The Israeli political analyst in the Hebrew newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, Nahum Barnea, confirmed that the most worrying reaction to the assassination of Al-Arouri is the future of the occupation prisoners held by the Palestinian resistance in Gaza.

Barnea said in an article published by Yedioth today that the belief that the assassination of Al-Arouri might increase the pressure on Hamas and Yahya Sinwar to complete an exchange deal is “a ridiculous claim; the Israelis can laugh at themselves with it, because the reality says that the assassination of Al-Arouri will delay the completion of the deal or perhaps undermine all negotiations through mediators.

The Israeli analyst described Al-Arouri as "a man who was able to wear two hats: political and military, with great skill until he became a cruel, difficult and deadly enemy."

He added: "Al-Arouri honestly obtained his place on the list wanted for exclusion, and even if he was not personally involved in planning and implementing the events of October 7 (the Al-Aqsa flood battle), the rising wave of resistance in the West Bank bears his full name."

Barnea considered that the messages behind Al-Arouri’s assassination are represented by three basic points: “The assassination conveyed a message to Hamas leaders that the Israeli security establishment’s threats to return to assassinations are not just idle talk, but rather serious and possible threats.”

As for the second message, it was to Hezbollah that “Israel, despite the events of October 7, still knows how to enter deep into Hassan Nasrallah’s house in Beirut.”

The third message is to the Israeli insiders: “Revenge against those responsible for killing Israelis is uncompromising.”

Perhaps, according to Barnea, the fourth message is that “Israel understands well the only language in the Middle East: killing for killing.”

However, the political analyst believes that targeted assassinations are not measured only by the blow that the “enemy” receives, but rather the important question is, “What can this assassination do to Israel? What is the price or what is the cost that it will pay in exchange for the value of the assassination and the benefit from it?!”

Whoever decided to assassinate Al-Arouri in Beirut expected that there would be a violent reaction from Hamas and Hezbollah, but he did not think well about the fate of the detainees and the exchange deal. Although it is true that the chance of reaching an exchange deal was slim even before the assassination in Beirut, but with regard to the lives of the detainees “Any delay may be decisive, and any assassination may lead to a counter-assassination,” according to Barnea.

He continued: "It is not comfortable to admit, but the decision to assassinate was a bet on the lives of the detainees, and time will determine whether this bet was justified."

In addition to the impact of Al-Arouri’s assassination on the Israeli detainees, the other expected scenario is that Hamas will respond to the assassination through operations in the West Bank and Jerusalem and launching rockets from areas “under its control” in Gaza, according to the Israeli political analyst’s article.

He continued: "Even if the events of October 7 did not succeed in fulfilling Yahya Sinwar's hopes of dragging Israel into a war on three fronts, the assassination of Al-Arouri could revive Sinwar's hopes," according to Barnea's opinion.

The political analyst believes that Hezbollah will respond, sooner or later, to the assassination of Al-Arouri, pointing out that the party’s response space is greater than Hamas’ response space.

He explained: “It is possible that (Hezbollah) will violate the rules of the game currently followed in the exchange of fire in the north and risk an all-out war; it can also attack Israeli tourists or Jewish centers abroad. Hezbollah can expand the borders that allow the Palestinian resistance factions in Lebanon to retaliate.” Although all of the party’s options for responding are known, the extent and time that the party can wait before responding remains ambiguous and unknown.”

Barnea also confirms that the assassination of Al-Arouri is not in the interest of the negotiations that the Americans and French have been conducting in Lebanon since the past few weeks. There was hope of reaching a diplomatic settlement that would prevent the war from extending and allow the population to return to their homes on the border. While US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken intended to come to Tel Aviv at the end of the week to strengthen settlement negotiations, he announced, following the assassination, the cancellation of his visit.

In his article, Barnea concludes by confirming one thing, which is that the assassination of Al-Arouri and his assistants, Samir Fandi and Azzam Al-Aqra, “although it will harm the activities of the Hamas movement in Beirut in the short term, it will not change the reality.” Hamas is a greater resistance movement than it can be reduced to any of its dead leaders or are potential dead ones, including Yahya Sinwar.