Dr. Amr Hussein: Egypt will not accept that one faction alone runs the Gaza Strip without comprehensive consensus among the Palestinian forces

Nizar Nazzal: Failure to issue a presidential decree approving the formation of the committee means that the authority is abandoning any commitment towards it

Firas Yaghi: The nature of the committee’s tasks is similar to the work of municipalities in the West Bank, with an additional focus on relief and reconstruction.

Dr. Saad Nimr: Any absence of Palestinian consensus will lead to the failure of the committee and will allow Israel to impose scenarios that are rejected by the Palestinians

Nabhan Khreisha: Possible pressure from Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the Palestinian Authority to ease its hardline stance towards the formation of the committee

Sari Samour: We may be facing a scenario of cancelling the idea of the support committee entirely and reaching an alternative working formula that is agreed upon

There is increasing talk about forming a community support committee after news that Hamas has submitted a list of names of candidates for its membership, in light of the lack of agreement on its formation with the Palestinian National Authority, which makes seeing it come to fruition without agreement closer to extinguishing national consensus and deepening division, despite its importance in managing people’s affairs after the war on Gaza amid humanitarian challenges.

In separate interviews with “I”, writers, political analysts, specialists and university professors believe that the initiative proposed by Egypt, which aims to alleviate the humanitarian crisis and rebuild the Strip, in light of the lack of consensus between the Palestinian factions, especially between the Fatah and Hamas movements, is hindering the progress of its formation, despite it reaching advanced stages, due to the PLO’s fear that the committee will turn into an alternative to the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, which raises deep political concerns.

They stress the importance of agreeing on the committee as a first step towards ending the suffering of the people of Gaza first, and as an entry point for forming a national unity government, and to block Tel Aviv’s path until it prevents the situation in Gaza from remaining under its control without allowing any unified Palestinian formula to manage the sector.

Despite what has been said about the trend towards its formation without national consensus on it, Egyptian and regional efforts continue in an attempt to find a consensus formula that guarantees the success of the committee as a means of filling the administrative and humanitarian vacuum in the sector, while avoiding the consolidation of the division between the West Bank and Gaza.

Egyptian efforts continue...but Palestinian consensus is needed

The Egyptian writer, political analyst, and specialist in international and strategic relations, Dr. Amr Hussein, confirms that the Egyptian efforts aimed at coordinating the management of the Gaza Strip after the end of the current war are ongoing, but it is necessary to achieve consensus among all Palestinian factions to form a temporary community support committee to manage the affairs of the Strip during the transitional period.

Hussein explains that Egypt, despite what is being said about Hamas handing over the names of candidates to take over the committee’s duties, will not accept that one Palestinian faction manages the Gaza Strip alone, but rather seeks to achieve a comprehensive consensus among all Palestinian forces and factions regarding the names of the candidates for this committee and the nature of its role.

Hussein asserts that this committee will not enjoy international legitimacy unless it is ratified by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, considering that the Palestinian Authority, led by President Abbas, is the only internationally recognized legitimate representative to manage Palestinian affairs.

Hussein points out that the Community Support Committee will bear major responsibilities, including the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and the management of its daily affairs, including the crossings after Israel’s withdrawal from them. The committee will serve as an interim authority that paves the way for holding comprehensive Palestinian elections and forming a national unity government, which is considered vital to achieving Palestinian unity and putting the internal house in order.

Hussein explains that Egypt proposed forming the committee as part of a plan aimed at preventing Israel from using the absence of a unified Palestinian administration in Gaza as an excuse to continue the war or obstruct the withdrawal.

Hussein explains that the Egyptian initiative, supported by the United States and Qatar, seeks to pressure Israel to accept a ceasefire and the withdrawal of its army from the Gaza Strip, with the committee taking over the management of Gaza and its crossings under international supervision.

Hussein points out that negotiations are still ongoing to determine the mechanisms for implementing this initiative, especially in light of the existing differences between the Fatah and Hamas movements regarding the names nominated for membership in the committee.

Hussein believes that unifying the Palestinian ranks is a priority for Egypt to ensure the success of its plan, stressing that Cairo will spare no effort to achieve this goal, given its importance in supporting the Palestinian cause and preserving the unity of the Palestinian position before the international community.

Hussein stresses that the role of the support committee will not be limited to managing Gaza only, but will extend to restoring life to the Strip and ensuring that citizens return to their homes as quickly as possible after the end of the war.

Community Support Committee in Gaza faces major obstacles

Nizar Nazzal, a researcher specializing in Israeli affairs and conflict issues, believes that the Community Support Committee in Gaza faces major obstacles due to the absence of Palestinian consensus and the lack of clarity regarding the political and administrative authority of this committee. Nazzal believes that the failure to issue a presidential decree approving the formation of the committee by President Mahmoud Abbas effectively means that the Palestinian Authority is abandoning any commitment towards it.

Nazzal points out that the issue of the Community Support Committee is not only related to legal aspects, but also has deep political dimensions from the point of view of the Palestinian Authority, the Fatah movement, and President Mahmoud Abbas.

According to Nazzal, President Mahmoud Abbas adheres to a strategic vision that sees the Palestine Liberation Organization as the body responsible for managing affairs in Gaza after the end of the war, and that the committee reinforces the Palestinian division.

Nazzal believes that forming the committee without national consensus may meet the desire of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who declared since the beginning of the war that he does not want “Fatah Stan” or “Hamas Stan” in Gaza.

According to Nazzal, forming the committee according to the Egyptian proposal without national consensus may mean that it is in line with Netanyahu's vision of separating Gaza from Palestinian geography.

Nazzal points out that the basic principle is the existence of consensus among the Palestinian factions, including Fatah, Hamas, and other active forces.

Nazzal believes that President Abbas's refusal to approve the committee reflects his strategic vision to avoid any steps that might contribute to "separating" Gaza from the unified Palestinian body.

Nazzal believes that even if the Palestinian Authority refuses to form the committee, Egypt may assume responsibility for arranging the situation in Gaza in cooperation with international parties, including the United States, as there are indications of the possibility of involving all Palestinian forces in Gaza.

Nazzal confirms that the committee, as stated in the discussions, will limit its tasks to humanitarian aspects such as relief, reconstruction and providing aid.

He points out that the committee's reference may be the Palestinian government if the Fatah and Hamas movements agree to it, but if the Authority and Fatah continue to reject it, it is likely that the committee will be independent under Egyptian supervision.

Nazzal believes that Israel will agree to the formation of the committee because it is in line with its needs in managing Gaza without taking full responsibility for the population of about 2.4 million people.

Nazzal points out that the committee consists of 15 non-political technocrats, which may make it acceptable to Israel as it focuses on humanitarian issues without political dimensions.

Nazzal does not believe that Israel will oppose the committee's work, especially in light of its military control over more than 50% of the Gaza Strip, if this is established as a fait accompli.

Nazzal points out that Israel will not bear responsibility for managing the details of daily life in Gaza, such as registering births, marriages, or civil transactions, which makes it more inclined to support the committee to ensure the continuity of civil life in the Strip, and Israel will facilitate the success of that committee in cooperation with the United States and Egypt.

Nazzal points out that the committee, according to Hamas’ vision, will be linked to a national unity government formed based on previous agreements, such as the factions’ meeting in Beijing.

Nazzal points out that this government is not the current government headed by Dr. Mohamed Mustafa, but rather a new government that will be agreed upon nationally.

Will the support committee become the de facto government?

The writer and political analyst Firas Yaghi confirms that the Community Support Committee proposed by the Arab Republic of Egypt as a mechanism to manage the Gaza Strip on the day following the cessation of war still faces several challenges, most notably the PLO’s refusal to form it. This means that there will be no presidential decree from President Mahmoud Abbas that will grant it the legal legitimacy necessary to operate, considering that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. However, if it is formed without a presidential decree, it will become the de facto government, as it was previously, the management committee formed by the Hamas movement after 2007.

He points out that the Community Support Committee was proposed to be an administrative body operating in the Gaza Strip under the authority of the Palestinian National Authority, and its tasks will focus on service and humanitarian affairs, including providing relief aid, supervising reconstruction in cooperation with a committee of donor countries, and managing vital sectors such as education and health in coordination with the Authority.

Yaghi explains that the nature of the committee's tasks is very similar to the work of municipalities in the West Bank, with an additional focus on relief and reconstruction.

Yaghi believes that the main goal of forming the committee is to remove the Israeli pretexts that refuse to allow Hamas to manage the affairs of the Gaza Strip, by presenting an independent committee consisting of experts and independents, far from factionalism.

Yaghi confirms that this committee will not begin its work until the war stops and calm returns to Gaza, which is linked to ongoing negotiations at the regional and international levels.

Regarding the legal status of the committee, Yaghi explains that its legitimacy requires the issuance of a presidential decree by President Mahmoud Abbas, in addition to the approval of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Yaghi confirms that the committee suffers from the absence of national consensus and the rejection of this step by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, due to fears that the committee will turn into an alternative to the National Authority within the Strip, which is what hinders the issuance of this presidential decree regarding its formation.

Yaghi points out that the lack of national consensus makes the committee appear as a “de facto government,” a scenario that brings to mind the experience of the Hamas government after the coup or military takeover in Gaza in 2007.

Yaghi stresses that the committee needs the support of the PLO, although the strongest and best alternative is to form a government of technocrats through national consensus that would assume responsibility for the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a comprehensive alternative to any temporary committees.

Yaghi points out that Egypt is leading this proposal to form a community support committee with the support of other Arab countries, with the aim of preparing for what comes after the war on the Gaza Strip and not leaving the Gaza arena to chaos, and is working to achieve this through a Palestinian national consensus that allows the formation of the committee as a transitional step.

Yaghi stressed that Egypt seeks to avoid the continuation of the Palestinian division and provide a consensual administration for Gaza affairs, stressing the importance of Egypt's central role in this area, especially in the Gaza Strip, which affects its national security.

Yaghi points out that the committee also aims to pave the way for the post-war phase and the reconstruction of the sector in coordination with the international community.

Yaghi stresses that this proposal represents a temporary solution, but it is necessary to fill the administrative and humanitarian vacuum in the sector, especially in light of the ongoing war and political complications.

He stresses that the success of this proposal is important because it ensures the work of the committee without political or legal obstacles, which contributes to ending the suffering of Gaza and the Palestinian people in the next stage. Therefore, there must be some kind of national consensus at the very least.

The formation of the committee will not achieve any success if it is not based on national consensus.

Dr. Saad Nimr, a professor of political science at Birzeit University, confirms that forming a committee to manage the affairs of the Gaza Strip after the war will not achieve any success if it is not based on national consensus among the various Palestinian factions.

Nimr stresses that the issue goes beyond merely appointing names or defining administrative tasks, noting that the lack of consensus will make the committee’s work impossible in light of the current complications.

Nimr points out that the committee that is supposed to be formed should be purely administrative, and work as a specialized technocratic body to manage the affairs of the sector. Its basic tasks include supervising the entry of relief materials and humanitarian aid, developing programs for the reconstruction of Gaza, returning the displaced to their places of residence, and dealing with various civil issues such as education, health, infrastructure, and maintaining internal security, all with the help of the international community, in a way that ensures the stability of the sector in the post-war phase.

Nimr stresses that the success of the committee depends on the availability of national consensus to support it, stressing that any attempt by the Palestinian Authority or any individual faction to manage the Gaza Strip without comprehensive consensus would be unrealistic.

Nimr stresses that the Palestinian Authority cannot manage Gaza's affairs alone without the approval of all parties, especially Hamas.

Nimr points out that recent Israeli reports confirm that Hamas is still an effective and influential force in the Strip, as it includes about 20,000 fighters, in addition to its cadres working in various civilian fields.

Nimr believes that ignoring these facts or trying to marginalize Hamas in managing Gaza would be a fantasy and would not achieve any stability.

Regarding the committee’s reference and working mechanisms, Nimr stresses that forming a unified national leadership that includes all Palestinian factions is a basic condition for the committee’s success.

Nimr stresses the necessity for this leadership to be the sole reference for the committee, while ensuring that no party or organization makes its decisions alone.

Nimr asserts that any absence of Palestinian consensus will lead to the failure of the committee, which will allow Israel to impose scenarios that are rejected by the Palestinians, such as the continuation of the war or direct Israeli military supervision over Gaza.

Regarding the Israeli position, Nimr points out that Israel does not want Hamas or the Palestinian Authority to exist as sole entities running Gaza.

Nimr believes that forming a civilian committee of an administrative nature for reconstruction may be acceptable for international discussion if Palestinian national consensus is achieved on it, but Israel seeks to avoid recognizing a unified Palestinian government in Gaza, which complicates matters and prolongs the crisis.

Nimr explains that Israeli proposals, such as forming Arab or international forces to supervise Gaza, or imposing direct military rule, are rejected by Palestinians and internationally.

Nimr believes that the only solution is to form a consensus committee capable of managing the affairs of the Gaza Strip with Palestinian approval and Arab and international support, which forces Israel to accept this framework if it is serious about ending the war.

Nimr points to Hamas's clear declaration that it does not seek to rule Gaza again, but rather supports national consensus to manage the Strip, as this position opens the door to formulating a clear Palestinian strategy for the post-war phase.

Nimr stresses that such a strategy will be necessary not only to rebuild Gaza, but also to ensure the stability of the Strip and prevent a recurrence of crises.

The administration of Gaza is the sole responsibility of the Palestinian Authority.

Journalist Nabhan Khreisha believes that the formation of the Community Support Committee in the Gaza Strip, according to the Egyptian proposal, faces major political challenges that may prevent its translation into a practical reality, and it will not see the light of day because of those challenges.

Among the most prominent of these challenges, according to Khreisha, is the refusal of the Fatah movement and the Palestinian Authority to involve Hamas in managing the affairs of the Gaza Strip, considering that this involvement constitutes a consecration of the Palestinian division that has continued for more than 17 years.

This position, according to Khreisha, was the main reason behind the failure of many conferences and initiatives that tried to end the division over the past years, while the Fatah movement insists that the administration of Gaza is the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority alone, which reflects the complexities of the internal political situation.

From another perspective, Khreisha points out that the current Israeli war on the Gaza Strip has a primary goal of ending Hamas’s military power and civil authority. At the same time, Israel strongly opposes the return of the Palestinian Authority to administer the Strip, adhering to a policy it has pursued since the division of the West Bank and Gaza in 2007.

Khreisha believes that this Israeli refusal complicates the situation, especially since Israel has not presented any clear alternatives for managing the affairs of the Gaza Strip after the war. Despite this, international pressures related to humanitarian aid to the Palestinians and the management of civil affairs in Gaza pose a major challenge to Israel, especially with its ban on the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and its failure to find an alternative body to provide services.

Khreisha believes that the future of the Community Support Committee depends on developments in the political and regional situations, as the first scenario is that the Palestinian Authority will continue its position of rejecting the formation of the committee due to its rejection of any formula that gives Hamas a role in managing Gaza. This scenario may lead to greater complications in the reconstruction efforts and management of the affairs of the sector, especially with the continuation of the war and its disastrous effects.

Khreisha points out that the second scenario relates to possible pressure from Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the Palestinian Authority to ease its hardline stance towards the formation of the committee.

According to Khreisha, this scenario is reinforced by the flexibility of the Hamas movement, which announced in a statement issued last Friday its readiness to implement any national agreements and its openness to formulas that unite the Palestinian people and restore respect for its political system.

Khreisha points out that Egypt, which feels the danger of an escalation of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the possibility of Palestinians flowing into Sinai, may be one of the most prominent parties supporting this scenario in order to preserve its strategic security.

The third scenario, according to Khreisha, includes an American role represented by the administration of US President-elect Donald Trump pressuring Israel to accept the participation of the Palestinian Authority in managing the affairs of Gaza or even allowing joint solutions that include Hamas.

Khreisha points out that Trump may seek to end the current war to ease tensions in the region, especially as his administration focuses on other priority regional and international issues.

Khreisha talks about Egypt's vision for the tasks of the Community Support Committee, as according to the proposal, the committee aims to manage various aspects of life in Gaza after the end of the war, including providing humanitarian services and supervising relief and reconstruction work.

Khreisha points out that the committee, whose formation was initially approved during the Cairo negotiations last month, will be formed by a presidential decree issued by President Mahmoud Abbas, with the Palestinian government headed by Mohammed Mustafa supervising its work.

According to Khreisha, the committee includes professional experts in various fields, such as health, housing and public works, and members are selected based on their competencies and experience, with the PLO factions submitting a group of candidates to fill 10 positions on the committee, with the possibility of increasing the number as needed.

Among the committee's tasks, according to Khreisha, are supervising the management of border crossings and coordinating with the international community to ensure the flow of humanitarian aid.

Khreisha touches on the declared Israeli position on Gaza after the war, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu summed up with the slogan “No role for Hamas and Fatah in Gaza after the war.” This position reflects Israel’s insistence on preventing either party from taking over the administration of the Strip. However, Israel faces great difficulties in providing alternatives to manage Gaza’s affairs, which makes it vulnerable to increasing international pressure.

Three main scenarios for the fate of the committee

Writer and political analyst Sari Samour believes that the future of the Community Support Committee that Hamas seeks to form in Gaza faces national and political challenges, with the absence of national consensus and the absence of a presidential decree supporting it.

Samour points to three main scenarios for the fate of the committee and its potential impact on the Palestinian scene. The first scenario is that the Fatah movement accepts participation in the committee and issues a presidential decree recognizing it, which is the option that was initially proposed.

Samour explains that the second scenario indicates the possibility of forming the committee with the consensus of all Palestinian factions except for the Fatah movement, which makes it a reality that requires regional support, especially from Egypt, which may play a decisive role in this framework if Fatah refuses to join.

Sammour addresses the third scenario, which we may be facing, related to canceling the idea of the committee entirely and reaching an alternative working formula that is agreed upon by the various parties, or even changing the name of the committee to calm reservations and satisfy everyone.

Sammour explains that the Community Support Committee aims primarily to provide services to citizens and take care of their affairs, especially in light of the cessation of the war, but the continuity of the committee, the form of its work, its functions, and even its reference remain questionable, with the possibility of changing its role or canceling it completely, based on political and field developments.

Samour discusses the Israeli position on the Gaza Strip, noting that Israel faces major challenges in achieving its goals. Its repeated attempts to implement alternative governance models such as “village associations” or “Lahd Army” inside Gaza have failed, and it has also sought to exploit tribal and social figures to gain influence, but it has not achieved any tangible results.

Samour believes that Israel is experiencing a state of strategic confusion, and is resorting to a policy of genocide as a means of pressure. At the same time, it realizes that no political or social body can manage the Gaza Strip without the approval of Hamas, as it is the most influential and effective force in the Strip.

Samour points out that Israel seeks to reoccupy Gaza militarily, but it realizes that this option will lead to long-term exhaustion, as popular and armed resistance against the occupation will escalate.

Samour explains that the continuation of the military occupation will not be acceptable to the residents of the Strip, which will lead to permanent resistance operations that will force Israel to withdraw again, as happened in its previous withdrawal in 2005. Therefore, Israel is living in a major dilemma regarding the Gaza Strip.