The Israeli military released the results of its investigation into the Hamas attack on Kibbutz Nir Oz on the morning of October 7, 2023. The head of the investigation team, reserve Major General Eran Niv, emphasized that "the IDF's failure to defend Nir Oz was particularly significant, and one of the reasons for this was that IDF forces were only able to reach the town after the last terrorists had left it."

"Never in any town has there been such a deadly combination of such a dangerous situation and the absence of military force," Niv added. During the attack, 41 kibbutz residents were killed, along with six others who had attended a nearby party and fled to the kibbutz. Seventy-six kibbutz residents were captured, including nine who died, and taken to the Gaza Strip. According to the investigation, 13 prisoners were killed in captivity, and five living prisoners and nine dead kibbutz residents are still being held in Gaza.

Former IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and former Southern Command Commander Yaron Finkelman were quoted by kibbutz members as saying after presenting the investigation findings to kibbutz members earlier that "the IDF's failure in Nir Oz was the greatest failure in the army's history," according to Haaretz.

According to the investigation, the deputy commander of the Golani Brigade's 51st Battalion said over the military communications network at 5:34 a.m. on October 7 that Israeli forces were preparing for dawn, in accordance with orders and a situational assessment. This indicated that he and the other forces in the area were unaware that Hamas forces would penetrate into Israel 55 minutes later and that Operation Protective Edge would begin.

Initially, 100-130 Hamas fighters entered, followed by 300-500 other fighters from several Palestinian factions, into Kibbutz Nir Oz, which was hidden from the army's view. The attack lasted more than six hours, during which no soldiers entered the kibbutz, and the Israeli army was unaware of what was happening inside.

The investigation indicated that "the army's failure to reach Nir Oz was neither tactical nor moral, but rather methodological. The commanders did not realize that the situation at Nir Oz was particularly difficult, and therefore did not attach importance to sending a force there at the expense of other locations. The collapse of the command and control system, especially in the brigade and division, is a central reason for the failure to establish a clear picture of the situation. The General Staff could have been expected to attempt to establish a true picture of the situation and not rely on reports."

The Golani Brigade's 51st Battalion was located three kilometers from Nir Oz. When Hamas began firing rockets at 6:29, an Israeli force headed toward the border fence, while Hamas forces had already entered Israeli territory. Four companies of Hamas's elite forces headed to Nir Oz, while one company headed to each of the other Israeli towns. The investigation team still does not know why such a large Hamas force headed to Nir Oz. At approximately 9:00 a.m., the fighting in Nir Oz ended, and the

Most of the armed alert squad members are in it.

Over the next four hours, the investigation describes repeated failures by IDF forces, some of whom reached Nir Oz but were unable to enter it. In other cases, forces were sent to the kibbutz, but failed to grasp the gravity of the situation and were sent to fight elsewhere.

At 9:22 a.m., a combat helicopter arrived on a road leading from Gaza to Nir Oz. The pilot asked his commanding officer, "Did you send me to fire on our territory?" It turned out that his commanding officer was unaware of the situation in the kibbutz. A short time later, the helicopter was hit by Hamas fire and was forced to withdraw. Other combat helicopters arrived and targeted Palestinian fighters, killing a woman resident of the kibbutz.

An Israeli tank then fired two shells at the fighters in the kibbutz and then headed for the border fence. The military investigation determined that the tank's actions were erroneous, and that it should not have been heading for the fence, but rather defending the communities in the "Gaza Envelope," including Nir Oz. Another tank was disabled after being hit by five anti-tank shells, and four of its soldiers were captured.

Throughout these hours, kibbutz members turned to the regional town council, the IDF, and other organizations for assistance. However, the General Staff's Operations Brigade, the IDF's Southern Command, and the Gaza Division were unaware of what was happening in the kibbutz and did not send troops, according to the investigation.

The investigation revealed that during the battles in the kibbutz, there were numerous infantry forces in nearby towns, including the Commando Brigade, which marched along the road leading to Nir Oz. However, the kibbutz's location meant they were unaware of what was happening there, and they continued to fight in other areas.

At 12:30, the last Palestinian fighters were observed leaving Nir Oz. Half an hour later, a Border Police undercover unit entered the kibbutz without any Palestinian fighters present.

The investigation indicated that the 51st Battalion, responsible for defending Nir Oz and the surrounding area, was not prepared for a major attack scenario such as the one that occurred. It did not receive any warning, and the battalion's chain of command collapsed in less than an hour. The battalion's soldiers were unable to assemble and assess the situation in an orderly manner.

According to the military investigation, Israeli forces did not reach Nir Oz for several reasons. These included the fact that Palestinian fighters blocked the road leading to the kibbutz, significantly hampering the army's advance; a small number of forces received clear orders to reach Nir Oz, and during their journey, they engaged in battles with fighters at road intersections; and a group of soldiers crossed one intersection and headed elsewhere. The investigation also indicated that army headquarters failed to understand the situation, that they were under attack, and that the command of forces, from the company level to the division level, had collapsed. They did not realize that the situation in Nir Oz was more difficult than in other places.

The investigation found that "the central failure of all the commands, from the brigade level to the General Staff, was the failure to build a picture of the situation and to exhaust the available information. Had these things happened, it is likely that the military force would have arrived earlier and at least succeeded in significantly reducing the targeting of the kibbutz and its residents."