In this atmosphere of mistrust and tension between Netanyahu and the leaders of the military and security establishment, Netanyahu no longer automatically accepts, as was previously the case, the military plans presented by the Chief of Staff and the military establishment...

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Following the surprise attack they carried out against Israeli military sites and settlements in the vicinity of Gaza on October 7, 2023, the Palestinian resistance factions were able to capture a large number of soldiers and settlement residents, in addition to a number of foreign nationals. The fate of these prisoners represents one of the major challenges that enter into the calculations of the Israeli government in its ongoing aggression against the Gaza Strip. Because of the pressures on it from the families of the prisoners, or the countries whose nationalities some of the prisoners hold, especially the United States of America; Which fuels the already existing disagreements between military and political decision-makers about the timing and objectives of the ground operation in the Gaza Strip.

First: Calculations of ground aggression

A number of factors influenced the postponement of the comprehensive Israeli army attack on the Gaza Strip, which the political and military leadership announced its intention to launch with the aim of eliminating the Hamas movement and its rule. The most important of these factors were: 

First, the great pressure exerted by the families of the Israeli prisoners on decision-makers in Israel and on Israeli public opinion, in order to release their prisoners, in an exchange with Hamas before the start of the ground war. 

Secondly, completing the necessary military preparations to launch the ground attack. Third, the American administration asked Israel to postpone the ground attack in order to enable the United States to complete its military preparations to protect its forces in the Middle East region from any possible attacks due to the Israeli aggression on Gaza, and to attempt to release prisoners, especially those who hold American citizenship. 

Fourth, some Israeli leaders in the military and security establishment put pressure to postpone the ground attack as long as possible, and to bomb the Gaza Strip from the air, land and sea to inflict the greatest losses on the Palestinian people and the resistance and exhaust them before starting the ground attack.

Second: The issue of prisoners and ground attacks

In recent days, the families of Israeli prisoners have intensified their activities to pressure decision-makers to give the prisoners the highest priority, and to work to release them immediately before the start of the ground attack, which may eliminate the opportunity to negotiate with Hamas to conclude a prisoner exchange deal on the one hand, and expose the prisoners to the risk of death on the other hand. . It has become clear in recent days that the issue of prisoners has begun to occupy a more important position than before at the level of public opinion. There have been increased statements by a number of former military commanders and analysts calling for a comprehensive prisoner exchange deal between Israel and Hamas. On October 26, Shaul Mofaz, the former Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff, called for a deal between Hamas and Israel in which all Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons would be released in exchange for the release of all Israeli prisoners. Opposition leader and head of the Yesh Atid Party, Yair Lapid, also announced his support for the prisoner exchange. Both of them, and other supporters, stress the continuation of the plan to "eliminate Hamas" militarily after the deal is completed.

It is noted that the escalation of the activities of the prisoners' families, on the eve of the start of the ground attack on the Gaza Strip, affected the position of Israeli public opinion regarding launching a comprehensive ground attack. An Israeli public opinion poll published by Maariv newspaper, on October 27, showed that 49 percent of Israelis support postponing the ground attack, while only 29 percent supported carrying it out immediately, while a week ago, 65 percent of Israelis supported Immediately launch a ground attack.

In light of the increasing public pressure demanding that priority be given to working to release the Israeli prisoners before the start of the ground attack, the war cabinet decided in the past few days to give an opportunity to try to release them. However, it seems that this opportunity will not last long; Multiple sources in the military establishment confirmed that the period of negotiations to release prisoners should be limited in time, during which efforts are exhausted to achieve this.

Third: The exacerbation of the dispute between Israeli decision-makers

Since the start of the war on Gaza, disagreement and intense conflict have prevailed among Israeli decision-makers regarding this war. These disputes are almost unprecedented in the history of Israeli wars. These conflicts are not limited to the crisis of personal confidence between the political and military levels, nor to public opinion’s opposition to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the conflict between him and Defense Minister Yoav Galant, but rather extend to fundamental issues. The most prominent of which is the disagreement over the goals and course of the war, especially with regard to the ground war, and who bears responsibility for the failure (Hamhadal) that occurred on October 7. 

What increases the impact of these disputes and conflicts on Israeli society is that they come in the context of the Israelis’ loss of confidence in the political and military leadership, as a result of this negligence and failure, as well as the Israeli army’s loss of self-confidence, in addition to the fact that this negligence and failure came during a period in which Israeli society was suffering. 

A severe political and social conflict and polarization that had never been seen before, and it came against the backdrop of the Netanyahu government’s intention to carry out a judicial coup, despite the opposition of the majority of Israeli society and its elites, especially the leadership of the military and security establishment. The attempted judicial coup led to a significant decline in the popularity of Netanyahu and his government, and increased tension between Netanyahu and the leadership of the military and security establishment.

The expansion of the government after the first day of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, the National Bloc’s accession to it, the establishment of the emergency government, and the joining of Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot (former chiefs of staff of the Israeli army) to the government and to the war “cabinet” did not reduce the crisis of confidence, nor did it lead to... Reducing conflicts between decision makers regarding war.

In light of the decline in the popularity of Netanyahu and his Likud party to the bottom, and his fear of holding him responsible for failure and negligence, and in light of the increase in calls demanding that he take responsibility and resign before the end of the war, Netanyahu and his close supporters launched a systematic and organized campaign against the leaders of the military and security establishment, and held them responsible for what happened. . Netanyahu appointed a new spokesman in his office responsible for contacting journalists and military correspondents to defend him and direct responsibility for the failure to the leaders of the military and security establishment.

While the leaders of the military and security establishment, including the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army, the Chief of Military Intelligence (Aman), the Chief of General Intelligence (Shin Bet), the Chief of Mossad, and the Commander of the Air Force, claimed responsibility for the failure, Netanyahu refused to bear responsibility, and contented himself with making the statement 18 days after The beginning of the war, saying: “Everyone must answer questions, and so do I, but this happens after the war”.

In this atmosphere of mistrust and tension between Netanyahu and the leaders of the military and security establishment, Netanyahu no longer automatically accepts, as was previously the case, the military plans presented by the Chief of Staff and the military establishment. His meetings with senior military leaders and retirees increased to consult with them on military plans, including General Yitzhak Brik and former Army Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi. 

In the context of preparations for the ground attack on Gaza, Netanyahu met twice in the last two weeks with General Brick, indicating his lack of confidence in the Israeli Army Chief of Staff and the military establishment. Brick warned Netanyahu of the dangers of the Israeli army launching a ground attack and advised him to be patient, due to his belief that the infantry and ground forces in general were not ready for war. He called on him to bomb the Gaza Strip from the air, land and sea for as long as possible. He added that the ground attack on Gaza may lead to Hezbollah launching a comprehensive war against Israel. Which will incur huge losses; Because, according to Brik, Hezbollah can bomb Israel with about 5,000 missiles a day; This causes severe damage to it, approaching the size of the damage inflicted by the Israeli army on Lebanon.

In addition to the dispute between Netanyahu and the military establishment led by Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy, the dispute between Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant has escalated since October 7 regarding responsibility for the failure and war priorities, and Netanyahu rejected Gallant’s request to attack Hezbollah. The background to the conflict between them dates back to March 2023, when Netanyahu dismissed Gallant from his position due to the latter’s request to freeze the judicial coup due to its negative influence on the army. Netanyahu was forced to rescind his dismissal under pressure from the protest movement and Israeli public opinion.

In light of the escalation of the dispute between the two parties, Netanyahu’s office refused to allow Gallant to enter the office to meet with Netanyahu to discuss military issues; Which indicates his lack of confidence in him, while the latter met with Gabi Ashkenazi, who has hostile relations with Gallant, and consulted with him about the war and military operations against Gaza, and tried to attract him to participate in managing the war.

The lack of trust between decision-makers at the political and military levels affects deliberations and discussions in the war “cabinet,” and in the political and security “cabinet,” at a time when they fear the investigation committee that will be established after the end of the war[9]. This increases the complexity of the discussion, deliberations, and decision-making process, which should take place freely and transparently, and without fear of investigation committees. This also affects the determination of the military strategy to achieve the agreed upon goals. In light of the mistrust and conflicts existing between decision-makers, there was no agreement on how to achieve the goals set by the Israeli leadership, which are eliminating Hamas’ rule in the Gaza Strip, eliminating Hamas’ military power, and restoring Israeli prisoners. Questions such as: Does achieving this require the need to occupy the Gaza Strip? How long will this take? Does achieving the war’s goals require remaining in the Gaza Strip for a period of time? What is the cost to the Israeli army and society for the level of resistance they will face? What scale of massacres against Palestinian civilians can the region and the world tolerate? How much would the loss of life and property be if an all-out war broke out between Hezbollah and Israel with or after the start of the ground attack? When will the Israeli army know that it has achieved its goals? Is there no contradiction between launching a comprehensive ground attack on the Gaza Strip and the goal of recovering Israeli prisoners safely?

Despite open questions and disagreements, there remains consensus on the goal of “eliminating Hamas”; Meaning its military power and its rule of the Gaza Strip, and also a consensus to carry out a ground operation or operations in the Strip to achieve this. This may be done without answering all these questions.

Conclusion

With the start of limited incursions by Israeli army ground forces in the past two days, the Netanyahu government faces a number of challenges that may affect the conduct of any ground operation. The most important of which is calculating the degree of resistance that the resistance factions will offer, the price they will pay, and the issue of the prisoners, who number at least 229. The families of the prisoners are now publicly demanding that the deal include all Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons in exchange for the release of all Israeli prisoners. Public opinion leaders in the Israeli media and the majority of Israeli society now accept this deal. But this is a matter of timing, and does not necessarily affect the ground attack decision based on not accepting a return to what was before October 7, and the necessity of exploiting the green light and American approval of Israeli targets in Gaza.