Liberation of Palestine and the regional role

Most of the Palestinian political documents issued in the period following the Nakba of 1948 refer to the centrality of the regional role in liberating the land and people of Palestine. A large part of the regional political documents, both official and partisan, express the same idea, based on two dimensions. The first is related to the role of the Zionist occupation in the region. While the second expresses the status of Palestine and its cause in the conscience and priorities of the peoples of the region.

However, despite the abundance of evidence for this organic connection, the Palestinian national liberation movement, especially Fatah, tended at the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies, to adopt the slogan “Oh, our unity”, to denote the negativity of the official regional role on the Palestinian national liberation movement, and the multiplicity of Manifestations of opportunistic regional interventions, which led to the escalation of tensions and shocks between the components of the liberation movement, as a reflection of the struggle of regional powers over their interests not related to the Palestinian cause, including the exploitation of the Palestinian card as a popular marketing card.

On a related level, the Zionist occupation applied the principle of "separating arenas" regionally and Palestinianly from its early beginnings, as it was embodied politically in the approach of unilateral negotiation, through which the occupation sought individual normalization with each regional country separately, from the Egyptian file to the Palestinian, Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese. Down to the UAE, Bahraini, Moroccan, Sudanese, Saudi and other files.

This principle was also embodied in security and militarily by dividing the Palestinian geography into separate entities and isolated from each other on the ground and legally, according to the laws of occupation, of course, and away from the provisions of international law, each of which has its own life and colonial specificity, as the occupation used in each of them seemingly dissimilar and essentially identical tools. It works to subjugate it in various ways, including the 48 areas, Jerusalem, the Negev, the West Bank, and Gaza, as well as separating the regional arenas, security and military, from each other, and from the Palestinian arenas, such as the Lebanese, Syrian, Jordanian, and Egyptian arenas.

The goal of the occupation, through this principle, is to reduce the risks of confrontation with the peoples and the Palestinian and regional liberation forces. What limits the dispersion of the Zionist occupation forces first, and raises the effectiveness of the Zionist attacks on these isolated areas secondly, and of course limits the material and human losses of the occupation thirdly.

In contrast to this Zionist strategy, the principle of "unity of arenas" was proposed at the Palestinian and regional levels, with the aim of thwarting the Zionist plans first, and based on the comprehensiveness of the liberation project for all Palestinians inside and outside Palestine second, and with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of the Palestinian struggle third. Despite the almost absolute consensus on the principle of "unity of squares" at the Palestinian and regional levels, the rounds of clashes with the occupation did not witness many models embodying it, as a result of many subjective and objective obstacles, as its application was limited to a few cases that are easy to enumerate, of which the Gaza Strip had the largest share in recent times. Through the haste of the effective resistance factions, specifically the Islamic Jihad and Hamas movements, to intervene militarily in support of Jerusalem often, just as the Zionist attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque had the largest share in inciting all Palestinians to struggle as one body with one liberating goal, as happened in the 2021 uprising, and finally as It happened when 30 missiles were launched from Lebanese territory.

Obstacles to the implementation of the Palestinian principle of "unity of arenas" are due to a number of factors, the most important of which is the decline in the power of the factions and their popular influence first. Secondly, the subjugation of the factions to the accounts of international and regional financing. Thirdly, the struggle for factional hegemony in the Palestinian arena, especially between Fatah and Hamas, of which division is one of its most important manifestations. Fourth, as a result of the methodology of the Palestinian forces, which intensify their efforts and pour most of their capabilities into a specific geographical area, with the aim of building a base to protect and entrench themselves in it, as happened historically in Jordan and Lebanon, and as is happening today in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This led to a decline in the role of the Palestinian political body in struggle, while preserving some of its official political role.

An important part of the external objective obstacles is due to the nature of the stage that prevailed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and led to the dominance of a semi-unilateral vision in the world, represented by the American vision, which besieged liberation movements, and classified the majority of the liberation struggle within selective terrorist lists, governed by the interests of the United States and the regimes. globally dominant, rather than international law, human custom and moral logic. The nature of the opportunistic regional regimes also impedes the application of this principle, as the majority of the region's regimes, historically and currently, have turned the Palestinian issue into a tool of targeted pressure, serving the interests of the regimes themselves, regardless of the issue of Palestine and the rights of the peoples of the region, as the act of struggle and talk about Palestine and the demand for human rights became The legitimate peoples of the region are just a bargaining chip and nothing more, which the regimes use to extract international and regional legitimacy, or to bargain over other political and economic files that only reflect the interests of the regimes.

From all of this, we find that the success of the principle of "unity of squares" requires many subjective and objective conditions that are not available today, in light of the decline of the Palestinian factions, and the weakness of their social support first, and as a result of the factional interests prevailing over their national theory second, and due to the opportunism of regional regimes and the secondaryness of liberal issues in their calculations. Third. From all of this, the writer believes that the multiplicity of arenas of engagement in the current stage depends on the vitality and will of the people of Palestine first, and the peoples of the region second, while the role of the regional regime will be limited to exploiting the principle of "unity of arenas" as a momentary tactical card, which it uses when it wants and ignores it most of the time, although Despite its qualitative impact on the course of the Palestinian liberation struggle and on the orientations and calculations of the Zionist occupation. Unfortunately, this principle is not a major component of the strategy of the entire regional system, including Iran. This is what the Palestinians must beware of, so as not to fall into the trap that we fell into at an earlier stage, especially from the Nakba in 1948 until the Naksa in 1967, and to a lesser extent until The exit of the Palestinian fedayeen from Beirut in 1982, despite the importance of the regional dimension to the success of the principle of “unity of arenas” in relieving pressure on the Gaza Strip, and its ability to control the effectiveness of the struggle and movements of the Palestinians in the diaspora, as well as its control over the effectiveness of the peoples of the region. However, turning it into a tactical card of interest will not serve the liberation project, even if it achieves some immediate gains. Rather, its use as a momentary tactical card from the regional system may lead to international and regional consensus, at the expense of the cause and the Palestinian people, as happened previously.

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