Cessation of combat operations without a ceasefire.. Is this a realistic scenario for the end of the Gaza war?

The scenario of a ceasefire based on a truce agreement - as happened in previous wars on the Gaza Strip - does not seem realistic at all in the context of the final scene of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle. No political leadership in Israel dares to sign an agreement or grant a commitment - even through a third party - that would result in understandings with the party carrying out the events of October 7. There is a huge psychological complex and dimensions that Israel cannot bear, and one of its consequences would be to recognize the other party in any agreement.

The final scene of this crazy war on the Gaza Strip is complicated by the impossibilities that cannot be achieved. The Israeli army achieving a clear victory over the Hamas movement - according to what the leaders of the occupation army say - is impossible, whether the military operation lasts long or short.

This is due to operational reasons and not emotional readings. Hamas's handing over of its prisoners - without an exchange deal that meets the Palestinian ambition to whitewash the prisons - is impossible, and it is unimaginable for Hamas to take such a step, even if the prisoners became missing.

Also, turning this war into a war of liberation at this stage is considered the third impossibility, as the West Bank did not benefit from the battle of “Al-Aqsa Flood” in building a deliberate movement for it in light of this situation, or breaking the stalemate in the West Bank towards a real project to confront settlement and occupation. At this point at least.

As for the fourth impossibility, it is that every war has an end. If we are talking about the fact that Gaza is not Ukraine - whose area exceeds 600 thousand square kilometers - then Israel is also not Ukraine, as its existence cannot tolerate long wars with an unclear end.

In the event that no fundamental achievement is achieved for Israel, it has no choice to save face but to resort to the scenario of a unilateral cessation of hostilities without a ceasefire, while retaining the right to persecute and assassinate, and without the cessation of hostilities entailing any obligations.

In the face of these current impossibilities, there is only one realistic scenario, which is Israel declaring, in agreement with the United States of America, a cessation of hostilities without declaring a ceasefire, and without reaching a truce, with regional approval. This option is ripe for either the Law of coincidence or the complexities of the facts on the ground.

There is no possibility on the horizon for any other scenario for the next stage. This option seems to be the most acceptable, as Hamas will not accept any truce that does not guarantee a clear lifting of the siege and a full pledge to clean up the prisons.

The law of coincidence reinforces the approach to this realistic scenario through what Israel has become accustomed to in previous wars and in its previous conflict with the Palestinians, waiting for what is called: the “golden mistake” or “golden information.” During the prolongation of its military operations and its intense attack, it is waiting for information to arrive by chance, through an error resulting from the use of technology, or being forced to change locations, or other means, about a leader or leaders in the first row to be eliminated. This is considered a major moral achievement for the Israeli army.

Then Israel can go to stop hostilities, while offering a meal of achievements to its audience, and then reserves the right to assassinate, and to carry out rapid military operations as necessary after that, thus keeping in the minds of the Israelis that the war has not ended and that the slogans it raised are still proceeding according to a well-thought-out plan.

As for the realistic scenario - which will lead to the same result - it is that the current zero-sum equation must stop at some point, and therefore, even though it is not clear what the time limit granted by the American administration to Israel is, in all cases it has approached, and all indications indicate it will not exceed a few weeks, no more.

In the event that no fundamental achievement is achieved for Israel, it has no choice to save face but to resort to the scenario of a unilateral cessation of hostilities without a ceasefire, while retaining the right to persecute and assassinate, and without the cessation of hostilities entailing any obligations.

This scenario is not considered bad for Hamas at all, as it means that it will not have any obligations, and it is implicitly understood that the flame of resistance will continue. What happened is considered a prelude to a long liberation war, and in the context of the natural state of resistance factions with their enemy, which is intermittent or continuous clashes, hit and run and work as much as possible in the entire occupied territory of Palestine.

This scenario also lays the foundation for building a cumulative state of resistance and struggle against the occupation without any other obligations, which is the state of mind closest to Hamas’ combat doctrine and the natural logic of things. But it is certain that the fragility of the situation in this case will be regionally worrying, especially for Egypt, as it will sustain the thunderbolts of explosion.

In such a scenario, it would be easier to achieve an honorable prisoner exchange deal, much more than in any other scenario. The two parties will complete this deal in light of a cessation of fighting, but without ceasefire obligations. Which means the scenario of the possibility of returning to fighting, and this is acceptable, is consistent with the Hamas movement’s decision not to negotiate over prisoners under fire, and also with the movement’s official position of calling for an exchange deal, then returning to fighting if the occupation is determined to return to completing the war.

However, this more realistic path has multiple scenarios, some bad and some good, and they are as follows: for Israel to stop hostilities unilaterally and maintain its control over parts of the Gaza Strip. This does not require approval or rejection from the other party, which is the Hamas movement. Because the announcement will be one-sided.

But this means that the period of calm will be limited to take a breath, and fighting will soon be renewed until the last soldier leaves the sector through hit-and-run operations, whether the matter is related to a limited presence on the border strip in agricultural lands - which is the closest to reality scenario - or the presence inside residential areas in the northern Gaza Strip, where the situation will be more complicated.

The occupation army also has a high ambition to stop hostilities, as it is in control of what is called the “Philadelphia axis”, which is the border strip of the Gaza Strip with Egypt. While emphasizing that nothing in the outcome of the battles is impossible, achieving this is very difficult, and it is closer for the imagination, even if the occupation forces reach it at some point, the resistance cannot make them settle there.

The cessation of hostilities without a ceasefire may result in political understandings, and may not be in the three basic files for any understandings, which are: governance in Gaza, prisoners, and weapons.

There are two assumptions for Hamas that it cannot give up: giving up its weapons and being complacent in the exchange deal, while Hamas is very flexible on the third topic, which is ruling Gaza. Quite the opposite, one of Hamas’ undeclared goals in this war may be getting rid of civilian rule in the Gaza Strip. Hamas movement put this scenario on the table, and previously discussed it with the Palestinian Authority and the factions, but did not receive a response.

A number of its leaders also issued clear statements in this war that the responsibility of civilians in the Gaza Strip is the responsibility of UNRWA and the United Nations.

Hamas has been aspiring for years to emulate the Lebanese model of separating the resistance from the government, but it does not want a government that stabs it in the back, and this is the thorny issue in the Palestinian situation.

The formation of a new leadership in the Gaza Strip may be marketed as a concession extracted from the Hamas movement, and this constitutes a regional solution, especially for Egypt, and one of the intersections of truce solutions that Netanyahu can market at some point with American approval.

As for the form of this government - whether it is closer to Hamas’ vision or closer to Israel’s vision - it depends on the results of the field, which is likely to be in accordance with the perspective Hamas aspires to, especially since the formation of this government will be a kind of loyalty on the part of Hamas to its popular base in that this new government is a gateway to lifting the siege and reconstruction.

The scenario of a cessation of hostilities without a ceasefire - although it appears in its immediate moments to not carry any vision related to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip or a pledge to lift the siege - nevertheless, strategically, it reflects the short-sightedness of the leaders in Israel who enjoy absolute narrow-mindedness and fatal strategic blindness. At that moment, it can be said that they had taken the first line in transforming the battle of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” into actual, continuous and accumulated foundational work towards true liberation in the coming years.

Source: Aljazeera