After the war on Gaza: what is required of the Palestinians?

Shortly after the outbreak of the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip, it seems that the American administration began to form its own vision of the consequences of the situation in the Strip after the end of this war. Despite the absolute and open support that Tel Aviv received from Washington, which was translated into a continuous flow of various types of support, and the compatibility of the American position with the Israeli goal of eliminating the Hamas movement, by ending its rule in the Gaza Strip and destroying its military structure 

When the American administration consulted the Israeli War Council about the future of the Strip after the war, it did not find anything new and convincing in the vision presented. This vision focused on the necessity of achieving the military goal of excluding Hamas from the scene of the Gaza Strip, but it did not present a political horizon or a clear vision for what would happen next. The basis of the vision of Netanyahu and his most right-wing ministers was to go in a smooth direction towards re-imposing comprehensive security control over the Gaza Strip, either by returning to the continued occupation of it completely or at least partially, and in the best case scenario, creating a Palestinian administration there that would handle the civil affairs of the Gazans, which might be the Palestinian Authority, after The largest number of them were expelled to Sinai.

Although the US Secretaries of State and Defense urged Netanyahu at the time to give greater attention to the issue of the future of the Gaza Strip, Washington was initially drawn, under the impact of the “Seventh of October” shock, to the Israeli square, to the Israeli vision square, and tried to pass the issue of expelling the Palestinians to Sinai under the argument of humanitarian reasons. But it did not take long for it to regain control of its position, not on the war, which it still strongly support, but on the future of the situation after the war. It is likely that three reasons prompted Washington to do so.

First, the contacts and consultations conducted by Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, in Arab capitals revealed to the administration the strength of the position of its Arab allies, not only in the categorical and absolute rejection of Israel’s expulsion of the Palestinians from their homeland, but also in the urgent need to close the conflict through the only way, which is the establishment of a Palestinian state  According to the principle of the “two-state solution” adopted by America and the international community. 

This is in addition to the urgent Arab demand for the necessity of a ceasefire as soon as possible to address the catastrophic situation of civilians. The American administration has become convinced of the Arab position that the goal of stabilizing the region and normalizing Israel’s presence in it cannot be achieved in a fundamental way except by resolving the Palestinian issue, and not by continuing to merely manage it with the intention of neutralizing it.

Second, the images conveyed daily of the brutality with which Israel unleashed its vengeance on all Palestinians in Gaza, causing thousands of victims, most of them children, and the enormity of the massive destruction that affected various aspects of Gazan life, led to a growing and angry international public opinion that began to put pressure on Western governments support to Israel without accountability. Of course, the anger was directed at Washington and President Biden, the symbol of unlimited support for Israel in its war with Gaza. The catastrophic humanitarian situation worsening daily in the Gaza Strip has become embarrassing for Washington, which began demanding that Israel legalize the war, not stop it, out of concern for the lives of civilians and the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

Third, despite the collapse of the US administration’s material, moral and emotional support for Israel after the Hamas attack on October 7, and its emphasis on the depth of the organic relationship that links America with Israel, its relationship with the extreme right-wing government of Israel is not good, and there is a long history of estrangement between Biden and Netanyahu. It is most likely that the confidence of the members of this administration in Netanyahu is low, as his intentions and actions - and the unbridled extremism of the extreme right among the settlers in his government - raise in them doubts. Therefore, this administration found that its support for Israel in the war on Gaza should not mean the necessity of submitting to the wishes of its current government, especially with regard to the future status of Gaza, and the settlement of the conflict in general.

The American administration wants a stable Middle East, at least to the minimum extent, that is, to the extent that American interests can be taken care of without the need to allocate high resources, or get involved in a muddy war. America's supreme strategic interest has shifted from the region, after it believed that it had guaranteed its interests and contained its conflicts to the minimum that it could live with, and has moved to what is more important and has a greater impact on it in the future, which is the threat of Chinese rise.

Therefore, it tried hard to contain the conflict with Iran by negotiating its nuclear file, and made a great effort to build on the success of its predecessor in normalizing Israel’s relations with Arab countries, and pushing towards the normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations. All of this came in order to devote more time to confronting China and containing its rise. As for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it has been neglected and ignored, as if it no longer has any importance or influence on the course of political life in the region.

Hamas' sudden attack on Israel came to change the monotony of the situation in the region and the bleakness of the Palestinian situation. Because of him, the Palestinian issue returned to the top of the list of global attention. The American administration has rediscovered that the Palestinian issue is the focus of political life in the region. It seems that for the reasons mentioned above, and in order to achieve the strategic American interest, this administration, under the pressure of need, which may be fleeting, found it necessary to shift its position from managing the conflict with the intention of keeping it on the simmer, to announcing its endeavor to resolve it.

In this context came the Biden administration's new position on the future of the sector after the war, which Blinken recently expressed, in which he publicly and noticeably differed from Netanyahu's position. Regarding the determinants of the new position, Blinken emphasized the US administration’s refusal to re-occupy the Gaza Strip, impose a siege on it again, forcibly displace its population out of it, or reduce its area, all of which are extremely important points. Assuming that the Israeli-American goal of the war is achieved, which is to end the possibility of Israel being exposed to “terrorist” attacks from Gaza and threats to it from the West Bank, and to achieve sustainable peace and security, governance in the Gaza Strip, according to what Blinken stated, must be based on the aspirations of the Palestinians, It should be led by the Palestinian Authority in the unified West Bank and Gaza, include a sustainable mechanism for the reconstruction of Gaza, and include a road map for Palestinians and Israelis to live in two states subject to the same standards.

Regardless of whether this vision is true or not, putting it into practice requires basic conditions to be met. 

First, being able to end Hamas’ rule and destroy its military structure in the Gaza Strip. This condition has not been fulfilled yet, as the war has not yet ended, and there are many factors that are still active and present, and will have their effects in determining the final outcome. Although the indicators available so far may suggest that there is a possibility of achieving the Israeli-American goal, ending Hamas’ rule of the Gaza Strip does not end the movement, and most likely will not reduce the percentage of popular support for it among the Palestinians, but rather may increase this support. What this means is that implementing the American vision cannot succeed by excluding Hamas from participating in the political process. This is something that requires the will of all parties, and the expenditure of a lot of effort and time to be achieved. This is something that may require, as Blinken indicated, to go through... A “transition period,” during which the future governance of the sector requires the involvement of countries from the region and beyond, as well as international institutions.

Secondly, getting rid of Netanyahu and his right-wing government, which constitutes a fundamental and real obstacle to the possibility of realizing the new American vision, and replacing it with a less extremist government that is open to achieving a political settlement of the conflict in accordance with the principle of the two-state solution, and capable of moving forward in this endeavor. This may be the easiest condition to achieve, as the Netanyahu government, before it was expanded and transformed into an emergency government, was on the verge of collapse, and the political future of its president was at an end after the war ended. It is likely that the forces of the religious settler right will be curbed in the next Israeli government. Although the October 7 attack took the Israelis towards the right, and united them around waging war and confronting Hamas, there is a reasonable possibility of a shift in Israeli public opinion after the end of this war, towards acknowledging that living in safety requires ending the conflict in accordance with the principle of the two-state solution.

Third, putting the vision expressed by Blinken into actual implementation requires the presence of a real will on the part of Biden and his administration, and not just a sloganeering position required by the needs of the stage, which fades with the end of the war, especially with the approaching entry into the season of preparation for the presidential elections, and entering into the fever of the electoral campaign. Although the US President will likely face a fierce challenge from Trump, it may lead to neglecting the implementation of the vision expressed towards resolving the conflict in the Middle East. But it is worth noting that the unlimited and unconditional bias that Biden presented to Israel in the beginning angered Muslim Americans, those of Palestinian and Arab origins, and other Americans with progressive tendencies, including Jewish Americans, as well as the progressive wing of the Republican Party, which caused him to lose electoral support. It is necessary for him, especially in swing states that he needs to win in order to win his re-election battle. Therefore, he is desperate to appease these angry people, which means he cannot neglect the topic of importance to them. This opens a positive area for internal pressure to transform the vision into action.

With the possibility of the American administration to proceed, even if it is limited and fraught with risks, and if it does come, it will come burdened with deep Palestinian pain due to the magnitude of the loss and enormous suffering that has engulfed the people in Gaza and disrupted the course of life there for many years to come. The important and urgent questions that must be answered by the Palestinians are: 

Should we let things flow smoothly over us, so that we are the recipients of what others plan and carry out against us, or does the duty require the Palestinian political level to seriously prepare for the next Palestinian path that is required to confront various possibilities, and to be well prepared to protect the supreme national interest of the Palestinian people, which may be targeted under the slogan and application of two-state solution. What are the most important preparations that must be taken, the warnings that must be taken into account, and the positions that must be adhered to, so that the Palestinian position is both strong and effective?

The most important pillars of the Palestinian vision can be summarized in the following points:

First, the necessity of effective action at various levels and various international arenas, with the help of Arab countries, on the necessity of immediately stopping the insane war on the Gaza Strip. All possible pressure must be exerted on the American administration to change its position on this war, and to assure it that its absolute support for Israel will have a negative impact on it, especially on achieving its strategic interest in a stable Middle East. This interest cannot be achieved by continuing to slaughter Palestinians in Gaza. The first urgently necessary condition is the immediate ceasefire and a comprehensive prisoner exchange that will end the suffering of thousands of Palestinians in Israeli detention centers. Lifting injustice against the Palestinians is the basic condition upon which it is possible to build to achieve stability in the region.

Secondly, focusing on the fact that the history of the conflict did not begin, according to the Israeli narrative, on “the 7th of October,” but rather extends through Palestinian suffering that has continued for seventy-five years, and that this suffering must end. Since wars are fought to achieve a political goal, the Palestinian goal of this war is not limited only to addressing the aspects of the enormous human suffering it has produced for the Palestinians of Gaza, although it is an urgent necessity, but rather to seriously addressing the accumulated causes that lead to the continued eruption of the situation. The fundamental Palestinian demand is the necessity of ending the occupation and achieving freedom and independence. This was the motivation for the Palestine Liberation Organization to accept the two-state solution, and requires the American administration and its Western allies to obtain Israeli acceptance of this solution, which has not been achieved so far.

Third, taking advantage of the American position rejecting the displacement of Gazans, present and future, outside the Gaza Strip, and relying on the solidity of the Palestinian cling to the land, on the one hand, and the categorical position of the Arab countries’ rejection of the Israeli displacement plan, especially Egypt and Jordan. On the other hand, to close the door permanently and definitively on the desire to Israel seeks to forcefully displace Palestinians from their homeland. This war will destroy Israel's ability to achieve its desire, not only for this once, but forever. 

Therefore, it is necessary to declare the Palestinian-Arab position that absolutely rejects the issue of expulsion, and to stop discussing it, so as not to inadvertently provide it with the oxygen necessary to keep it in circulation and alive. However, in this context, special attention must be paid to what the mechanism for achieving the Israeli desire to displace the Palestinians could become, so that voluntary migration becomes the path followed to achieve the goal. 

Therefore, it is important, Palestinian and Arab, to work early and diligently with the countries that Israel might seek to open the doors of its immigration to a large collective number of Palestinians, in order to alert and warn it of the possibility of engaging in such a suspicious goal.

Fourth, with the urgency of the worsening need in the Gaza Strip, and the necessity of giving it the greatest Palestinian importance and attention, it is also required not to ignore what is happening in the West Bank in terms of the intensification of the settlement process and the targeting of Palestinians, whether from the occupation army, or from systematic settler violence. It is necessary to carry out a comprehensive and focused media and diplomatic campaign in various capitals of the world, but in the Western capitals allied with Israel, to demand serious positions on it, not only to continue to provide verbal condemnations, but to translate them into taking steps to curb this settlement expansion and the ongoing terrorism that the Palestinians are exposed to.

Fourth, confronting the urgent need to put the Palestinian internal affairs in order, in a real and realistic manner. Over the past sixteen years, the Palestinian national cause has suffered from a division that has exhausted it and has not led to any progress in the effort to achieve the goal of the Palestinian national project. We must acknowledge the mistakes that have been committed, and not continue throwing them from one party to another, and continue throwing accusations around, as this is ineffective. Although it is not permissible to underestimate the important issue of acquiring the legitimacy of Palestinian representation, which is being fought over internally, and may even be very important, the continuation of this struggle over it weakens the overall Palestinian ability vis-à-vis others. The continued preoccupation with the self division deviates the Palestinian compass.

This division must end in order for the collective Palestinian effort to be directed towards achieving the general national goal. The Palestine Liberation Organization must open its doors to be the umbrella of all Palestinians. Hamas must also translate the step it took when it changed its charter in 2017, and confirm what the head of its political bureau expressed a few days ago, by accepting the two-state solution. As for recognizing Israel, this is another matter, and it is not permissible for a Palestinian to make the mistake of repeating it again, as it is a result and not the gateway to a settlement. Ending the division is a must necessitated by current events, and if this necessity is exceeded now, we will lose achieving any meaningful political goal from this war, which means that we will continue in self-discussions that are not useful, and will only be satisfied with healing the wounds.

Fifthly, the importance of ending the division and putting the internal Palestinian house in order lies in preempting the possibility of imposing what Blinken called a “transitional phase” for managing the sector. Although it is hoped that the outcome of the war will be different from what Israel and America want, taking other possibilities into consideration is important to determine the best ways for an effective Palestinian confrontation. In this regard, the Palestinians must reject the “transitional phase” clearly, completely and firmly, for three reasons. 

First, this will create a real possibility of separating the future of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank, which could form the basis for undermining the Palestinian national endeavor to establish a comprehensive Palestinian state, and lead to the swallowing of Jerusalem and the West Bank by Israel. 

Second, accepting the arrangements for that stage will make the Palestinian Authority merely a participating party with other parties in the arrangements, and not the only party with exclusive responsibility for the occupied Palestinian territory. This is something that, if accepted by the Palestinians, would most likely open up negative future possibilities on the issue of Palestinian representation. 

Thirdly, because we Palestinians have a bad experience with the “transitional period” It has been tried and turned into a “final stage,” which has been in existence for three decades now, even though it was supposed to end in five years. Learning from the past, we must never again accept negotiations on an open-ended path without a real and binding guarantee. Therefore, the outcome must be agreed upon in advance, which is ending the occupation and establishing the Palestinian state, obtaining an international declaration guaranteeing this within a specific time frame, and then entering into detailed negotiations to translate this into practice within the duration of that ceiling. In short, from now on, we should focus on recognizing the principle, then looking into the details.

Sixth, all of the above requires activating the Palestinian political system, and ridding it of the monotony of calcified routine, which has made it unable to face the enormous challenges. Injecting dynamism into this system requires, in addition to ending the division, a transition and return from relying on individual capabilities and initiatives, to activating the various institutional structures of this system, and benefiting from employing all the capabilities of the Palestinians, regardless of their orientations and whereabouts, in a way that ensures the holding of general elections as soon as possible. There is a real opportunity, created by the depth of the enormous Palestinian suffering as a result of this crazy war, to heal the Palestinian rift, reunite and sharpen resolve. Patriotism is higher than factionalism, and the national need now calls for the solidarity and action of all Palestinians.

(Alayam)