Dr. Bilal Al-Shobaki: Failure to grant the Israeli delegation sufficient authority to make decisions makes it more of a message carrier than an authorized negotiator.

Nabhan Khreisha: Israel sent a delegation to Doha without real authority in an attempt to buy time and pressure Hamas.

Dr. Jamal Harfoush: Achieving a breakthrough in the negotiations remains contingent on the existence of an international and regional environment capable of imposing clear obligations on Israel.

Majed Hadeeb: Israel and Hamas do not have a genuine will to end the war, but rather seek to achieve their goals through a deal that maintains the status quo.

Imad Moussa: The future of the conflict in the region depends on the outcomes of the ongoing negotiations and the ability of international parties to impose new balances.

Amid an atmosphere of anticipation and caution, indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas continue in the Qatari capital, Doha. These negotiations are fraught with complications that reflect the divergent goals of the two parties, while the second phase of the deal faces an uncertain fate.

In separate interviews with Al-Quds, writers, political analysts, and university professors believe that Israel is seeking to renegotiate the agreement from scratch, attempting to buy time without making any real commitments regarding the second phase of the agreement. This, coupled with Hamas's insistence on a permanent ceasefire, makes reaching a settlement difficult given the divergent positions and conflicting interests.

The authors and analysts point out that the Israeli delegation sent to Doha lacks sufficient authority to make substantive decisions, reflecting a longstanding Israeli policy of stalling negotiations. This policy, despite the United States' efforts to maintain regional calm, seeks to maximize Israeli gains through mediation that keeps the situation under control without imposing final solutions. Nevertheless, the possibility of resuming military operations remains, unless international efforts can impose clear obligations on Israel that prevent it from evading the requirements of negotiations.

An Israeli attempt to renegotiate from scratch

Dr. Bilal al-Shoubaki, a professor of political science at Hebron University, says that the ongoing negotiations between Israel and Hamas cannot be considered negotiations for the second phase of the agreement, due to the lack of clear parameters that were initially agreed upon for the second phase of the agreement.

Al-Shoubaki explains that what is currently happening is an Israeli attempt to renegotiate from scratch, meaning that the current discussions are completely separate from those that preceded the preliminary agreement months ago.

Al-Shoubaki points out that Hamas's premise in the current negotiations is centered on achieving a permanent ceasefire and ending the war once and for all, while Israel is talking about a temporary ceasefire that may last only two months.

Al-Shoubaki asserts that current circumstances do not indicate the possibility of achieving a breakthrough in these negotiations, and that they may, in fact, take longer due to the fundamental disagreements between the two parties.

Al-Shoubaki explains that Hamas seeks a long-term truce and a permanent end to the war, while Israel insists on not committing to a definitive end to the war, reflecting a significant divergence in positions.

Al-Shoubaki asserts that there are indications that the United States is not interested in returning to military operations, despite US President Donald Trump's pro-Israel statements.

Israeli stalling strategy

Al-Shoubaki points out that the moves of US envoy to the region, Steve Witkoff, indicate Washington's efforts to maintain calm while maximizing Israeli gains.

Al-Shoubaki points out that the nature of the Israeli negotiating delegation, which traveled to Doha with very limited powers, reflects a long-standing Israeli strategy of stalling the negotiation process by failing to grant the delegation sufficient authority to make decisions, rendering it more of a message-bearer than an empowered negotiator.

Regarding the options available should the negotiations fail, Al-Shoubaki does not expect to reach the stage of declaring the negotiations a complete failure. Rather, the process may falter, with the possibility of a return to threats of military operations.

Al-Shoubaki believes that the most realistic option is to reach a longer-term ceasefire, even if Israel does not officially announce an end to the war.

Al-Shoubaki expects the coming period to witness attempts to extend the first phase of the agreement by releasing a limited number of prisoners, especially in light of the talk about the possibility of releasing prisoners holding American citizenship.

Reducing the understandings to extending the first phase

For his part, journalist Nabhan Khreisha said that the ongoing negotiations in Doha regarding the second phase of the ceasefire agreement and the prisoner exchange are facing Israeli obstacles aimed at prolonging the war. Israel is attempting to reduce the understandings to an extension of the first phase, to avoid committing to its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and achieving the goals it failed to achieve over the course of 15 months of war.

Khreisha points out that Israel sent a delegation to Doha without any real authority, in an attempt to buy time and obstruct any real progress. It is also exerting pressure on Hamas by escalating threats to resume the war, redeploying its military forces around the Gaza Strip, and tightening the blockade by preventing the entry of humanitarian aid. The Israeli army continues to target civilian gatherings with shelling, resulting in casualties and injuries.

Khreisha points out that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is seeking to overturn the agreement by obstructing its implementation, driven by personal and partisan considerations, disregarding the fate of Israeli prisoners. However, his continued procrastination could exacerbate Israel's international isolation and expose the falsity of its narrative to global public opinion.

In contrast, Khreisha explains that Hamas insists on Israel's commitment to its commitments in the first phase of the agreement, but at the same time, it does not object to continued US mediation.

Khreisha points out that there is an implicit understanding between the parties to separate the implementation of previous commitments from the new negotiating track. Washington appears to be seeking to consolidate the ceasefire and pressure Israel to prevent it from sabotaging the negotiations, in order to preserve its positive relations with the Arab states of the region, particularly the Gulf states.

Reconciling internal pressures and negotiation requirements

Khreisheh believes Netanyahu is trying to balance domestic pressures with the demands of negotiations, exploiting the Doha talks to give the impression that any progress achieved is merely an "extension of the first phase," potentially allowing him to avoid making major concessions that could impact his domestic political standing.

Khreisheh believes there are two possible scenarios for the outcome of the Doha negotiations: the first is an agreement to extend the first phase of the truce, creating a positive negotiating environment without a radical change in the Israeli position. The second scenario is an agreement to implement the second phase of the initial agreement without officially calling it "the second phase," with Israel making calculated concessions under American pressure, serving Washington's interests in calming the region and strengthening its economic relations with the Gulf.

Khreisheh believes that negotiations will continue, with each side striving to achieve its goals without the negotiating process collapsing. However, he cautions against excessive optimism, despite positive signs of progress, most notably Netanyahu's dispatch of his delegation to Doha after realizing that the direct channel between Hamas and the US administration could impose a new initiative on Israel that is not in line with its interests.

Any agreement requires good faith and guarantees of execution.

For his part, Professor Dr. Jamal Harfoush, Professor of Scientific Research Methods and Political Studies at the University of the Academic Research Center in Brazil, says that assessing the legal and political trajectory of the ongoing negotiations in Doha requires caution and careful consideration of the general framework governing these discussions, both in terms of the actual will of the negotiating parties and the political and field circumstances surrounding them.

Harfoush explains that any international agreement—whether a truce, ceasefire, or political settlement—requires good faith and mutual commitment between the parties, along with clear implementation guarantees.

Harfoush points out that the long history of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations has shown that the primary obstacle to achieving a substantive breakthrough is Israel's double standards, with Tel Aviv exploiting negotiations to buy time rather than reach sustainable solutions.

Harfoush points out that the chances of achieving progress in the second phase of the agreement depend on several factors, most notably Israel's seriousness in engaging in genuine negotiations and not using them as a means to absorb international and regional pressure. He also notes the role of the United States and the extent of pressure it may exert on Benjamin Netanyahu's government, which seeks to maintain the war to achieve domestic political gains.

Failure of negotiations does not mean the end of options

Harfoush points out that the Palestinian resistance's ability to impose fair conditions that guarantee the protection of Palestinian rights is a crucial element, especially in light of the ongoing Israeli aggression and systematic targeting of civilian infrastructure.

Harfoush explains that the possibility of achieving a breakthrough in the negotiations remains contingent on the existence of an international and regional environment capable of imposing clear obligations on Israel, along with the necessity of binding legal guarantees to prevent a recurrence of the scenario of Israeli procrastination, which has thwarted numerous previous agreements.

Regarding the possibility of the negotiations failing, Harfoush stresses that this does not mean the end of options, but rather requires adopting a multi-track strategy to ensure that the arena is not left to a political or military vacuum.

Harfoush asserts that one alternative path is to escalate the legal process through relevant international courts, such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, to file lawsuits against Israel for its failure to abide by its international obligations, and to issue UN resolutions condemning Israeli intransigence and increasing political and diplomatic pressure on it.

Harfoush points out that the Palestinian resistance has the right to self-defense under international law, which makes resuming defensive operations a legitimate option if the occupation continues its aggression.

Intensifying popular action and peaceful resistance

Harfoush emphasizes that intensifying popular action and peaceful resistance is an effective tool for thwarting Israeli plans, particularly with regard to forced displacement projects or imposing new facts on the ground.

Harfoush emphasizes the need to activate the Arab and Islamic role through diplomatic pressure to compel the occupation to implement the agreement according to its terms without modification or procrastination. He also emphasizes strengthening international partnerships with countries that support the Palestinian cause and exerting pressure to isolate Israel politically and economically.

Harfoush points out that legal resistance within the occupied territories is an important tool for confronting the occupation, by employing the Palestinian and international legal systems to prosecute Israel for its crimes and document its violations to ensure its prosecution before international courts.

Harfoush asserts that the failure of negotiations does not mean the end of alternatives, but rather requires the adoption of a comprehensive strategy combining law, politics, popular resistance, and diplomacy, with the goal of imposing the Palestinian will and countering Israel's attempts to evade its obligations.

Netanyahu and Hamas have an interest in continuing the fighting.

For his part, writer and political analyst Majed Hadeeb says that both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas share a common interest in continuing the fighting, with each side seeking to achieve its own goals before accepting any ceasefire agreement.

Hadib believes that neither Israel nor Hamas possess a genuine will to end the war, but rather each seeks to achieve its own goals through a deal that maintains the status quo.

Hadeeb explains that Israel lacks a genuine will to negotiate the second phase of the agreement, or even to move from the first to the second, as Netanyahu, backed by the extreme right, is placing numerous obstacles in the way of any new understandings that could lead to a ceasefire or a prisoner exchange deal.

Hadeeb points out that there are several reasons pushing Netanyahu to obstruct the negotiations, the first of which is his commitment to extremist Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich not to cease the war until the far-right's goals, which include occupying the Gaza Strip and displacing its population, are achieved.

The second reason, according to Hadeeb, is Netanyahu's desire to buy more time. He supports US envoy Steve Witkoff's proposal, which gives him two additional months of maneuvering time after the release of half of the living prisoners held by Hamas. This would allow him to pass the government's budget and secure exemptions for the ultra-Orthodox from military service, two issues that are crucial to his government's survival in power.

Hamas wants to consolidate its control without regard for the suffering of the people.

Hadib believes that these interests coincide with Hamas's desire to reassert its control over Gaza and consolidate its rule, without regard for the suffering of the Palestinian people and the nation, nor with regard to the stagnation and possible oblivion of the Palestinian cause under its absurd policies. He points out that the movement is benefiting from the prolongation of the war to reshuffle its cards internally and strengthen its political and regional standing, which makes both sides strive to ensure that the other does not fall at this stage.

According to Hadeeb, there are three possible scenarios for the course of the ongoing negotiations in Doha: either the war resumes based on threats from the Israeli military, particularly the statements of the new Chief of Staff, Eyal Zamir, who confirmed that five military divisions are ready to resume fighting with the goal of "crushing Hamas and ending its political and military presence."

Hadib says: The second scenario is to conclude a new exchange deal that would be in line with the implementation of the Egyptian initiative, under the title of "extending the first phase," or as a transitional phase between the first and second phases. However, this scenario faces a fundamental obstacle: Netanyahu does not want a ceasefire, and therefore sent a delegation to Doha without any real powers, indicating Israel's lack of seriousness in reaching an agreement.

Hamas' attempts to circumvent the Egyptian initiative

The third scenario, according to Hadeeb, is one that would crush the Egyptian initiative, in terms of concluding a prisoner exchange deal based on Witkoff's proposals, which would see the release of half of the remaining prisoners and a two-month extension of the truce. This would lead to maintaining the status quo. This scenario is the most likely if Hamas succeeds in continuing to circumvent the Egyptian initiative, as all parties benefit from the current stalemate.

Hadeeb explains that Netanyahu is exploiting the time to strengthen his political position and advance his domestic policies, while Hamas is exploiting the situation to reassert its control over Gaza.

Hadib points out that the discussions between the US administration and Hamas were a preemptive step to explore the possibility of Hamas becoming a regional partner, provided it commits to protecting the border and disarming its heavy weapons. This could hinder any Arab initiative to establish a new administration in Gaza or begin reconstruction.

Hadib points out that the most likely scenario is to maintain the status quo, with Israel gradually achieving its goals through continued blockade and economic pressure to force Gazans to emigrate, while Hamas ensures its continued rule with indirect American support.

Hadib believes that Hamas not only contradicts its own strategies, but also contradicts the aspirations of the Palestinian people, from its inception to the present day.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is linked to the energy issue.

Writer and political analyst Imad Moussa believes that the ongoing negotiations may yield results that benefit the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, given the US administration's strategic direction under President Donald Trump aimed at halting wars and preparing the ground for major investment projects in the region.

Musa explains that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has become directly linked to the energy issue, as gas and oil extraction operations in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria require an end to the war and security stability.

Musa points out that the powers controlling energy resources have the power to control global markets in terms of pricing and supply volume, which makes investing in this region a clear American interest.

Musa notes that the Trump administration has opened channels of communication with Hamas, which will enhance the chances of implementing investment projects in the Gaza Strip and pave the way for a permanent ceasefire.

According to Musa, Hamas is interested in capitalizing on these American investment trends and harnessing them to its advantage, which will grant it greater regional and international legitimacy and enhance its standing at the political and popular levels.

Facilitating Hamas's participation in PLO institutions

Musa asserts that this approach could facilitate Hamas's participation in the institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) according to a political quota formula that guarantees it representation commensurate with its political and popular achievements.

Musa explains that the widespread attention Hamas has received stems not only from its resilience in the face of aggression, but also from the transformations taking place within Israeli society, which has increasingly leaned toward the extreme religious right, adopting policies based on genocide and ethnic cleansing, and refusing to recognize international legitimacy and the decisions of international courts. This has exposed the true face of the extreme right-wing government.

Regarding the Israeli government's options, Moussa believes that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces two main paths: the first is to escalate the aggression on the Gaza Strip and expand it to include the West Bank, in an attempt to regain the initiative domestically. The second path is to accept American pressure, stop the war, and begin implementing the second phase of the agreement, a step that would calm the Egyptian and Arab street and give Israel an opportunity to reorganize its strategic priorities.

Netanyahu devoted himself to attacking Iran and Yemen

Musa explains that a halt to the war in Gaza could allow the Netanyahu government to devote more time to implementing its regional military plans, including a strike against Iran, which could be preceded by airstrikes targeting the Ansar Allah (Houthis) group in Yemen, with American support and the participation of some regional countries.

Musa points out that Israel may keep open the option of military intervention in Syria, with the aim of reducing Turkish influence there and seeking Ankara's participation in the region's available economic shares.

Musa asserts that the future of the conflict in the region remains contingent on the outcomes of ongoing negotiations and the ability of international parties to impose new balances that advance their economic and political interests without fundamentally conflicting with the interests of the actors on the ground.