew” the Palestinian Authority must include in order for it to be able to fulfill its role in Gaza and to gain American support. Will Mahmoud Abbas, who is 88 years old, be asked to serve only as honorary president, and transfer his powers to the prime minister? Will he be asked to inject “new blood” into power? What are the government's administrative tests? Will the “renewed” authority, if it is established, guarantee significant assistance, whether American or Arab?

Abbas has previously made clear to Blinken and the Egyptian President that he is against the establishment of a government of experts, or a government imposed by the Americans. He said that even the government, which relies on new administrative and legal reforms, needs the approval of the PLO, the entity that signed the Oslo Accords, which led to the establishment of the Authority. 

Meanwhile, it was learned that Abbas asked Sisi to invite the leaders of the Palestinian organizations, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to a meeting in order to discuss the composition of the “new” PLO. It is not known whether Sisi intends to discuss this, or if Hamas will agree this time to adopt the conditions set by Abbas for its joining the PLO, namely, Hamas’ willingness to move from armed resistance to “peaceful resistance,” and to recognize the agreements that It was signed by the PLO, including the Oslo Accords, which recognized the State of Israel.

Even before talking about the nature and characteristics of such authority, Abbas has two basic demands from the administration in Washington: a ceasefire, and the start of discussions about the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. 

On this point, he got an American response when Blinken made it clear that he supports “concrete steps to establish a Palestinian state.” But it is not clear what is meant by “concrete steps.” 

Does this mean that Washington is ready to call for an international conference, such as the Madrid Conference, to express its seriousness? Can you guarantee the approval of the Israeli government, in its current composition, to participate in such a conference?

It was not easy for the Americans to push Israel to make tactical concessions in the field of humanitarian assistance, or in the field of the scale of military operations. They do not know when and/or how Israel will allow the residents of the northern Gaza Strip, or rather those of them who are still alive, to return to their homes. 

The difficulty will increase when the United States tries to advance the promotion of Palestinian authority in Gaza. It is possible that the issue of political negotiations will force the Americans to make a strategic decision: should they enter into a direct confrontation with the Israeli government?

Haaretz