Netanyahu and Sinwar are caught in a political dilemma that has turned the continuation of war into a goal in itself

By Zvi Barel

Communications between Israel, Hamas, and the Egyptian and Qatari mediators take place on two parallel secret channels: Senior intelligence officials in Israel, Egypt, and Qatar discuss, on a daily basis, the details of the conditions for the return of the kidnapped people. At the same time, there are public negotiations in the media filled with test balloons and muscle flexing, based on words of questionable accuracy.

In recent days, the Egyptians published two proposals related to communications: The detailed version of the first proposal, published by the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, stipulates starting a three-stage move. Initially, a ceasefire will last between 7 and 10 days, during which about 40 kidnapped civilians will be released. In the second stage, the Israeli female soldiers are released, and bodies are exchanged between the two parties, with a complete ceasefire, and the withdrawal of the Israeli army forces from the population centers. In the third phase, which is expected to last a month, all the kidnapped persons will be released, in exchange for the release of more Palestinian prisoners, and Israel will deploy its forces outside the Gaza Strip. In addition, Egypt, Qatar, and the United States begin discussions with a temporary Palestinian technocratic government, which will be responsible for managing the West Bank and Gaza, with Qatari, Egyptian, and American guarantees.

Hamas and Islamic Jihad rejected this proposal and insisted on not establishing contacts until after a complete ceasefire. Yesterday, Reuters published, citing an Egyptian source, that Egypt and Qatar proposed to the leadership of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza to relinquish power in the Gaza Strip, in exchange for a permanent ceasefire, and Egypt and Qatar guaranteeing that Hamas leaders leave the Gaza Strip peacefully. It is not clear whether this clause was present in the previous proposal, or was added to it, and in any case, the two organizations rejected it, and adhered to their position that any negotiations, from now on, are conditional on a complete ceasefire and the release of all the kidnapped, in exchange for all the Palestinian prisoners. Without giving up Hamas' authority in Gaza.

The Israeli public response, as expressed by the Prime Minister yesterday, was just as severe. Israel will continue to use very significant force with the aim of completely dismantling Hamas' authority, based on the working hypothesis that only military pressure can push forward the release of the kidnapped persons. At the same time, Israel sees the continuation of the fighting as an expression of its commitment to eliminating Hamas’ authority in the Gaza Strip and dismantling its military infrastructure.

But Hamas's civil authority no longer actually exists: civil institutions no longer function, and the residents of the Gaza Strip are captive in areas called "safe areas," but they do not feel safe at all, and Hamas is not able to protect them. According to high-ranking officials, including the Chief of Staff, the army has moved into a long and arduous phase of careful “cleansing,” which is expected to last many months.

There is no clear definition, or agreed upon criteria, on how to define the military elimination of Hamas. But when Israel says: Only military pressure, intense attacks, and heavy bombing, along with a reduction in the amount of humanitarian aid, will force Hamas to agree to a new exchange deal, it is inevitable to say that the fighting has turned into a political pressure tool in order to prove that we are forced to use force. For the sake of the kidnapped, it no longer aims only to dismantle the military capabilities of Hamas.

The public responses of both Israel and Hamas indicate that both sides are stuck in a quagmire, where continued fighting is portrayed as an independent goal. Yesterday, Al Jazeera published a letter sent by Yahya Sinwar to Hamas leaders abroad, in which he described the achievements of the war, which included the killing of 1,600 Israeli soldiers and the destruction of the army’s Merkava tanks. But after a short time, the channel removed the message from its screen.

Even if the message was fabricated and incorrect, Al-Sinwar is conducting a double dialogue: the first, with the Hamas leadership abroad, which he believes is moving behind his back, and planning “the next day” with senior officials in “Fatah,” without his participation. The second dialogue is with Israel, as it uses the continuation of the fighting to demonstrate its strength and, through it, impose its conditions on it. Is there a possibility to add a clause to the Egyptian plan that threatens Sinwar regarding a government of Palestinian experts that takes control of Gaza from Hamas? This is not a new idea. The Palestinian Authority witnessed a government of experts headed by Rami Hamdallah in 2013, and a national consensus government between Fatah and Hamas in 2014.

This experiment failed. The power struggle, conspiracy over the presidency, and disputes over positions turned this government into a political battlefield and paralyzed its work. The technocratic government may give the impression that it is a non-political entity, but in practice, it is far from that. Egypt had previously proposed a similar proposal in July to representatives of Fatah and Hamas at the meeting held in El Alamein between Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh. Now, it seems that Egypt is trying to revive the idea that was kept as a solution for managing Gaza after the war. But the war changed the content of the dialogue between Hamas and Fatah, and at least both sides are talking publicly about the possibility of reconciliation and a unity government, without clarifying its structure or composition. The new idea poses a threat to Sinwar, but he can rest assured, because Israel will not allow it to be realized.

In this set of considerations, the stifling power and political temptation that imposes continued fighting between Hamas and Israel cannot be ignored. This was expressed on the Israeli side by Netanyahu using the support of part of the families of the kidnapped, and by quoting the words of fighters in the field who “demand” him to continue fighting at any cost. As if without this demand, he would have considered a ceasefire. It seems that Netanyahu's use of this logic is a rhetorical choice through which he is trying to contain his extremist partners in the government who threaten to topple it if he agrees to a ceasefire.

Hamas, and to be more precise, Sinwar, is in a similar dilemma. He is obligated to fight in order to demonstrate his steadfastness, and to curb the plan of leading his movement outside Gaza, which is examining alternatives that take him out of the game. Sinwar's point of superiority over Netanyahu is that he is not subject to popular pressure from Gaza, and thousands of demonstrators do not take to the streets to demand his removal from office. Whoever believes that the military pressure and the terrible distress that Israel is causing in Gaza will lead to a popular rebellion against Sinwar must have a very long breath, or a wide imagination.