How to Match Ends and Means in the Middle East. America Must Rediscover the Practice of Statecraft

By Dennis Ross

For years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States enjoyed superpower status in a unipolar world. Its economy roared, and its military power went unmatched. When it came to pursuing its goals, Washington had to contend with few obstacles. But even during these boom times, American leaders sometimes botched foreign policy. The United States often made mistakes that caused it to punch below its weight internationally. Many wondered, for instance, how the United States could be powerful enough to win the Cold War yet fail to accomplish its mission in places such as Somalia just a few years later.

Since then, the world has changed dramatically. China has experienced a remarkable ascent. It now competes with the United States militarily and economically and, along with Russia, has sought to upend the U.S.-dominated international order. Washington once again has peer competitors. In short, the United States has slowly been losing its edge.

The American people have changed, too. There is no longer a domestic consensus that the United States should be a global leader. That impulse could prove dangerous because the world is generally more stable when the United States plays a leading role. Given these constraints at home and abroad, American leaders no longer have the luxury of conducting statecraft poorly. They must learn from the mistakes of their predecessors—namely, that a policy will fail if a president does not align its objectives with its means.

If U.S. President Donald Trump is going to be successful, he will have to internalize this truth. A few of his goals, such as ending the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, are commendable but so vast that they will require the United States to expend all its means. Even then, Washington will need help from some of its partners. Although Trump sees allies as burdensome free riders, it will be hard for him to end the war in Gaza without the support of Arab countries, just as it will be difficult to impose “maximum pressure” on Iran without sanctions from U.S. partners. If the Trump administration wants the United States to claw back its dominance, it must figure out how it intends to do so and what it needs to succeed. That might sound blindingly obvious. But American history is full of foreign policies that failed because presidents could not or would not marshal enough resources to achieve the objectives they set for themselves.

GOAL SETTING

Many U.S. foreign policy endeavors are doomed to fail from the start because they are created in the service of bad objectives. Sometimes, American presidents have a poor understanding of what they are getting into, leading them to grandiose goals. U.S. President George W. Bush thought the United States could bring democracy and peace to the Middle East by removing the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. A free Iraq would serve as a model for the rest of the region—or so the president believed. Bush was convinced of the plan by his advisers and some notable Iraqi exiles. He sidelined those around him, such as Secretary of State Colin Powell, who challenged his assumptions. As a result, the United States changed Iraq’s regime but left a vacuum, which led to a sectarian war. Without providing security for the Iraqi population, the political process had no chance of succeeding.

Political pressure can also lead presidents to embrace goals that they are not prepared to act on. In 2011, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad began killing and torturing thousands of his own people. For months, activists and analysts called on U.S. President Barack Obama to do something. In August 2011, he responded to the pressure by declaring that it was time for Assad “to step aside.” But Obama was unprepared to intervene. The price of his inaction was a devastating war that gave rise to the Islamic State, killed 600,000 people, and displaced millions more. It is true that U.S. intervention could not have prevented the entire war, but the United States could have significantly mitigated the damage, such as by enforcing a no-fly zone over northern Syria.

Sometimes presidents achieve one goal and become convinced they can do more. U.S. President George H. W. Bush, for example, approved a military mission in 1992 to provide famine relief to Somalia and to prevent militants from seizing humanitarian aid. U.S. forces succeeded in reducing the threat of famine—achieving Bush’s original objective—but the country remained unstable because of fighting among warlords. Bush then broadened the mission so much so that the United States was effectively drawn into a civil war in Somalia. President Bill Clinton inherited the revised objective and maintained Bush’s policy until Somali militants shot down two U.S. Blackhawk helicopters and dragged the bodies of U.S. marines through the streets of Mogadishu. After the tragedy, Clinton withdrew American troops. The mission ultimately failed because the United States lacked the stakes, the forces, and a credible local partner who could win Somalia’s civil war. Somalia proved to be a classic example of mission creep; over time, the goal grew so unwieldy that the United States promised more than it was prepared to deliver.

American leaders no longer have the luxury of conducting statecraft poorly.

Ill-considered objectives almost guarantee poor statecraft. To come up with appropriate goals, a president must carefully weigh the stakes. The United States can be ambitious when it is willing to commit the necessary resources, as it did in Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The George H. W. Bush administration believed that German unification was inevitable and that the new German state needed to be a part of NATO. Washington worried that if a unified Germany was neutral, it would feel the need to build its own nuclear weapons and would become an area of competition between great powers—re-creating the conditions in Europe that had led to two world wars.

The stakes, therefore, were very high, and the obstacles were formidable: the Soviet Union would not easily accept an outcome in which the two Germanys unified and joined the United States’ alliance. British and French leaders, too, were concerned that a more powerful Germany could dominate Europe. As British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher put it, “The Germans will get in peace what Hitler couldn’t get in war.” Bush and Secretary of State James Baker resolved that they could overcome the various sources of opposition if they seized the initiative, showed the Germans that Washington was on their side, offered Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev a package of assurances and material support, and demonstrated how the United States would help transform the economic and security architecture of Europe so that Germany would not dominate European institutions. (Bush and Baker often reassured their allies that the result would be a European Germany, not a German Europe.)

Washington was able to ensure that a unified Germany became a part of NATO—a massive undertaking—because it was prepared to back up the effort with intensive diplomacy. Baker flew around the globe to meet his British, French, German, and Soviet counterparts to work through details, such as how Soviet forces would leave East Germany, who would pay for their removal, and how NATO could appear less threatening to the Soviet Union. The United States carefully choreographed every step of its diplomacy. For example, Washington used backchannels to work out key issues in advance of meetings with allies and the Soviet Union, going so far as to give Gorbachev and his foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, a draft NATO declaration to show that the United States’ alliance was changing—something, according to Shevardnadze, that enabled Gorbachev to convince the party leadership to accept Germany’s accession to NATO.

Bush’s success in Germany was the product of careful diplomacy and American soft power. The United States has an easier time achieving its objectives when it brings allies along and frames issues in a way that makes the U.S. position attractive to others. Soft power cannot substitute for hard power but can supplement it when wielded effectively. Trump has largely ignored this tool. He prefers to shock allies and partners as opposed to attracting them to his cause. He is more comfortable embracing another element of statecraft: leverage.

PEACEMAKER?

Trump’s penchant for wielding leverage could help end the war in Gaza, if applied prudently. Israel and Hamas have completed the first phase of a three-phase ceasefire they agreed to in January. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been unwilling to negotiate phase two, in part, because he wants to avoid causing problems within his coalition. Trump has not pressured Netanyahu to negotiate phase two. The deal has stalled, meaning no hostages are being released and no humanitarian aid is being delivered to Gaza. Instead, Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, is proposing an alternative plan that would see a 40-day cease-fire in which half the living hostages would be released in return for a large number of Palestinian prisoners, allowing the United States more time to try to resolve all issues. Hamas, however, has rejected the plan. On March 18, Israel resumed bombing Gaza, possibly with the aim of pressuring Hamas into accepting Witkoff’s proposal. More fighting will lead to more Palestinian deaths, may seal the fate of the hostages, and could entrench Israel deeper into Gaza with no easy way out.

Now is the time for Trump to focus his leverage on Arab countries. If the war is to end, there needs to be an alternative to Hamas’s rule in Gaza, and that can only happen with the support of Arab governments. On March 5, Egypt released a plan to create a technocratic Palestinian administration for Gaza and rebuild the territory without requiring Gazans to leave—a response to Trump’s suggestion that Gazans be relocated to other countries so the United States could build a “Riviera of the Middle East.” Under Egypt’s plan, Palestinians would move to certain zones of the territory so that reconstruction could begin in other areas. But the plan’s fatal flaw is that it does not deal with Hamas. In fact, it doesn’t even mention Hamas. Few donors will invest in the territory knowing that Hamas can rebuild itself and trigger another war in a few years’ time.

Israel will accept an end to the war only when all the hostages are returned and it believes that Hamas cannot reconstitute itself. An Arab plan must include credible provisions to stop smuggling from Egypt into Gaza and to ensure that humanitarian assistance and reconstruction material won’t be seized, resold, or repurposed by Hamas. Such provisions would effectively cut the group off from its sources of revenue. Arab governments need to show how they will implement these mechanisms, such as by offering to send troops to enforce law and order and prevent Hamas from commandeering aid. The United Arab Emirates has indicated some willingness to do so if other Arab countries join in.

Iran already has six bombs’ worth of near-weapons-grade material.

Trump can influence Egypt’s plan through both coercion and inducements: for example, he could make clear that unless such mechanisms are part of the deal, he will reject it and back Israel’s further decimation of Hamas. Arab states have no love for Hamas but they want the war to end. At the same time, he could promise that if these mechanisms are credibly implemented, Egypt can take the lead in reconstructing Gaza, which would be a boon to Egypt’s contractors and overall economy. Arab governments must also produce a plan to reform the Palestinian Authority so it can eventually assume responsibility in Gaza. If the Palestinian Authority remains corrupt, sclerotic, and deeply unpopular, there is no credible pathway to a Palestinian state.

When it comes to Iran, Trump’s goal is to prevent the Islamic Republic from building a nuclear weapon. So far, he has issued sanctions and threatened force against Tehran. He also launched military strikes against the Houthis, an Iran-backed militia, declaring that “Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon...as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN.” Trump would be more compelling if he employed an integrated approach that includes increasing Tehran’s political isolation—a tactic that has historically worked well. To effectively cut Iran off financially and diplomatically, Washington needs the help of its allies and partners. Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio should mobilize others to join the United States by calling attention to the fact that Tehran has been enriching uranium to 60 percent at an accelerated rate—30 kilograms a month—since at least the end of last year. According to Rafael Grossi, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, there is “no justifiable civilian purpose” to enrich uranium to that level. The IAEA now reports that Iran already has six bombs’ worth of near-weapons-grade material.

Washington should trumpet the IAEA’s findings and remind the world that every country that has enriched uranium to 60 percent has gone on to produce nuclear weapons. The Trump administration has already taken steps to ratchet up economic pressure on Iran by enforcing sanctions on those who buy Iranian oil. Convincing allies to get on board will magnify Trump’s ability to coerce Iran into halting its nuclear program.

STRENGTH IN NUMBERS

Trump would be wise to use leverage not just against Iran but also with countries that have influence over Tehran. China, for example, does not want to see the United States or Israel use force against Iran lest it dramatically drive up the price of oil; Trump should be clear with Chinese leader Xi Jinping that he will take U.S. military action off the table only if Iran signs a deal that dramatically reduces the size of its nuclear infrastructure. (Civilian nuclear power would be permitted.)

Trump must, of course, communicate with Iran through multiple channels. He needs to convey both publicly and privately that—although his preference is to use diplomacy—the United States, either on its own or with Israel, would be left with no choice but to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure if Tehran turned down a deal. Iran’s leaders must know they would lose four decades’ worth of investment in their country’s nuclear infrastructure if they rejected a diplomatic outcome.

Trump can couple his threats with inducements, including promises to invest in Iran and lift sanctions. Iranian leaders may be dubious about such offers given that their country benefited only modestly from the economic payoffs of the Iran deal of 2015, but Trump can also offer help with water and related food security. Iran has profound water shortages. A former Iranian minister of environment warned that the country could not sustain its population if it continued to mismanage its water. The United States can help by providing technologies that regulate crop irrigation and prevent the loss of water through evaporation—and Washington should publicize its willingness to do so.

Good statecraft requires setting realistic goals and dedicating the necessary resources to achieve them. Trump understands better than most the importance of exercising leverage to meeting his objectives. But he misses that Washington has historically been most effective when it has drummed up support from its friends. By working with others, the United States increases its leverage and becomes more powerful. The Trump administration has the best shot at success if it uses all the tools at its disposal—including soft power and alliances.