Israeli media revealed more details and internal discussions that took place in the Israeli army in the last months, days and hours before the Hamas attack on October 7.

In the latest evidence of information and assessments that should have enabled the Israeli military command to prevent a large-scale operation by Hamas, Channel 12 reported on Monday evening that an intelligence officer in the Gaza Division prepared a presentation in July 2022 outlining “Hamas’ plan for a comprehensive attack.”

One graphic from the presentation showed about 20 groups of Hamas' "elite forces" invading southern Israel from Gaza. The presentation warned that "terrorist cells will be accompanied by engineering teams to penetrate the border fence and defenses in multiple places." According to the report, the document included the following sentence: “This invasion constitutes the most serious threat facing the IDF forces in defending (Israel).”

Channel 12 also reported that the Israeli Army’s Military Intelligence Directorate held a discussion three months before October 7, in which an officer with the rank of brigadier general, whose name was not revealed, participated. He concluded his speech by saying: “We tried, but we did not succeed. We cannot now know how (the Hamas president) will act.” In Gaza, Yahya Al-Sinwar, and therefore commanders in the field must take the necessary precautions.”

The report stated that the results of the discussion were referred to the head of the Israeli Defense Intelligence Department, Aharon Haliva, who ordered the intensification of intelligence gathering, adding that this actually happened.

On October 1, the Gaza Division Commander ordered an assessment of the situation, which revealed a “sharp increase in elite force training.” The report on this assessment said that six Hamas brigades, a number of them in northern Gaza and one in Khan Yunis in its south, were carrying out digging operations once or twice a week.

However, according to Channel 12, the author of the report concluded that “in light of the contradiction between the economic benefits of Hamas and the ongoing unrest (on the Gaza border), things currently seem to be moving towards (settlement) arrangements and calming the unrest.”

The last hours before the attack

On the night between October 6 and 7, hours before the early morning attack, an email was sent from an Israeli army base on the Gaza border talking about “certain signals coming from Gaza” about an imminent attack. At the same time, the Shin Bet security service also saw signs that something was happening.

At approximately 1:30 a.m. on October 7, the director of the office of the Israeli Chief of Staff, Herzi Halevi, was informed of this matter, by the Shin Bet and then by the IDF general in charge of the Southern Command. At approximately 3:30 a.m., Halevy was awakened, who requested to arrange a telephone consultation in order to assess the situation, and that session was held approximately 90 minutes later.

The IDF Operations Commander organized his own consultation before Halevy's consultation, finding the same signs of an imminent attack, and asked for clarification as to whether the talk was about training or a strategic operation against Israel in the coming hours. That consultation concluded that no final explanation could be reached, and requested additional intelligence from the IDF's 8200 Signal Intelligence Unit.

After the consultation ended, Halevy and the head of operations of the IDF and the General Southern Command were briefed on the indicators of an imminent attack. Halevy requested more information and ordered the Israeli Air Force to be informed. He also ordered an examination of intelligence, including from a skeptical perspective on the widespread assumption that Hamas is not interested in war.

According to Channel 12, this may have been the first crack in the concept that Hamas had been deterred, but it was not enough to order Halevy to prepare for a major incident. Only three drones and a combat helicopter were mobilized.

Haliva, head of the Intelligence Department, did not participate in these consultations that took place on October 6 and 7, as he was on vacation in Eilat. He was briefed around 3 a.m. on the worrying signs from Gaza, but he did not participate in the consultations and was not available to them by phone.

In addition to Israel having multiple sources of information about Hamas training and other preparations for an attack in the weeks leading up to October 7, Channel 12 also drew attention Monday to the television series entitled “The Fist of Free men” which Hamas channel broadcast during the month of Ramadan in late spring 2022. Which showed the infiltration of Palestinian fighters into Israel.

The series depicted an attack on Israel that included the use of white pickup trucks, disrupting Israeli communications, and targeting kibbutzim and Israeli army bases, including the Ra'im base, where the Israeli army's Gaza Division is stationed. The series also showed the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, and the establishment of a Palestinian base on an Israeli army base.

The head of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, publicly praised this series, saying that it “has a very great impact on the struggle of our people,” and that it is “an important pillar of the liberation and return project,” stressing that it is “absolutely inseparable from our very great preparation and the work of Our brothers in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and their manufacturing and intelligence workshops.”

Israeli media also reported that two divisions of the Israeli army's commando brigade, which were deployed on the Gaza border during the Jewish holiday season in October, were sent to the West Bank just two days before the Hamas attack on October 7.

The Israeli Broadcasting Corporation "Kan" reported that about 100 soldiers from the two companies were deployed in the town of Huwwara in the West Bank, following a shooting attack on settlers there.

The Israeli army pledged on Monday to conduct an investigation into the decision to transfer forces from the Gaza border in early October.