Analysis: The Israeli war on Gaza: Is there a time horizon for the end of the war?

Introduction

Two days after the Al-Aqsa Flood operation launched by the Islamic Resistance Movement “Hamas” on October 7, 2023, targeting Israeli military sites and settlements in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip, the Israeli security mini-ministerial “cabinet” declared a state of war, and prevented the arrival of water and electricity supplies. And fuel and food supplies to the already besieged sector. 

The Israeli government took advantage of the strongly supportive American position to launch a fierce military operation with an open horizon in the hope of bringing about a radical change in the Gaza Strip, and through it the Palestinian issue and the entire region, according to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. But with the change in the international “mood” as a result of the policies of collective punishment practiced by Israel against civilians, and the targeting of hospitals and schools, the question becomes more urgent about the extent to which the Netanyahu government can continue its aggression against Gaza in light of its inability to achieve some or all of the goals it set for the war. In fact, there is a group of factors that lead to prolonging the war, while another group may contribute to shortening its duration.

Factors that lead to prolonging the war

1. Difficulty in achieving war goals: 

Israel has set itself a number of difficult goals, namely eliminating the military power of Hamas and its rule in the Gaza Strip. Then it added two other goals: returning the Israeli prisoners and abductees and achieving victory in an unequivocal manner. The difficulty of achieving these goals stems from the fact that this requires the Israeli army to completely occupy the Gaza Strip, in light of the presence of about 2.3 million Palestinians, which means committing widespread massacres and crimes against humanity without this necessarily leading to achieving the goals of the war.

Since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Israeli army has not fought an urban war, and its readiness and the capabilities of its ground forces have not been tested, with there being a widespread belief within Israel that they are unprepared. The Israeli army uses three divisions in its war on Gaza City and the areas north of the Gaza Strip. His forces are advancing there very slowly to avoid causing major losses among their ranks, which would prolong the war. Despite the Israeli army’s superiority in numbers and equipment, its use of road-clearing bulldozers for tanks, tracked vehicles, and other military vehicles, and its support and advice from American military experts in urban warfare, it finds it extremely difficult to advance in Gaza City due to the stubborn resistance it faces. The Palestinian resistance fighters know the area well, and are trained in urban warfare. 

They suddenly appear from tunnels, trenches, from among the rubble, or from the buildings that are still standing, and direct their anti-tank missiles and light weapons against its tanks, vehicles, and soldiers, and then quickly disappear. Therefore, the Israeli army finds it very difficult to occupy Gaza City and eliminate the resistance there. Israeli Security Minister Yoav Galant and Army Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy believe that the army needs many weeks, or months, to occupy Gaza City and the entire northern Gaza Strip and eliminate resistance there.

Even if the Israeli army is able to occupy Gaza City and the northern region of the Strip, this does not mean that Israel has achieved the goals of the war, because Hamas may nevertheless maintain at least part of its military capabilities, which means that Israel will then go, if the powers cannot Regional and international, from stopping its aggression against the Gaza Strip, to occupying its center and south; This will require additional months, according to what Israeli military commanders say. Even if the Israeli army is able to occupy the entire Gaza Strip, this does not mean the end of military operations there, as resistance may continue in the form of commando operations against the Israeli army forces in the Strip.

2. The Israeli leadership has set achieving decisive victory as a primary goal of the war on the Gaza Strip, along with eliminating Hamas and its rule. 

The concept of victory here includes rebuilding the deterrence capacity and restoring the prestige of the army and security institutions that collapsed on October 7, and this matter takes a long time to achieve. Israeli leaders realize that it is difficult to erase the defeat inflicted on Israel by Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and its strategy, perceptions and assumptions towards the Gaza Strip, at a time when various forms of Israeli strategic, military and intelligence failure are still clearly visible. 

What increases the bitterness of the defeat on October 7 is that the party that directed the strike against Israel was not a large country to be reckoned with, but rather a resistance movement in the small Gaza Strip that has been besieged since 2007, killing more than 1,400 soldiers in Israel in one day. And civilians, and several thousand wounded, and about 240 others captured, some of whom were taken from their military bases, including the headquarters of the “Gaza Division” in the Israeli army and the “Yarkon” base of Military Intelligence (Aman), which is considered one of the most important military intelligence bases in Israel.[ 1], Palestinian resistance members also occupied about 20 Israeli kibbutzim and continued “fighting there for about two full days”[2].

For the Israeli leadership, achieving victory does not only mean eliminating Hamas and its rule in the Gaza Strip, but it also means, to a greater extent, teaching the Palestinians an unforgettable lesson for daring to resist and humiliate Israel by inflicting the greatest possible number of losses of life and property, and committing massacres. Successive attacks against civilians, within the framework of what has become known in Israeli literature as “cauterization of consciousness.” Committing successive massacres against Palestinian civilians is not necessary to eliminate Hamas and its rule in the Gaza Strip, nor does it come only to satisfy the instinct for revenge, but rather, according to the concept of “causing consciousness,” it is part of the equation for achieving victory, in which the Palestinian losses in lives and property must not be proportional in any way to Israeli losses. 

The victory equation is an important part of the process of restoring deterrence and prestige to the Israeli army locally, regionally and internationally. It means, as the Israeli Minister of Agriculture and member of the Political Security Cabinet, Avi Dichter, stated, committing a second Nakba against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, greater than the first Nakba in terms of the number of deaths and displacement.

The statements of Israel's political and military leaders come, such as Netanyahu's statement about the "extermination of Amalek", Halevy's speech to his soldiers, clips of which were broadcast on Israeli television, stating the need to annihilate the enemy, the statements of many Israeli leaders and analysts about the need to erase Gaza from the map, and the statement of Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu from the Judaism Power Party, regarding the use of nuclear weapons against the Gaza Strip as one of the possible possibilities[3], in the context of achieving the equation of victory over the Palestinians.

3. Prolonging the war serves Netanyahu, Gallant, and the leaders of the military and security establishment, especially the Chief of General Staff, the head of Military Intelligence (Aman), the head of General Intelligence (Shin Bet), the head of Mossad, the commander of the Air Force, and the commander of the southern region in the Israeli army, as they are responsible for the “disaster” of October 7. 

With the exception of Netanyahu, the leaders of the Israeli military and security establishment announced that they bear responsibility for the failure that occurred that day. Netanyahu, Gallant, and the leaders of the military and security establishment believe that prolonging the war and moving away from October 7 may reduce the burden of criticism and calls to hold them accountable for failure and negligence, and that achieving the goals of the war, or some of them, including committing massacres against Palestinian civilians and demonstrating the destruction. The massive inflict by the Israeli army on the Gaza Strip may satisfy the Israelis’ instinct for revenge and alleviate their resentment towards those responsible for the negligence and failure, and may score positive points for the leaders of the political and security establishment in the official investigation committee that is certain to be formed upon the completion of the war on Gaza.

4. The differences, tensions, and mistrust that exist between Netanyahu on the one hand and Gallant and the leaders of the military and security establishment on the other hand contribute to prolonging the war, as each of them seeks to appear as the party most committed to the war’s goals, within the framework of continuous bidding aimed at winning over Israeli public opinion.

5. The military support that the United States provides to Israel contributes to prolonging the war, because it now has enough ammunition to continue it for a long period.

Factors that affect stopping aggression

There are a number of factors that may push Israel to reconsider its calculations and stop the aggression against the Gaza Strip, the most important of which are:

1. The position of the American administration is one of the most important factors that can influence Israel’s decision to stop the aggression against the Gaza Strip. The US administration so far supports Israel's goal of eliminating Hamas rule in Gaza, but American support for Israel is not open-ended, and may change if Israel fails to achieve its goals during the next few weeks, especially if opposition increases within the United States to the policy of supporting Israel's war on Gaza. And it has begun to seriously affect the chances of Joe Biden being re-elected to the US presidency, if it also becomes clear that its continued support for the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip may harm American interests in the region, or weaken its position in the face of a global public opinion whose opposition to Israeli crimes and violations in Gaza is growing.

2. Israeli society is extremely sensitive to the losses that the army can suffer during military confrontations. So far, Israeli public opinion seems ready to bear losses at the current rates, considering that the price is acceptable for restoring what happened on October 7, but if the losses increase significantly, this will affect public opinion’s position on the war, and it may begin to exert pressure to finish it.

3. The Israeli army relies heavily on reserve forces, thousands of whom were called up for duty in the early days of the war. Although it is not known precisely how many reserve forces have been called up and are actually serving in the Israeli army currently, and even if the number of reserve forces serving in the Israeli army is less than 360,000 as some Israeli media reports stated, keeping them in service causes great harm to the Israeli economy, which constitutes a pressure factor to shorten the war, even if it requires changing its objectives.

4. It is expected that pressure will increase to quickly end the war from about 125,000 displaced Israelis who were evacuated from the area adjacent to the Gaza Strip and the area adjacent to the Lebanese-Israeli border, to inside Israel. They want to return to their areas and live their lives normally.

5. Large sectors of the Israeli economy are exposed to significant losses due to the continued aggression against Gaza. There is conflicting data about the extent of the losses to the Israeli economy, but it is clear that the continuation of the war for a long period will inflict huge losses on the Israeli economy and may cause a severe economic crisis.

Conclusion

The chances of forcing Israel to stop its aggressive war on the Gaza Strip remain weak. The factors driving its continuation seem more likely at this stage, especially in light of the failure to achieve any of its goals so far. Retreat at this stage will be seen as a new defeat, the consequences of which Israel cannot bear at the level of deterrence. In addition, the continuation of the war benefits Israel's political and military leaders on a personal level, because it strengthens their position if they achieve some of the war's goals before the investigation committees that will be formed to hold those responsible for the negligence and failure that occurred on October 7 accountable. Without a stronger Arab position and great pressure on the American administration, Israel is likely to act according to its own time in its aggressive war against the Gaza Strip.

[1] Ronen Bergman and Itay Ilnai, “Investigation: The series of incomprehensible errors that led to the October 7 surprise,” Yedioth Ahronoth Supplement, 10/20/2023. (in Hebrew)

[2] Sima Kadmon, “This Will Not Be a Victory,” Yedioth Ahronoth, 11/10/2023. (in Hebrew)

[3] Yehontan Liss, Noah Spiegel, and Jackie Khoury, “Minister Eliyahu: Nuclear power in Gaza is one way, this Netanyahu is disconnected from reality,” Haaretz, 11/5/2023, viewed on 11/13/2023, at: https:// bit.ly/47xz6pd (in Hebrew)

Source: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies