The Israeli occupation army admitted its failure on October 7, announcing that Hamas had managed to subdue the Gaza Division within hours of the attack, which it described as a surprise and organized one.

The occupation army explained in a statement that all of what it called "achievements" made during the war could not hide the failure of that day, which revealed major security and intelligence gaps.

He pointed out that despite dealing a severe blow to Hamas, which included a series of assassinations of its leaders and whose effects extended to Hezbollah through the assassination of a number of its leaders, this did not compensate for the failure that occurred at the beginning.

The occupation army admitted the collapse of a set of security doctrines that "Israel" relied on, including the belief that Gaza represents a marginal threat, and that Hamas can be deterred, in addition to excessive confidence in the capabilities of the security wall on the Gaza border.

He pointed out that the attack on October 7 revealed a major development in the resistance doctrine, specifically Hamas, regarding the multi-front war, which Israel was not prepared for.

The occupation army explained that the army at all levels failed on the night of October 7, pointing out that there is a large gap between intelligence estimates and the actual reality on the ground.

He stressed that the army's estimates indicate that about 5,000 Palestinians participated in the attack in three successive waves, and that during that night conflicting signals were received between what indicated exceptional conditions in Gaza and other reports indicating a normal situation, which led to confusion in decision-making.

He added that Hamas' attack on the Gaza Division headquarters and its collapse made it very difficult to build a clear picture of the situation on the ground, which directly affected the decisions of the army officers and the Israeli General Staff.

The occupation army confirmed that this confusion had a negative impact on the course of military operations in the first hours of the attack.

He pointed out that ongoing investigations in the intelligence field revealed a huge gap between the army's estimates and reality, which necessitated internal reviews of security doctrines and methods of collecting and analyzing information.

He stressed: Before October 7, we were convinced that Hamas could be tamed, but it turned out that this conviction was a big mistake.

Hebrew reports said that on October 7, Hamas carried out one of the most sophisticated deception operations ever, which will be studied deeply in intelligence agencies around the world. "Israel" thought one thing about Gaza, while Gaza was preparing for something else entirely.

She pointed out that "Israel" was convinced that Hamas had become pragmatic due to its responsibility for managing the population in Gaza, while in contrast, Hamas had been working for a long time on a surprise attack aimed at resolving the confrontation with "Israel."

While the occupation army admitted that it was convinced before October 7 that Hamas could be tamed, this turned out to be wrong.