At a time when the secrets of the dispute between the government and the army over the decision to invade the Gaza Strip came to light, a group of political figures and experts in strategy and media, known for their closeness to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, launched a broad campaign against the implementation of the army’s plan, and warned that a ground invasion will put Israeli army soldiers at risk from Hamas operations, threaten a dispute with the American administration, cause a wide regional war, and threaten the lives of Hamas prisoners.

The officials behind this campaign raise a central slogan that says: “We destroy Gaza and level it to the ground before the ground invasion.” They write in their text posts on social networks, as well as in video clips, that the bombing from afar aims to liquidate as many buildings as possible. They even express their support for the bombing of hospitals, schools and other places where civilians seek refuge from Israeli bombing. They say: “These are not hospitals, but rather the headquarters of Hamas’ leadership.” This is not a humanitarian shelter, but a missile warehouse. This is not a school, but an anti-tank missile ambush. “Our children’s lives are more important.”

Campaign management

This campaign is managed by Ariel Segal and Erez Tadmor, who are media and strategic consultants, along with Amit Halevy, a member of the Knesset from the Likud Party. The source of its funding is not known. Therefore, Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper said that it is Netanyahu’s campaign, which he is running in the face of the army’s decision that it is ready for the invasion while taking the necessary precautions.

The army responded to this campaign by saying that it was awaiting permission from the political leadership to carry out the ground operation. News leaked from his side that Netanyahu met again with retired General Yitzhak Brik, who is considered an outcast in the army, and is one of the most ardent opponents of carrying out an invasion, because it will cost a large number of lives and open a wide regional war on five and perhaps six fronts, namely: Gaza. The West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and perhaps Iran. Brick accuses the Israeli military leadership during the last twenty years of not truly preparing the army to fight a war of this magnitude and challenges. According to those who follow Israeli politics, this is how the army leadership works when it intends to place the burden of strategic political decisions on the government, or primarily on the prime minister.

A crisis of confidence between Netanyahu and the army

The two most prominent writers in Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, Nahum Barnea and Ronen Bergman, had published an article on the front page under the title “A crisis of confidence between Netanyahu and the army,” in which they stressed that the issue is not a matter of a professional and strategic dispute over the management of the war, but rather it stems from a belief the army claims that Netanyahu is conducting the war according to his own interests and not out of general interest, and that he is seeking to prolong the war so that he can remain in power for the longest period.

The article stated: “The crisis of confidence is an addition to the terrible damage that Israel suffered on October 7th. It makes it very difficult to focus on the war and to make decisions, even painful ones. “Israel now needs effective leadership, focused on the mission.”

They said: “Houses can be rebuilt. The most difficult thing is to build trust. In 1973, Israel was bitterly surprised and was severely hit at the beginning, but its leadership, at least most of it, continued to perform its duties, and reinforcement players joined and contributed to the experience and calm to restore the process of making orderly decisions and confidence that in the end we will be victorious. Today, Israel is acting, but it does not have an administration that can perform its duties. This is the trap of 2023.”

The article continued by saying: “This time, despite good intentions, the two consolidation players, Ministers Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, are leaving a weak impact on the final result, at least at this moment. By virtue of the agreement they signed with Netanyahu, the two men cannot meet with officers outside cabinet deliberations except with the Prime Minister’s permission. 17 days have passed since the criminal attack by Hamas on the Gaza Strip. For families whose loved ones are detained somewhere in Gaza, this is a very long time. This is also a long time for those who bury their dead every day, those who wait for the order in the military units in the north and in the south, and for all of Israeli society. “The Israelis succeed in the challenge.”

Tension between Netanyahu and his Defense Minister

Political sources revealed that the system of relations between Netanyahu and his Defense Minister also makes joint work very difficult. The sediments arose before March, when Netanyahu fired Gallant and he was forced to retract. It flared up after news was leaked according to which Netanyahu used a veto on a military operation wanted by the army and Gallant in the north, the details of which are not known to this day. He revealed that during US President Joe Biden's visit to the country, Netanyahu prevented Gallant from detailing his estimates within earshot of the US President. He contented himself with telling Secretary of State Blinken that he initially wanted to attack Hezbollah, but he stopped due to a decision from other parties.

Barnea and Bregman say that the confrontation is not only between different plans, but also over a personal background. Netanyahu is preparing himself for the mass struggle that will begin with all intensity when the situation on the ground stabilizes. Those close to him in the social network place responsibility for the disaster on the security apparatus, from Gallant and the chief of staff on down. The fear of the storm that will come the next day also guides the steps of the ministers and infiltrates the leadership of the Israeli army. In the deliberations, they talk about the protocol, starting from thinking about the day when an investigation committee will be established. This makes honest and insightful conversation, as it should be, between decision-makers very difficult.

The goal of war

The government has announced a war goal that the Israeli army doubts is achievable. In various statements, Netanyahu and Gallant promised to erase “Hamas” from the face of Gaza, and they did not explain the practical meaning of the pledge. Chief of Staff Halevy said: “We will dismantle all the organizational infrastructure that exists under Yahya Sinwar,” but how will this goal be achieved? Should this be the last gambit?

Is it only in Gaza City, or is it in complete control of the entire Strip? When will the Israeli army and the government know that Israel has actually won? In the army, they say that the fault lies with the political leadership, which did not set clear goals for the army. This may be true, but an army that goes to war without clarifying how it will know if it has won, let alone how it will exit the battlefield, must at least be warned that this is the situation. The army knew how to warn in the last year of the crisis that broke out due to the judicial coup. This time, at least as far as we know, its voice faded. Also, as far as we know, the question of what the reality will be in Gaza after Hamas is expelled, if it is expelled, is not being discussed, neither in the army nor in the government. Israel seeks to enter Gaza without clearly defining when and how it will leave there, and what it will leave behind.