It is easy to predict the direction of the war in Gaza. It is a recurring war at different times and circumstances. Because of the repetition, Hamas learned from Israel, just as Israel learned from Hamas. Both sides learned war lessons, in all its dimensions, from strategic to tactical, through to practical. The only difference is that Israel knows who its primary, sustainable and historical ally is, unlike Hamas, which has changed its alliances a lot until it reached this stage.

This stage is the stage of existence or non-existence for Hamas. Has it reached its maximum military maturity after its success in the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation? Did you expect this success? Will this impressive military success be overlooked by a player outside the state?

The best military plans do not last the first minutes after the first shot. The war plan is revealed when the battle begins, so that there are no surprises. Accordingly, there is a constant and persistent effort by the combatants to adapt to reality. Hamas cannot deny its success, even if it was not expected. Success is a responsibility in itself, which requires preserving it and benefiting from it, because it erodes over time. How will Hamas maintain military victory? Where will it be translated?

The actual theater of war between Israel and Hamas is in the Gaza Strip and its immediate surroundings (the Gaza envelope). Whenever one team exceeds the limits of the tacitly agreed upon rules of engagement, the other team responds with everything it has in order to redraw the old borders, but with new rules of engagement.

Operation Al-Aqsa Flood

The Al-Aqsa Flood operation changed all the lines drawn in advance, and struck all imaginable rules of engagement. Therefore, the Israeli response must be parallel (Proportional) with the Hamas operation. Let us imagine the regional and international repercussions of the results of the Hamas operation in order to know the extent of the damage that the movement has inflicted on the concepts of Israeli national security.

Retaliation restrictions

There are many factors restricting the Israeli retaliation. In addition to the presence of hostages in the main theater of war, there is the difficulty of war in cities, as it requires great effort and great sacrifices, in equipment, and a long period necessary to carry out the mission and succeed in it, and this is something that is not guaranteed in advance.

In addition to these restrictions, there is the fear of a fire in the region, especially if Hezbollah, on the orders of Iran, opens the southern Lebanon front.

Accordingly, the most important restriction emerges, which is the “Biden Effect” factor. President Joe Biden seeks to engineer a regional security-deterrent system.

It aims to deter those who want to interfere in the Gaza war, and to keep the war within its geographical context, while providing protection for the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip.

Because deterrence requires displaying muscle by demonstrating elements of force, and  American forces have strengthened their forces in the region in an unprecedented manner.

Because deterrence requires that the deterred person be convinced deep down that the deterrent will use its capabilities if deterrence fails, America is working to respond militarily to the attacks on its military bases in the region. But the biggest test for America is when military harassment of its forces rises from proxy to actual.

America does not want a comprehensive and complete military operation on all fronts of the Gaza Strip. Rather, it requests that Israel carry out limited operations, in several places, aimed at striking Hamas' infrastructure, especially its leadership.

The third operation is limited to the sector

 Israel carried out a new ground operation, the third of its kind in the Gaza Strip since the start of the war. What's new in it?

It is the third ground operation. It differs from the first and second operations, in the intensity of the aerial bombardment, and in its conjunction with a naval operation on the shores of the Gaza Strip, and with the cutting off of the Internet and communications, in addition to a complete and comprehensive blackout.

The fact that Israel carried out three limited ground operations in a short period indicates the following:

Time is working against Israel, which was forced to cease fire several times under American pressure, the most important of which was the October 1973 war.

Israel is literally implementing what America asked of it. It is advancing, destroying and assassinating some leaders in Hamas, the latest of which is the commander in charge of the air system, Issam Abu Rukba.

A limited attack on several fronts may mean that Israeli forces want to deceive Hamas about the location and timing of the main attack (there may be no main attack).

Through attacks on several axes, Israel seeks to stabilize and disperse Hamas forces on the large front.

Most of the attacks occurred during the night. Which gives the Israeli forces an advantage, as they are equipped for night fighting.

The limited Israeli incursion aims to test the pulse, collect information about Hamas’ readiness, and also test this readiness to adjust the target bank. In the event of a ground advance, Israeli forces may remain inside the Gaza Strip and resume the attack on the weaker axis of Hamas forces.

Thus, the Israeli forces do not give Hamas the form and characteristics of the war that Hamas prepared for in advance in the streets, buildings and alleys of the Strip, which is urban warfare.

Last but not least, the Israeli attacks center around Gaza City. This indicates that the center of gravity of the Hamas movement is in the city, or in the tunnels under the city. Otherwise, what is the meaning of Israel targeting Al-Shifa Hospital and requesting its evacuation, because Hamas leaders are running the war from the tunnels that are located under this hospital?