Hamas and "putting the house in order": Joining the "Organization"?

By Muhammad Qawwas

While there is widespread talk about the “day after” the war in Gaza in Washington and European capitals, the Palestinian side seems absent from this discussion, unable to come up with creative ideas that match the dramatic historical event that has occurred since last October 7. If political leaders in the Hamas movement were surprised by the “Al-Qassam Brigades” launching the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, the leadership of the Palestinian Authority and the rest of the factions seemed confused and improvising to deal with an imminent historical juncture that was difficult to anticipate.

Whoever observed the performance of the Authority in Ramallah, especially in the first days of the event and the subsequent Israeli launch of its devastating attack against the Gaza Strip, noticed that the “Almuqataa,” meaning the headquarters of the Palestinian president and leadership, is dealing with a matter that it has no compunction about, and is issuing principled positions regarding a situation far removed from the context of its usual daily life. On the other hand, the spokesmen for the Fatah movement (or some of them, so as not to generalize) addressed the event as political analysts or as defenders of the “faction” to which they belong without any consideration of the Fatah movement’s history of charting the course of the entire Palestinian national movement and taking the lead in defending any Palestinian “situation” whatever the Palestinian political and factional movement causing it.

Times changed, and it seemed that the dispute between Hamas and Fatah, which exploded bloodily in 2007 and expelled Fatah and the Authority from the Gaza Strip, had accumulated a reality that could not be overcome by feelings and emotions.

Despite the distance and disagreement between the Hamas movement and the Palestinian leadership during the era of President Yasser Arafat, the late man continued to act as a leader of all the Palestinian people, and Israel has always accused him of being behind the support that reached the movement led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin at the time. When Israel deported more than 400 leaders of the Hamas and Jihad movements towards the Marj al-Zuhur area in southern Lebanon in December 1992, “Abu Ammar” denounced the Israeli behavior, defending the cause of the deportees and he was keen, through the influence he had in Lebanon, to communicate with the deportees and convey aid for them.

The time of Abu Ammar... and the time of Kouchner

Times changed, and it seemed that the dispute between Hamas and Fatah, which exploded bloodily in 2007 and expelled Fatah and the Authority from the Gaza Strip, had accumulated a reality that could not be overcome by feelings and emotions. The accumulated and repeated failure to reconcile the relationship between the two parties and the failure of all regional mediations in this regard made the division an almost final state, or it was intended to be so, so that the world began to deal with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as two separate, independent cases.

It is not a coincidence, in this context, that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s speech, every time he receives a Western official these days, focuses on the fact that “Gaza is an indivisible part of the Palestinian state” and on the refusal to deal internationally with a Gazan situation that differs from the rest of the Palestinian situation. This speech is based on real data that Abu Mazen possesses regarding what was being simulated by Israel, America, and internationally in this regard. Even Jared Kushner, advisor and son-in-law to former US President Donald Trump, chaired a conference for the Gaza Strip in March 2018 and promoted a project in June 2019 to transform Gaza into a “city of dreams,” hinting at including Sinai in the “Deal of the Century.”

According to this reality and this division, it seemed that the Hamas movement was positioned based on the “finality” of this situation. It was clear that the movement was not ready to abandon its Gaza “achievement” by ruling the Gaza Strip in the interest of “national reconciliation” that would restore the partnership within its sphere of influence. It was also clear that the regional extensions of the movement were reconciled with the status quo and perhaps encouraged it, without being interested in making any efforts to restore cohesion to the fractured Palestinian body.

The situation changed after the "Flood". The nihilistic war against Gaza tempted the Israelis to float dreams of “transfer” towards Sinai and Jordan. It seemed that the position of Egypt and Jordan was firm and decisive in rejecting this possibility, which called for a deterrent American position in this regard without the positions dispelling this possibility. It also seemed that the Palestinian "house in order" had become an urgent Palestinian demand, but it had also become an urgent regional and international demand, especially since the United States, with its president and its delegates to the region, had rediscovered the "two-state solution."

There is no new and serious Palestinian workshop to put the Palestinian house in order. If Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau, said that his movement is open “to discussing any ideas or initiatives that lead to stopping the aggression and open the door to putting the Palestinian house in order at the level of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,” then he neglected Hamas’ responsibility for tampering with this house. Turning away from its arrangement is met by the authorities with a ready-made prescription that has its own authority and is based on the fact that the PLO is the political umbrella representing Palestine and that the house is arranged within its framework and according to its program that is recognized by the world.

While there is widespread talk about the “day after” the war in Gaza in Washington and European capitals, the Palestinian side seems absent from this discussion, unable to come up with creative ideas that match the dramatic historical event that has occurred since last October 7.

Starting the path of “reconciliation”?

The rounds of dialogue between Fatah and Hamas since 2008 have not been able to convince the latter to join the ranks of the organization. The Hamas documents accepted a long-term truce with Israel without going as far as the PLO documents did, regarding recognition of the State of Israel and the establishment of a state on part of Palestine. Since 2017, Haniyeh had announced that his movement does not oppose “interim” the establishment of a state on the 1967 borders, but is committed to not recognizing the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. A few days ago, in an interview with the American Al-Monitor website, Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzouk expressed the movement’s readiness to become part of the Palestine Liberation Organization, as a step towards ending the divisions between the Palestinian factions, adding that “we will respect the organization’s commitments.”

The man later retracted his statement, saying it had been "misunderstood." In other words, Hamas has retreated from abandoning a taboo that is still firmly established in its texts. Commitment to the organization’s obligations, according to Abu Marzouk’s position, includes the Palestine Liberation Organization’s recognition of Israel since 1993. If the man, Haniyeh, and others express and will express the transformations of necessity, the movement whose military wing is fighting the Gaza battle does not want to throw away its cards at a time when the major capitals are hesitating. There is no place for Hamas in any future political settlements.

It may be true that "no voice is louder than the sound of battle." It may be understood that Hamas will not fall in politics unless Israel has so far been able to resolve it militarily. It may be logical for the movement not to open a political bazaar in the absence of any major credible international regional Palestinian workshop, but courage requires that the movement draw on the examples of war that Fatah and other Palestinian factions have previously drawn, and that it invests in the possible, abandons the impossible, and does not go outside the two squads. Palestinian and Arab, and to be part of the post-war dynamic.

If Hamas launches “experimental” positions, Fatah and the Palestinian Authority must seize the historical moment to encourage Hamas and all Palestinian factions to join in entitlements that require unity to confront an international scene that appears to be looking at the “Palestinian solution” with a more serious eye. If previous experiences do not encourage trust and faith in the international community, then it is worth crossing over to Palestinian unity as an inevitable option, even if it involves coercion, not heroism.

The Palestinian Authority is enjoying a rare historical moment in which the international community returns to recognizing it as a solution to governing Gaza and unifying it with the West Bank. Washington therefore requires “reform and revitalization” of power. Although the two expressions are new in the texts of American diplomacy, they are a necessity that the Palestinians have been demanding for years through elections.

Does the world allow these elections? Does Israel and this world accept the results of these elections? If voting is impossible, how can this reform and revitalization be achieved?

That's another question.

Source: Assas Media