By Victor Chalhoub

In dealing with the war on Gaza, the administration of US President Joe Biden is relying on a miniature version of “shuttle diplomacy” formulated by Henry Kissinger to contain the October 1973 war.

Successive visits and tours, bargaining and pressure to identify commonalities that lead to the desired exits. The difference between the two cases, in addition to the difference in circumstances and the nature of the two wars, is that Kissinger's diplomacy - designed to serve Israel in the end - had an accurate compass, and dealt with Israeli intransigence at times with the firmness of a superpower, which allowed it to achieve its goal at the time of a ceasefire and disengagement.

Joe Biden's shuttle compass seems to be faltering at best, and Israel is dealing with it as if it is the superpower with regard to how to manage the war and determine its time limit. There appears to be no indication on the horizon that Joe Biden intends to use the influence of his position to regain the initiative and put the war on Gaza on another path.

So far, four members of the administration have made nine visits to Israel, the last of which was on Sunday with the arrival of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in Tel Aviv for the second time. The officials’ talk about these tours ranged between “providing advice to the ally,” and expressing repeated and tiresome concern for “the safety of civilians,” and the importance of the flow of “humanitarian aid,” and the need for Israel to adhere to these obligations, but without drawing any red line in this regard or even waving at it.

All violations were implicitly given as mitigating reasons under the guise of “Israel’s right to defend itself,” although this tone has declined somewhat, following the increasing scale of the humanitarian disaster in the Gaza Strip. As more aspects of it were revealed and the hype around it rose, even within America, expressions of distress began to increase, even if they remained within the limits of insinuations and talk that the administration had “ran out of patience” with excessive Israeli power and was “fed up with it,” to the point that Joe Biden was forced to disclose his annoyance, even if he was shy, with it .

As a result, Jake Sullivan and Secretary Austin were quickly scheduled to visit Israel, to ask officials to begin the phase of “reducing” the intensity and intensity of military operations and moving them toward “focused” selective targeting, but what accompanied and surrounded their visit reinforced the belief that the mission was further than that. The demand to "reduce indiscriminate bombing" does not require the visit of two senior officials to Israel. According to precedent, communicating such a request does not require more than a phone call to the head of its government.

It is most likely that the purpose is elsewhere, indicated by growing fears about the possibility of the war deviating from its invasive nature. Israeli signals in this regard continue in the speech as well as in the field, and this may have been behind the decision of Secretary of Defense Austin, on the eve of his travel to Israel, to extend the deployment of the aircraft carriers Gerald Ford and Dwight. Eisenhower is in the area until further notice.

The aircraft carrier Gerald Ford was supposed to depart in the middle of this month. This is the second time that it has been decided to renew its residency there, with the expectation that this entails anticipating developments that are not excluded, related to the possibilities of expanding the war that is still faltering in Gaza, and in which doubts are growing about Israel’s intentions to open its northern front. Such a scenario is constantly being pointed out on the grounds that the current moment provides Israel with direct leverage by American power in the region to push towards open escalation, perhaps leading to the cutting of ties between Washington and Tehran. The moment is appropriate for Netanyahu to achieve this strategic goal.

Likewise, there is another fear reflected in the Israeli field stumble in Gaza, which is sometimes likened to the failure of the Ukrainian forces in the counter-attack that they launched in early summer, which ended in stagnation at best. This brings to mind what was said by Israeli military authorities before the war on Gaza about the existence of a defect in the preparedness of the Israeli forces, which explains the increase in their losses in Gaza and their confusion, as was shown in the killing of three prisoners at the hands of these forces, which was highlighted by the American media with many comments. Question marks surrounding the incident and its implications.

A month later, partisan elections for candidates begin. The continuation of the war on Gaza in this manner “for several months,” as the Israelis suggest, is a possibility that Democrats fear will have negative repercussions on Biden’s already threatened situation. The president's fumbling diplomacy exacerbates his difficulties and expands and complicates the war.

Source: Alaraby Aljadeed