How can the Netanyahu government's decision to expand the ground campaign in the Gaza Strip be explained in light of the faltering negotiations over a prisoner exchange deal between Hamas and Israel? Does this escalatory step fall within the category of negotiating pressure to force Hamas to make concessions and accept a partial deal in line with Israeli demands, or does it constitute a link in the strategy to topple Hamas, which has been the focus and orbit of the war that has been ongoing for more than a year and a half? Could the broad ground campaign develop into a comprehensive invasion of all areas of the Gaza Strip?

Starting; It should be emphasized that the idea of a comprehensive and simultaneous ground invasion of all areas of the Gaza Strip has become isolated and excluded from the contexts of Israeli military thinking and plans for reasons related to its high human cost, which the Israeli army cannot bear after Hamas restored part of the military strength it lost before the exchange deal last January. It is also impossible to obtain an American green light for this step, which would tip the scales and reshuffle the cards, and would mean a widespread clash with the dense population structure deep within the Gaza Strip, which would completely explode the humanitarian situation and would result in loud international criticism. This is in parallel with the existing divisions and conflicting opinions, positions and trends within the political and security institutions within Israel regarding the feasibility and effectiveness of a comprehensive ground invasion and the humanitarian obligations resulting from it. This is in addition to the Israeli economy’s unacceptability of this step, which would lead to a long-term occupation that would drain the general budget for years to come and exhaust the energy of reserve soldiers, which is fading day after day, and who are difficult to recruit for long periods of time. This is in addition to the absurdity of a comprehensive ground invasion after the destruction of most of Hamas’s military strength and capabilities and the movement’s limitation to a war of attrition. The regime is based on setting up traps and field ambushes, and does not yet have an alternative ruler for Gaza on the day after the war.

It appears that the general trend within the Israeli political and security leadership is toward gradually dissolving and eliminating Hamas through various means of pressure, including military pressure on the ground, by escalating the ground campaign in a systematic and calculated manner, avoiding the risk of escalation and a comprehensive ground invasion, which the current circumstances and effects cannot tolerate.

In the context of the new Israeli plan, Israel is heading towards a medium-term, open-ended escalation that relies on expanding the ground incursion into specific areas to tighten pressure on Hamas, specifically the northern and eastern areas of the Gaza Strip in Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia, Jabalia, the neighborhoods of Al-Tuffah, Shujaiya, Al-Zeitoun, and the eastern governorates of the Middle and Khan Younis, in addition to Rafah, which is completely subject to the broad Israeli ground invasion, so that the Israeli army establishes a security belt along the eastern border of the Gaza Strip, starting from Salah al-Din Street to the Israeli border with the Gaza Strip, while cutting off the north of the Gaza Strip to the end of Jabalia at the Abu Sharkh roundabout and the Al-Tawam roundabout, which means that the Israeli security belt will cut off very large parts of the Gaza Strip.

Thus, the situation on the ground in the Gaza Strip as a whole is being shaped by the complete occupation of Rafah Governorate and the control of the Morag axis between Rafah and Khan Yunis, along with the complete reassertion of control over the Netzarim axis in the central Gaza Strip, and the establishment of a large security belt encompassing the eastern borders of the Gaza Strip, in addition to the northern Gaza Strip Governorate. This is in parallel with the continued aerial and artillery bombardment and the concentrated assassinations that have not ceased throughout the war.

What makes matters even more dangerous is that the areas near the security belt will witness a massive population displacement, as they will be under Israeli fire control. This will effectively confine the residents of the Gaza Strip to the west of Gaza City and the central and western governorates of the Central and Khan Yunis Governorates, with all the resulting massive population congestion and unbearable humanitarian suffering.

Needless to say, the new Israeli plan is not easy to achieve. Military leaders, in particular, are aware that penetrating deep into certain residential areas and neighborhoods, such as Jabalia, al-Tuffah, and al-Daraj, poses significant operational challenges, given the robustness of Hamas's military infrastructure there compared to other areas. This makes achieving the Israeli military objectives of this campaign difficult and arduous, with much bloodshed, body parts, and destruction to be expected.

Given the mounting difficulties facing the Israeli army in areas under full Israeli control, such as Rafah and Beit Hanoun, the traps and ambushes set by Hamas fighters for Israeli forces there, and the current ferocity of the resistance in the eastern neighborhoods of Shuja'iyya and al-Tuffah, this should provide us with a more accurate and comprehensive picture of the difficulties and challenges that await the Israeli army in the new areas of incursion.

However, both the political and military leaderships in Israel are betting on the direct impact that military pressure on Hamas could have on the decision-makers within the Hamas leadership. They see with their own eyes the increasing pain, misery, and suffering of the people of Gaza, and the successive collapses affecting all humanitarian sectors within the Strip. They are betting on the possibility of them abandoning their positions and accepting proposals that meet Israeli conditions and demands.

The most important point in the context of analyzing and interpreting the Israeli military plan lies in the fact that the means of negotiating pressure, adorned with the subjugation of the field and its violent bloody tools, carry within them a fixed strategy to bring down Hamas through systematic mechanisms of dissolution and termination. These mechanisms operate gradually, relying on the time frame to exhaust what remains of Hamas and completely remove its project from the political and field arena.

Undoubtedly, official Israel is no longer content with simply toppling Hamas, which has expressed a willingness to voluntarily relinquish control in favor of an independent "technocratic" committee, as it had hoped during the first months of the war. Rather, the tactical military achievements it has achieved over the course of the long months of the war have tempted it to pursue the goal of bringing down Hamas's project—politically, militarily, and socially—by forcing it to submit to Israeli conditions and demands, which clearly and without any ambiguity signify a declaration of surrender.

There is complete clarity in the features and manifestations of the official Israeli vision for Gaza and its future. It is not true that the Netanyahu government does not have a general strategic vision for the present and future of the Strip. Its goals are complex and intricate, and their implementation and delving into their details and circumstances require a slow and gradual process, despite the obstacles and challenges that beset them. However, it faces a structural and political problem related to the ruling alternative to Hamas on the day after the war. It continues to insist on denying and excluding the Palestinian Authority from the governance and administration scene for political and strategic reasons. However, it will find no alternative but to engage with it and accept its rule, as it is the most experienced and capable of managing Gaza, even if it takes some time.

Finally, the fate of this plan remains inversely linked to the fate of the prisoner swap negotiations over the coming days. The success of the deal, whatever its content, would mean a postponement or perhaps the complete thwarting and termination of this step. Meanwhile, the collapse of the negotiations would lead to the initiation of implementation procedures and phases that would extend over the coming weeks and months, resulting in geographical realities and realities on the ground that may be difficult to overcome easily in any future agreements or deals.