In light of the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement: Which one is closer to the interest? Political discourse or sectarian dispute?

The era of the Shiites began after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, in 632 and continues to this day with the distinction of the Shiites and their distinction as a separate sect within Islam, and the opposition of the Sunni caliphs.

Despite the division of the Shiites into separate paths, the most important division and disagreement is what is going on between Shiites and Sunnis in the aftermath of the death of the Messenger of God, Muhammad, based on the policies of the first caliphs, given the Shiites’ belief that the caliph Ali bin Abi Talib should have been the first caliph, and that the three caliphs who preceded him, Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman were considered illegal usurpers.

For this reason, the Shia hadith collectors did not accept any hadith narrated by these three caliphs (or any of their supporters).

As a result, the number of hadiths accepted by the Shiites is much lower than the hadiths accepted by the Sunnis...

What concerns us in today's report is the study of the possible dimensions of an old sectarian dispute. Will Iran, its president and mentors intend to deepen this dispute, and will it have a potential and significant impact on the overall sectarian tensions in the Middle East? Or are the intentions heading towards a reflection of opinions and beliefs with the recent Iranian-Saudi rapprochement?

Going back several years, things reached the point of attacks against the largest Shiite state centers, which Sunni groups accused of being responsible for that with the support of Saudi Arabia. This included other Sunni extremist groups in Iran carrying out attacks from time to time on military and civilian targets in order to shed light on what they say Discrimination against Iran's Arab minority and Sunni ethnic groups.

Iran did not stand idly by and launched attacks on social networking sites, including mass arrests and death sentences that are still being carried out to this day.

Arab minorities who live mainly in the oil-rich southern province of Khuzestan say they are denied decent living standards and some civil rights.

The main Sunni separatist groups in Iran see themselves as part of a larger conflict between Shiite Iran and the Sunni-ruled Arab states in the Gulf. Iran and these countries support different parties in the Syrian conflict, in Iraq and Yemen.

Tehran claims that Saudi Arabia funds most of these groups, an accusation Riyadh has repeatedly denied.

Among the most prominent major Sunni militant groups in Iran are: Jaish al-Adl, Jund Allah, Ansar al-Furqan, and others...

And the interest in the regional role of Iran has escalated, on the rhythm of wars in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic actively supports its allies in the main conflicts in the region - Iraq, Syria and Yemen - which has put it at odds with most of its neighbors. Such division is neither political nor strategic, but sectarian. Iran and its main allies are all or perceived to be Shiite, and they are fighting together against Sunni forces backed by Sunni-led states. This dynamic has deepened the region's slide into sectarianism and exacerbated political conflicts between Iran and many of its Sunni neighbors.

Iran's operations in Syria provided the clearest examples of its sectarian behavior. It facilitated the involvement of thousands of non-Syrian Shiite militants in defending the Bashar al-Assad regime. Although the Iranian leaders focused on the legitimacy of their intervention in Syria, and denied the existence of any sectarian agenda, the Iranian forces and their followers weave their role along the lines of very clear sectarian lines that affect Iran's foreign policy without any doubt, as sectarianism is mainly on Iranian foreign policy. It obscures more than it reveals the nature of its behaviors. However, just as the Middle East has become more sectarian since the fall of Saddam Hussein and the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the same applies to Iran's regional behavior.

It can be said that the foreign policy of the Iranian Republic is the result of its self-interest, which is represented in protecting Iranian Islamic rule from external threats. A sectarian angle also emerges here. Because of its isolation from its neighbors since the 1979 revolution, Iran has pursued a strategy based on weaving relations with entities that do not possess the characteristics of the state to help them advance their interests. The strategy. Although it supports Sunni groups, such as the Palestinian Jihad and Hamas movements, its support for Shiite organizations has angered its neighbors. This approach, often combined with an unspoken policy of exporting the revolution, has yielded strategic gains for Iran, but it has also resulted in deepening perceptions of its sectarian biases.

Returning to history and geography, and the administration it provides for the most important Islamic sanctities and the consequent enormous symbolic legacy, Saudi Arabia leads the Islamic world religiously. But it aspires to more than that politically, and not only at the level of the Middle East region, but rather it seeks to play a distinguished global role, given the economic position that Saudi Arabia enjoys, the main reason for which is the oil wealth, and the influence of the massive structural renaissance (intellectually, socially, culturally and economically) that it initiated. Muhammad bin Salman, as soon as he was appointed crown prince, and as it is located in the heart of the areas of strategic competition between the various global projects, it finds itself in the midst of a frantic struggle to prove itself and lead.

On the other hand, Iran finds itself in direct contradiction with Saudi Arabia, as it is fully aware that it cannot compete with it for religious leadership, given that the overwhelming majority of Muslims are Sunnis, and therefore, the velayat-e faqih has no power over them.

All this made the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran the most intense, and was reflected in the region's devastation and destruction. And while the Kingdom is heading towards integrating within the effective international system, and after jumping great strides in establishing the state with its modern concepts, we find that Iran is moving in the opposite direction.

The announcement of the Saudi-Iranian agreement, which was sponsored by China, raises many more questions than answers. This is not due to the nature of the ruling systems in the two countries only, nor to their great aspirations to lead the region, but also to the large number of files between them and their ramifications as well. The Arab Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, the drug industry and smuggling, and direct interference in the Palestinian cause from Iran through the support of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and other armed organizations, made the points of discord and disagreement more than the points of agreement and cooperation. And let's not forget that Saudi Arabia has announced its intention to acquire nuclear weapons as soon as Iran is able to do so, and this in itself opens the gates of hell for the region as a whole.

Iran's arms in the region are capable of harming Saudi Arabia and disrupting its interests, just as the Houthi militia has repeatedly bombed oil installations.

Can this agreement be reduced, for example, to Saudi Arabia’s desire to avoid the effects of an imminent Israeli war on Iran to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons, and will Iran really be about to change its destructive behavior in the region, and what are the guarantees for that, and can China press in this direction motivated by passing its transitory economic interests? Between the two arch-neighbors? What is the impact of this on the Syrian and Lebanese files, and what are the effects of this rapprochement in Iraq, which began to slowly awaken from its stupor twenty years after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime?

Only days are enough to show the extent of Iran's commitment to these understandings. Although its interest in stability and ending international isolation is very great, the nature of its extremist regime cannot leave Iran the state and Iran society any role in completing this reconciliation with neighboring countries. A regime in crisis that was built on the basis of destruction and sabotage cannot guarantee its side in any regional or international agreement.

It is very important what the coming weeks will produce, which will guide us to this Saudi-Iranian step. Is it a tactical step for both of them or a long strategic journey? Will there remain an impact of sectarianism despite the new trends, which could undermine all agreements? Or will international diplomacy be the strongest to spare the region from the effects of a comprehensive war to restore calm, and thus the language of ideology and sectarianism becomes a bridge only to achieve a fleeting truce, to return to the fore again and ignite sectarian conflict in the Middle East?

We conclude by saying that the Iranian-Saudi deal has the potential to end one of the most important rivalries in the region and expand economic relations across the Gulf.

So Iran will no longer stand alone in the face of the Arab-Israeli coalition that the United States had hoped would do the difficult task of containing it.

Rather, the deal has the potential to bring Iran closer to its Arab neighbors and gradually stabilize its relations in the region.

The Iranian President, Ibrahim Raisi, accepting an invitation to visit Riyadh at a date that has not yet been determined is another sign of the intention of the Saudi and Iranian sides to strengthen relations between them further. "Will this visit and this rapprochement have positive benefits towards reducing sectarian differences, if they are deep and develop positively, or are they Will you achieve political goals for the benefit of the international parties that control the region, primarily China and the United States?

Days alone reveal the important dramatic developments that await our region