Dr. Suhail Diab: Netanyahu's failure to return to war on Gaza does not mean that he is reluctant to create pretexts to turn the tables, and his eyes will be on Iran

Akram Atallah: The option of resuming the war is still strongly on the table, especially if the mediators do not succeed in pressuring Hamas to accept the Israeli conditions

Fayez Abbas: Implementing the first phase of the deal is a strong indication that the agreement will continue despite Netanyahu's attempts to obstruct the second phase

Majed Hadeeb: Netanyahu's insistence on prolonging the first phase and Hamas' hesitation in announcing its final position on the "next day" will lead to maintaining the status quo

Talal Okal: Hamas' handing over of Israeli detainees, dead and alive, is a "tactical" move aimed at avoiding disrupting the start of the second phase negotiations

Yasser Manna: In the event of moving to the second stage, Israel may set impossible conditions, most notably disarming the resistance and removing Hamas from power.

Everyone is anticipating what the next few weeks will witness in a crucial phase in the course of the current agreement between Israel and Hamas, as this period is considered one of the most sensitive and dangerous periods in the ongoing negotiations regarding the second phase of the exchange deal and the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.

In separate interviews with “I,” writers, political analysts, specialists, and political science professors believe that Israel has reached two main conclusions: the first is to abandon the project of forced displacement of the residents of the Gaza Strip, after realizing that this project will not find a way to be implemented practically in light of the strong Arab rejection, especially from Egypt and Jordan, which are supported by Saudi Arabia. The second conclusion is that Israel has realized that there is no military way to recover the remaining Israeli detainees in Gaza, which prompted it not to rush back to war, at least for the time being.

They point out that this does not mean that Israel will stop manipulating the situation, as it retains the means to “turn the tables” at any time it deems appropriate, and Israel may resort to military escalation in the West Bank or even threaten to confront Iran as part of its strategy to achieve its political and security goals.

They believe that Hamas continues to show flexibility in the negotiations, as it announced its readiness to accelerate the process of releasing Israeli detainees, including the bodies, as a tactical step to avoid disrupting the start of the second phase negotiations.

Israel has reached two main conclusions.

Political science professor and Israeli affairs expert Dr. Suhail Diab believes that the next few weeks are among the most sensitive and dangerous periods in the course of the current agreement on the truce in the Gaza Strip.

Diab points out that Israel reached two main conclusions during this period, especially after the warnings issued by Hamas prior to the sixth prisoner exchange. The first is to abandon the project of forced displacement of the residents of the Gaza Strip, after the United States of America surrendered to the idea that this project would not find a way to practical implementation.

Diab points out that this abandonment is due to several reasons, the most important of which is the lack of an Arab partner that clearly supports this trend, especially in light of the Egyptian-Jordanian position supported by Saudi Arabia, which opposes any attempts to displace the residents of Gaza.

Diab stresses that the absence of an Arab partner means that Israel will not be able to implement the displacement project, especially in light of the strong Arab rejection of any step of this kind.

Diab points out that this conclusion reflects a shift in the Israeli position, as Tel Aviv has come to realize that the displacement project will not be possible in the foreseeable future.

Diab explains that Israel's second conclusion is its realization that there is no military way to recover the remaining Israeli prisoners in the Gaza Strip.

Diab asserts that this conclusion prompted Israel not to rush back to war, especially in light of the presence of Israeli prisoners still being held by Hamas.

Diab points out that this does not mean that Israel will stop manipulating the situation, as it retains the means to "turn the tables" at any time it deems appropriate.

Diab explains that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may resort to turning the tables if he feels that his political future is in danger, or if he reaches the conclusion that the next stages of the agreement may lead to putting the Palestinian issue on the table again, including the possibility of a two-state solution.

Diab explains that Netanyahu has many ways to turn the tables, including options other than returning to war in Gaza.

Diab points out that the first scenario is escalation with Iran, as the Israeli cabinet has placed Iran at the top of the list of existing threats, even bypassing the issue of recovering prisoners and eliminating the Hamas movement.

Diab believes that Netanyahu's failure to return to war in Gaza does not mean that Netanyahu is reluctant to create pretexts to turn the tables, and his eyes will be on Iran.

According to Diab, the second scenario to turn the tables is to expand military operations in the West Bank, especially in areas that Israel sees as the most dangerous, such as Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Jenin, Nablus and Tubas.

He points out that this step may be a way to please the right-wing parties in the Israeli government, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, in addition to the fact that it may open the door to the forced displacement of residents of some areas in the West Bank.

He stressed that the speech of the head of the Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip, Khalil Al-Hayya, carries important indications about the future of the agreement.

Diab points out that Al-Hayya stressed in his speech that implementing the humanitarian protocol is not a purely humanitarian issue, but rather a political issue on which future policies for the Palestinian cause in general, and for the future of the Gaza Strip in particular, depend.

Diab explains that Al-Hayya's speech indicates that the next stage will witness a focus on rebuilding the Gaza Strip and keeping the Palestinian population on their land, awaiting a comprehensive proposal from the Arab group to be discussed at the upcoming Arab Summit.

Diab points out that this trend worries Netanyahu, especially in light of the possibility that these steps could lead to the introduction of comprehensive political solutions to the Palestinian issue, including the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.

The expected payment from the deal does not mean the success of the subsequent stages.

Writer and political analyst Akram Atallah believes that the expected new batch of the exchange deal, which will see the delivery of four bodies on Thursday, and six living Israeli detainees on Saturday, does not necessarily mean the success of the subsequent stages of the agreement.

According to Atallah, although there are hopes among mediators and Palestinians that the deal will continue to be implemented, the Israeli position indicates the opposite, which raises doubts about Tel Aviv's intentions and its political and military behavior during the coming period.

According to Atallah, the nature of the current Israeli government, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, and its declared goals for this war make it more inclined to impose impossible conditions rather than make concessions that guarantee the continuation of the deal.

Atallah explains that Israel has been able to achieve progress on most military fronts, which gives it the ability to impose its political and security vision, without feeling the need for serious negotiations to end the war or provide facilities to make the second phase of the deal a success.

He points out that Israel is talking about a second phase of the agreement, but this phase, according to its terms, means ending the rule of the Hamas movement in Gaza and handing over its weapons completely.

Atallah believes that these conditions are not just a negotiating framework, but may be a prelude to continuing military operations, especially since they impose demands that are difficult for Hamas to implement, which may lead to the collapse of the deal instead of its continuation.

Atallah explains that Israel enjoys absolute American support, as US President Donald Trump confirmed that Tel Aviv has “complete freedom” to make any decision it deems appropriate, while stressing his support for any choice made by Netanyahu’s government.

Atallah believes that this unconditional support strengthens Israel's position in imposing its conditions, without worrying about international pressure to end the war or enter into comprehensive political settlements.

Atallah believes that the option of resuming the war on Gaza is still strongly on the table, especially if the mediators do not succeed in pressuring Hamas to accept the Israeli conditions without military escalation.

He points out that Israel does not care about the means by which it achieves its goals, whether through negotiations or war, what is most important to it is achieving its strategic goals.

Atallah explains that the Israeli condition of handing over weapons may be a pretext for resuming the war, as Israel may exploit any refusal or procrastination by Hamas to justify a new round of fighting, which is a very likely scenario in light of the current circumstances. If the negotiations fail, Tel Aviv may resort to resuming the fighting to impose its vision by force, based on its advanced military position and continued American support.

A strong indication that the agreement will continue.

The writer and expert on Israeli affairs, Fayez Abbas, explains that the Hamas movement’s decision to release six of the living detainees is a step that differs from the previous stage, which witnessed the release of only three detainees, as this step comes in response to Hamas’ desire to accelerate the process of releasing 48 Palestinian prisoners who were sentenced to long terms and who were returned to prison after being previously released in the exchange deal for the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in 2011.

Abbas points out that the implementation of the first phase of the deal is a strong indication that the agreement will continue despite attempts by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to obstruct the second phase.

Abbas stresses that implementing the second phase means an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip without achieving the goals that Israel sought, most notably eliminating the civil and military authority of Hamas in the Strip, which is considered a setback for the Israeli strategy.

Abbas believes that decisions regarding negotiations and taking the next steps are no longer in Israel's hands alone, but have become completely subject to American will.

He points out that Netanyahu is carrying out the instructions of the US envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, who announced that the United States and its President Donald Trump insist on completing the deal, no matter the cost.

Abbas asserts that Netanyahu will not dare to confront or oppose Trump on this matter, especially in light of the close relationship between the two leaders and the escalating American pressure.

Abbas points out that these developments come in the context of escalating international pressure to end the crisis, and show that Hamas is seeking to strengthen its negotiating position by showing flexibility in releasing detainees, while Israel faces internal and external pressure to end the conflict without achieving its full military goals.

According to Abbas, the new second phase of the deal appears to be a shift in the dynamics of the conflict, with the actual decision-making centered in the hands of the US administration.

Three possible scenarios for the future of the sector

Writer and political analyst Majed Hadeeb believes that there are three possible scenarios for the future of the Gaza Strip in the coming period: either the resumption of fighting, and the failure to complete the remaining stages of the truce, which could lead to Israel reoccupying the Gaza Strip completely with the aim of overthrowing the rule of the Hamas movement.

Hadib believes that this scenario will not be easy, as reoccupation will have great consequences for Israel, which will find itself forced to bear the responsibility of managing the Gaza Strip and meeting the demands of the Palestinian people.

Hadeeb points out that this scenario will put Israel in a difficult position on the international level, as it will face international isolation and an Arab boycott, in addition to threats to sever agreements and treaties, especially those related to normalization with Arab countries.

Hadib points out that this situation will not be acceptable to the US administration, which makes this scenario unlikely in the short term.

The second scenario, according to Hadib, is represented by the Egyptian initiative that seeks to launch an independent Palestinian administration subject to temporary international guardianship.

Hadib explains that the second scenario is related to the reconstruction of the sector and the consolidation of the institutions of the Palestinian state, in a way that guarantees temporary stability that paves the way for a comprehensive political solution in accordance with the Egyptian initiative, which receives Arab support and readiness to adopt it, in addition to the international support it will find, as it works to meet what all parties interested in the Palestinian issue see.

Hadeeb points out that Hamas may oppose this scenario, especially in light of recent statements by some of the movement’s leaders, such as Osama Hamdan, who rejected any concession of Hamas’ control over the Strip.

Regarding the third scenario, Hadib considers it the most likely under the current circumstances, which is to maintain the status quo without any fundamental change.

Hadib explains that this scenario would give Israel freedom of movement in the Gaza Strip by redeploying its forces without a complete withdrawal, while maintaining Hamas' control over the Strip.

He points out that Hamas may welcome this scenario, as it ensures its continued hold on power, even if it comes at the expense of the continued siege and humanitarian suffering of the Palestinian people in Gaza.

Hadeeb points out that this scenario could exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, with more Palestinians being pushed towards voluntary or forced migration, threatening to displace large parts of the Strip’s population.

Hadeeb believes that the current deal will not last long, especially in light of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s insistence on prolonging the first phase of the truce in order to release the largest possible number of living Israeli prisoners, while Hamas is hesitant to announce its final position the next day, which will lead to the situation remaining as it is now in Gaza.

Hadib points out that this insistence may lead to the third scenario, which is maintaining the status quo, which reflects the complexities of the political situation and the lack of quick solutions.

Meanwhile, Hadeeb asserts that Hamas, through its insistence on remaining in power and its refusal to give up its weapons, is contributing to the complexity of the situation, especially in light of the contradictory statements and wavering positions of the movement’s leaders.

Hadib explains that this insistence may push the Palestinian cause into the unknown, with the continuation of human suffering and the failure to achieve any progress in the reconstruction process.

He points out that Egypt, through President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, is trying to launch initiatives to get out of the current impasse, while trying to satisfy all parties.

Hadib stresses that these initiatives face major challenges, especially in light of Hamas’s rejection of any concessions and Israel’s unwillingness to make major political concessions.

Hadib believes that the Arab countries, led by Egypt, must work to thwart the third scenario, which he considers the most dangerous for the future of the Palestinian cause.

Hadeeb points out that any real solution must include ending the Israeli occupation and rebuilding the Strip, while ensuring the participation of the Palestinian Authority in managing Gaza with the approval and request of the Hamas movement, which must be absent from the political and security scenes to facilitate the transition of the Palestinian people and their cause to the safest square in the direction of achieving their right to establish their independent state without dependency or guardianship.

Israeli attempts to extend the first phase are still ongoing.

Writer and political analyst Talal Okal confirms that Israeli attempts to extend the first phase of negotiations with Hamas are still ongoing, as part of its efforts to release the largest possible number of hostages.

Awkal explains that the Israeli goal behind this step is to limit Hamas's negotiating ability and reduce the price the movement insists on receiving in exchange for releasing the hostages.

Awkal points out that Israel seeks through this strategy to undermine Hamas's negotiating position, which gives it an advantage in determining the terms of the deal.

Okal believes that Hamas's handing over of the bodies of detainees on Thursday, and of living detainees on Saturday, is a "tactical" move aimed at avoiding disrupting the start of the second phase negotiations, which were delayed according to the agreement concluded between the two parties.

Awkal stresses that this step does not necessarily mean that Israel is committed to implementing the three agreed-upon stages, but rather that it may be merely a maneuver to complete the release of the hostages without committing to the rest of the terms.

Awkal explains that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is constantly trying to evade this negotiating path, but he finds himself forced to return to the negotiating table under increasing internal pressure and strong American support for the release of the hostages.

Okal believes that Netanyahu prefers to deal with each stage separately, without a clear commitment to implement the subsequent stages.

Awkal warns that the upcoming negotiations will be very difficult and complex, especially if Hamas insists on its conditions.

Okal points out that Netanyahu may try to disrupt the negotiations if he feels that Hamas's conditions conflict with Israel's strategic interests.

Awkal stresses that the great difference in positions and goals between Hamas and Israel makes it difficult to predict the course of the negotiations, especially in light of the internal and external pressures that both parties are exposed to.

A positive indicator of the continued implementation of the current agreement.

Writer and expert on Israeli affairs Yasser Manna confirms that the expected batch of releases is a positive indicator of the continued implementation of the current agreement between the concerned parties.

However, Manaa points out that this step does not necessarily mean ensuring the implementation of all stages of the agreement, especially in light of Israeli attempts to extend the first stage for as long as possible through side exchange deals, thus avoiding entering the second stage, which requires difficult political entitlements.

Manaa explains that Israel is trying to avoid the second phase of the agreement, which includes major political entitlements such as ending the war and withdrawing from disputed areas.

Manna points out that Israel does not currently appear prepared to face these political challenges, which makes it seek to extend the first phase through partial exchange deals outside the framework of the second phase.

Regarding the possibility of a return to war, Manaa points out that any stumbling block in the negotiations or collapse of the agreement could lead to a military escalation.

Manaa believes that this escalation will be in the form of a limited round of fighting and not a comprehensive war like the one that the region witnessed on October 7 and what followed.

Manaa explains that this scenario reflects Israel's attempt to avoid engaging in a long-term war, while keeping military pressure as a negotiating card.

Manaa believes that the second phase negotiations have already begun, but they face major complications, pointing out that Israel is trying to evade these negotiations because of the major political obligations they require, such as ending the war and withdrawing, which is not consistent with its current strategy. Therefore, Israel seeks to extend the first phase as much as possible through partial exchange deals outside the framework of the second phase.

In the event of moving to the second stage, Manaa expects that Israel will set impossible conditions, most notably disarming the resistance in Gaza and removing Hamas from power completely.

Manna points out that the concept of “deportation” itself is unclear, wondering whether Israel seeks to remove Hamas from the administration of Gaza only, or whether it wants to exclude it from the political scene entirely, including local roles such as managing municipalities and civil services, stressing that this point will be a fundamental axis in any future negotiations.

Manaa explains that Israel has divided the negotiations into two main tracks: the first with Hamas, which is related to the exchange of prisoners and detainees, and the second is an attempt to bypass Hamas and the Palestinians regarding the management of Gaza in the next stage.

He points to the existence of a clear Arab determination for the Palestinian Authority to have a role in the future of Gaza, expecting that a consensus Palestinian technocratic administration will be formed to manage Gaza, ensuring reconstruction and supervising services, which may constitute a major point of contention between the parties concerned.

Manaa stresses that the continued implementation of the deal depends on the parties’ ability to overcome these complications, and if that fails, we may witness a new round of escalation, but it will be limited compared to the comprehensive war that broke out in October 2023.