Yesterday evening, for the first time since the Second Lebanon War (2006), Hezbollah claimed responsibility for firing rockets at Israeli civilians in Kiryat Shmona. The party did not try to hide behind “Hamas,” as it did a week ago. This came in response to the bombing of an Israeli drone that caused the death of 4 Lebanese citizens “(after Hezbollah killed an Israeli civilian working as a water tanker driver with an anti-tank missile).”

Hezbollah's rhetoric is becoming more stringent, as are its operations, which have become more directed south of the border and against civilians. Yesterday, 30 missiles were launched, some of which were intercepted in an area far from the border. This range of Hezbollah missiles has not been used since the Second Lebanon War. This time, Hamas claimed responsibility for the launch, but it was clear that it was coordinated with Hezbollah.

On the other hand, the American display of power in the region raises clear concerns among the Iranian regime and the Hezbollah leadership. Yesterday, the New York Times reported in a report that the Biden administration sent a clear warning to Iran and Hezbollah, stating that the United States would actively participate in the war if Israel was attacked. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu does not want such a confrontation to occur. In his meetings with the Americans, he stressed the need for Israel to focus on the attack against Hamas in Gaza. Netanyahu is trying to contain the tense situation with Lebanon and limit himself to limited attacks, in response to Hezbollah attacks, so as not to force the army to be divided on two fronts.

In the long run, Israel will face a strategic problem in the north, even if it succeeds in its operation in Gaza. It is true that the Israeli army attacks slightly pushed Al-Radwan's forces away from the Lebanese border, but this party force is still present in southern Lebanon, which contradicts Resolution 1701, issued by the Security Council, which ended the last war on Lebanon. Hezbollah still possesses a missile arsenal containing more than 150,000 rockets and missiles.

In such circumstances, it is difficult to persuade residents of the border line to return to their homes, even if the war in Gaza ends with Israeli success. After October 7, deterrence is no longer a valuable commodity in the region. On the other hand, an Israeli offensive operation against Hezbollah would be dangerous, and would lead to a harsh war and widespread damage on the home front. To date, Israeli governments and the army have refrained from doing so. Israel did not respond when Hezbollah violated the military balance, deployed an advanced anti-armor system in Lebanon, and established facilities to produce precision missiles.

After the Hamas attack on the "Gaza envelope", the priorities of the Israeli public changed, and the fear of missiles in the center of the country became much less, and was replaced by a real fear of attempts to infiltrate the settlements in the border areas and on the contact line. The "massacre" in the "Gaza envelope" settlements, the entry of "saboteurs" into homes, storming shelters, and killing and kidnapping entire families, caused a strong shock among the citizens, and completely destroyed their sense of security.