On Sunday, the Hebrew newspapers focused on the end of the military round of fighting on the front of the Gaza Strip, after 5 days, which was called "Shield and Arrow" by the Israelis, while the Palestinians called it "Revenge of the Free."

The Hebrew newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, indicated that the Islamic Jihad Movement succeeded in continuing to fire rockets even after the time when the cease-fire entered into force, pointing to the reopening of the Gaza Strip crossings and the return to normal life in the Gaza Strip, and the settlements surrounding the Strip.

The newspaper quoted the mayor of Sderot, Alon Davidi, as saying that the operation was good, especially after the targeted assassinations, which indicate a change in Israeli policy, expressing his hope that it will continue.

The newspaper says that after the completion of the operation in Gaza, attention is now turned to the march of flags that will be organized in Jerusalem on Thursday, which Islamic Jihad tried to link with what is happening in the Strip.

According to the newspaper, the Israeli police, at this stage, do not intend to change their course by passing through Damascus Gate in the Old City of occupied Jerusalem.

In another report in the newspaper, its military correspondent, Yossi Yehoshua, described the operation as one of the most successful operations of the Israeli army and the Shin Bet security service in the Gaza Strip, claiming that the Islamic Jihad had received a severe blow that may be the most severe it has suffered so far at the hands of Israel, especially after losing most of its elite in a precise liquidation process. From the first strike until the last moment.

Yehoshua claimed that the Islamic Jihad had encountered difficulties in directing a large barrage of missiles towards Israel, pointing out that the most severe strike was the fall of the missile in Rohovot, which the Israeli army is investigating the circumstances of its fall and the failure of the dome to intercept it.

He claimed that the Israeli army is satisfied with the defense system after it recorded a success rate of about 95%, according to the interception policy followed.

And he considered that the manner in which the operation ended could be considered a partial Israeli achievement, especially since the army was planning for it to end as soon as possible, noting that the political level benefited from Egyptian pressure as well as from Hamas in order to reach a cease-fire, at a time when it was pressing Iran attacked Islamic Jihad for not agreeing to it, but the movement agreed under those pressures to a cease-fire.

He believed that the Islamic Jihad and its sponsors in Tehran had suffered a blow, which came from Israel's point of view at an appropriate time, given their recent audacity.

For his part, Ron Ben-Yishai, a security and military commentator in Yedioth Ahronoth, says that the operation was primarily aimed at making the Islamic Jihad leadership sitting in Beirut think twice and three times before ordering their men in Gaza to fire rockets at Israel, whether because of the situation in Al-Aqsa. Or because of a prisoner's hunger strike, or simply to harm Israelis.

Ben Yishai believes that the operation achieved this goal, but it achieved much more than that with regard to field activists in Islamic Jihad, and conveyed a clear message to their counterparts in Hezbollah and Hamas, how the Israeli intelligence locates and senior field activists and can attack them one by one during the fighting on the battlefield. Although they moved from one hideout to another, and all this at a time when Israel was maintaining international legitimacy to continue the operation.

And he saw that the achievements in Gaza - according to him - are also being absorbed in Iran, Nasrallah in Beirut, and even in Yemen, saying: "The enemies of the State of Israel and its friends have learned a useful lesson in the civil flexibility and internal cohesion that Israel shows, even when It is in the midst of a social and political division that has not been the same since its birth,” considering that this has tremendous psychological significance at this time precisely because the Iranians and their proxies, as well as the Gulf states, erred in believing that “Israel was weakened by internal conflict, and that it collapsed spontaneously from within.” as he says.

He added, "It will not force the Islamic Jihad alone to recalculate its path, but also its sponsors in Iran, as well as Hamas and Hezbollah," noting at the same time that the operation will not change the intentions of the Jihad and Hamas, but it may give us a relatively long period of calm, especially if it becomes known. The Israeli army and the Shin Bet, how to act with operational wisdom and precision in the West Bank, which appeared in conjunction with the Gaza operation.

He believed that the main problem stems from the West Bank, not the Gaza Strip, and that the Israeli right-wing government must formulate a strategy to calm the region, because the peak of its explosion may be after Mahmoud Abbas's term in power.

And he believed that there was another advantage that emerged from the operation in Gaza, which was the very significant improvement in the ability to collect intelligence information to carry out assassinations and close the circle very quickly with the operational component that carries out and supervises the attacks, referring to the development of the Shin Bet Operations Unit, whose capabilities in recent years have been Less than now, and the Air Force has proven its ability to plan and execute with the utmost precision, it is claimed.

He referred to what he said about the success of the Gaza Division in the Israeli army, which was working to catch cells firing anti-missile and mortar shells and hit them with greater success than in previous operations, which deprived the Islamic Jihad of succeeding in carrying out the launching of these rockets.

He pointed out that despite Iron Dome's success in stopping more than 90% of the missiles, according to the interception policy, the mortar shells still cause losses, pointing out that in light of the conflict with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, there will be a greater number of victims than in this case. This time, especially since the Islamic Jihad is less capable than others, and perhaps in this round it was less capable than before.

He says that the "unity of squares" that were being warned about, proved once again that Hamas, Hezbollah and even Iran are reluctant to enter into a conflict with Israel to help each other, and that what is promoted in the media remains there without an actual truth when one of them has to pay the price.

He pointed out that Hamas in this round did not participate explicitly in the action, but provided some operational assistance, but not on a large scale, and this was something that was noticed by the military and political echelons, but for correct tactical and strategic considerations, they chose to focus on Islamic Jihad, which suffered severe blows, and therefore Restoring deterrence in the entire region without paying a price more expensive than what was paid, and the partial differentiation between the Jihad and Hamas, allowed Israel to obtain a rehabilitation of deterrence at a relatively low economic cost and without incurring many casualties, with that the army, the Shin Bet, and the Mossad must have the same ability and the same competence Operational and intelligence operations to confront a battle on several fronts in which Iran participates.

For its part, Haaretz newspaper said in an analytical report by its correspondent and military analyst, Amos Harel, that Israel throughout the tour pinned its hopes on the Egyptian intelligence to succeed in a cease-fire, noting that the assassinations that were carried out were the ones that made it difficult to reach a quick agreement, at a time when the Jihad leadership was The Islamic in Beirut is looking for the completion of my operations before the end of the operation, and was not keen to stop the fighting.

Harel believed that the current operation showed once again that Israel has the ability to start any round, but it is difficult for it to end it, and that despite its military success and the damage it caused to the Islamic Jihad movement, it had difficulty dictating the exit strategy from the operation, at the time and circumstances in which It also does not have much to gain from continuing the operation, and the longer it lasts, the more difficult it is to locate and hit targets in Gaza, which prompted the army leadership and the Shin Bet last Thursday to recommend the political echelon to seek a cease-fire, while the continuation of The shooting would have endangered the political echelon, given the Israeli public's loss of patience.

He pointed out that the Islamic Jihad benefited from the lessons of the previous operations, especially Al-Fajr, which lasted for 3 days last August, and wanted the conflict to continue for a longer period even if it did not achieve major casualties among the Israelis, and that it viewed the ability to continue and to withstand the confrontation as an achievement in itself. .

And he considered that the Islamic Jihad had failed to draw the other factions, even the other hours, into the round, and that Hamas was comfortable to a certain extent, and preferred to stay away from the round, just as the other fronts remained watching, and the international arena did not care much about what was happening in light of the events in Ukraine and others.

He pointed out that the Israeli security establishment built hopes on the relationship between Ziyad al-Nakhala, Secretary General of Islamic Jihad, and the head of Egyptian intelligence, Abbas Kamel, but that did not lead to quick results, but the pressure exerted from Egypt yesterday, especially on the leadership of the Jihad in Gaza, as well as Abbas Kamel's pressure on Al-Nakhala and his deputy, Akram Al-Ajouri, bore fruit to reach a cease-fire agreement.

In another report by the Palestinian affairs reporter, Jackie Khoury, the newspaper said that, since 2019, Israel has focused its attacks against Islamic Jihad, at a time when Hamas has remained far from the forefront, something that Israel prefers to remain on and has no interest in finding a solution to the Gaza problem. Ensuring the continuation of the political separation with the West Bank, and providing humanitarian and economic aid to the Strip as long as there is no real strategic threat.