By Iman Shams 

“If Israel carries out an assassination campaign against Hamas leaders abroad, it risks provoking retaliation from Hamas and the risk of regional escalation, including possible direct Iranian intervention on the table next year, and risks slowing post-war normalization efforts, and provoking further anti-Semitism and rebuke from Western governments, and a negative regional reaction.”

This is the summary of the warning issued by the American Stratfor Center for Strategic and Security Studies, before the assassination of senior Hamas leader Saleh Al-Arouri in the southern suburb of Beirut last Tuesday evening. Stratfor, which defines itself as “a global center of excellence in geopolitical intelligence and analysis,” and which the American press calls “The Private CIA in the Shadows.” Because most of its experts are former officers and employees in American intelligence.

If Israel carries out an assassination campaign against Hamas leaders abroad, it risks provoking retaliation from Hamas and the risk of regional escalation, including possible direct Iranian intervention on the table next year.

In its monthly assessment of global situations, on December 28, 2023, the Center issued a report entitled “The Expected Repercussions of Israel’s Alleged Campaign to Kill Hamas Leaders,” in which it referred to the circulation of media reports detailing Israeli plans to assassinate Hamas leaders in some Arab countries and foreign countries, and the issuance of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instructed the country's intelligence services to track down and assassinate senior Hamas officials living in Lebanon, Turkey, Qatar, or wherever they reside for however long, in response to the intense public pressure that followed the Hamas attack on October 7, which resulted in the deaths of about 1,200 from Israel and shattering Israel's sense of security.

Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Qatar and Malaysia

The report suggested, a week before Al-Arouri’s assassination, that Israeli assassinations would take place in Lebanon and Syria, and added Turkey to the possibilities, and Qatar came as “the least likely.” The report mentioned countries outside the region such as Malaysia as potential locations for Israeli attacks (where Mossad allegedly carried out a 2018 kidnapping and assassination of suspected Hamas members).

But Lebanon is the most likely place for the assassinations to be concentrated, as the country has hosted a number of key Hamas leaders for years. Hamas fighters are also increasingly using southern Lebanon to launch cross-border attacks into northern Israel with the tacit, and sometimes explicit, approval of the Iran-backed party, which extends its influence over the country. Türkiye is also a potential location for Israeli assassinations because it has also hosted Hamas leaders. But compared to Lebanon, the repercussions of Israeli assassinations in Turkey are more dangerous for Israel, given its relations with Ankara and the fact that Turkey is a member of NATO. 

As for Qatar, it is the least likely to be subjected to Israeli assassinations, despite the Gulf state hosting the political office of Hamas, due to Qatar’s main role in facilitating negotiations and the exchange of prisoners and hostages between Israel and Hamas. As for Syria, according to the Stratfor report, it is likely to also witness Israeli assassinations on its soil due to its political and military support for Hamas, but Israel does not care much about any repercussions in its hostile relations with it.

The report ruled out that the Israeli assassination campaign would take place in the United States and Europe for two main reasons:

First, unlike in the 1970s, armed Palestinian leaders do not enjoy safe havens in the West, which means there are few, if any, targets that Israel can pursue.

Second, Israel will need any support it can get from the United States and European allies such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, as it faces widespread condemnation of its military operations in Gaza, which may increase during the expected Israeli occupation of the Strip after the end of the war.

The report suggested, a week before Al-Arouri’s assassination, that Israeli assassinations would take place in Lebanon and Syria, and added Turkey to the possibilities, and Qatar came as “the least likely.”

The report warned that any assassinations in the West, amid historic levels of anti-Semitism and growing popular opposition to the Israeli military campaign in Gaza, would fuel anti-Semitic activities such as property damage, harassment, and targeted attacks on Jewish individuals and Jewish sites. 

Israeli assassinations may also lead to more protests against its actions, especially if the expected occupation of Gaza leads to a rebellion that leads to a new round of fighting, and thus new accusations of war crimes committed by Israel, and may generate criticism from Western governments that could put increasing pressure on Israel. If the attacks result in civilian casualties and/or are publicly disclosed through clear evidence. It may threaten to suspend its military or economic aid, although this will only happen in conjunction with other developments, such as accusations of major Israeli atrocities during the expected occupation of Gaza.

Lebanon first... and Saudi Arabia’s position

In the Middle East region, according to the report, Israeli assassinations may lead to diplomatic and economic repercussions, and delay, but not necessarily thwart, post-war normalization with other major regional countries, most notably Saudi Arabia. The Israeli assassinations may hamper efforts to revive relations with four countries that have normalized relations with Israel in recent years: Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates.

Lebanon backs down from demarcating maritime borders?

If Israeli assassinations occur on Lebanese territory, it may withdraw from the historic agreement it signed with Israel in 2022 to demarcate its maritime borders and move forward with hydrocarbon exploration. The deal has so far withstood the pressures of the current conflict, but a major Israeli assassination campaign in Lebanon could change the status quo. The Israeli assassination campaign would also entail inevitable retaliation from Hamas, maintain the risk of regional escalation with the party in Lebanon and various other Iranian proxies, and could cause greater involvement for Tehran itself if Israel kills targets close to the Iranian government.

In the immediate term, Israel's assassination of Hamas leaders will lead to Hamas retaliation, perhaps in the form of ambushes against Israeli soldiers in Gaza, rocket firing into Israel, and at least attempts to launch attacks inside Israel and against Israeli (and more broadly Jewish) targets in foreign countries. An Israeli assassination campaign against Hamas will increase the extremism of the movement's leaders and incite them to plan bolder acts of revenge. Israeli attacks would also risk provoking reprisals from pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria, as well as from the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.

The report suggested that the danger would be greater in Lebanon, and that Israeli assassinations in the country would easily lead to retaliatory attacks that would quickly turn into a larger conflict, the danger of which would be great, as each party could make a mistake in judgment amid the ongoing fighting and severe tensions. 

If Iran, which supports the party, has so far controlled its response to avoid direct involvement in the current crisis, the possibility of a direct confrontation between the party and Israel may force it to do so, because the party, compared to Hamas (which Iran also supports), is by far the strongest military agent. Tehran and those closest to it politically. The risk of Iranian involvement will be greater if Israeli assassinations in Lebanon, Syria, or elsewhere target targets closely linked to Tehran. Such a scenario could lead to a wide range of Iranian retaliations, ranging from more aggressive cyberattacks against critical Israeli infrastructure, to increased support for regional proxies to escalate the intensity and/or geographic scope of their attacks against Israel, the United States, and other Western targets. In the worst-case scenario, Iran could even use its missiles to strike Israeli targets, a possibility that would guarantee a massive Israeli response and risk launching a direct military confrontation between Israel and Iran.

Source: Assas Media