Oraib Al-Rantawi: The lack of consensus among the Palestinian parties on the formula for the “day after” the war negatively affects the course of negotiations on the deal

Nihad Abu Ghosh: Initial indications from various parties of a possible deal.. and thorny issues preventing reaching a final agreement

Suleiman Basharat: Current circumstances may push the resistance to rearrange its priorities and may be forced to accept understandings that were not proposed in the past

Dr. Saad Nimr: Strong indications that a deal is close.. and Hamas realizes that its management of Gaza is no longer possible in light of Netanyahu's categorical rejection

Muhammad Hawash: Netanyahu's statements about the deal may be part of a maneuver to buy time and prolong the war, but the Trump administration will pressure him

Hossam Abu Al-Nasr: Conditions are ripe for reaching a temporary truce agreement in the Gaza Strip, but that does not necessarily mean a complete cessation of the war

The political and diplomatic arena is witnessing intensive efforts to try to conclude a deal aimed at stopping the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip, amidst multiple complications and pressing regional and international variables.

In separate interviews with “I”, writers, political analysts and specialists believe that the negotiations taking place with the participation of international and regional mediators indicate relative progress in the understandings, despite the many thorny issues related to the details.

Writers, analysts, specialists and university professors point out that the discussions are focused on steps that include a temporary ceasefire, partial withdrawals of Israeli forces from the Strip, and improving the humanitarian situation of Gaza residents. They point out that the differing visions about the administration of Gaza in the next phase, especially in light of the Palestinian divisions over the form of government after the war, increase the complexity of the negotiations and weaken the unified Palestinian position.

Hamas flexibility versus unprecedented pressure on Israelis

Director of the Jerusalem Center for Political Studies, Oraib al-Rantawi, explains that the ongoing negotiations between the various parties regarding the Gaza Strip have achieved tangible progress in the recent rounds that are being held behind closed doors, noting that the Hamas movement is showing a willingness to show great flexibility at this stage, in the face of unprecedented pressures being exerted on the Israeli side to reach an agreement.

Rantawi believes that these negotiations may lead to a relatively long ceasefire, which may extend for two months, in addition to partial Israeli withdrawals from some areas in the Strip, as Hamas may accept a gradual Israeli withdrawal instead of demanding a comprehensive and immediate withdrawal.

He points out that the current negotiations equation is for Hamas to make partial concessions, such as releasing a limited number of Israeli detainees, in exchange for achieving urgent humanitarian and economic gains for the people of Gaza, especially with regard to aid and relief.

In parallel, Rantawi stresses that the full release of Israeli detainees will not take place except by stopping the war within a comprehensive agreement that includes a binding timetable for Israeli withdrawal.

Al-Rantawi points out that Egypt plays a major role in sponsoring the understandings, especially with regard to the management of the Rafah crossing and the mechanisms for bringing in humanitarian aid.

But on the Palestinian side, Rantawi points to the lack of consensus among the Palestinian parties on the formula for the “day after” after the end of the war, which complicates the scene and negatively affects the course of negotiations on the deal.

Al-Rantawi points out that the Palestinian leadership adheres to the government of Dr. Muhammad Mustafa, and rejects any proposals related to a national consensus government, which constitutes a major obstacle to achieving internal consensus that may contribute to strengthening the Palestinian position.

Al-Rantawi points out that the ongoing Palestinian division has a devastating impact on the negotiation process, expressing his regret that the disasters and war of extermination that befell Gaza did not succeed in pushing the parties towards unity.

However, Rantawi points out that there are positive indications that a deal can be reached before the Trump administration arrives, as Netanyahu’s fascist government faces internal and external pressure to reach an agreement. However, Rantawi warns of the possibility of last-minute surprises that could disrupt the negotiations, especially given the fascist nature of that Israeli government.

On the other hand, Rantawi confirms that summoning Hamas leaders to Doha and Qatar’s return to playing the role of mediator is a major indication that the talks may yield positive results this time.

However, Rantawi warns that Israel may return to escalation at any moment, especially since it is exploiting the achievements it has made on the Lebanese and Syrian fronts to strengthen its position towards Gaza.

Regarding Hamas the day after the agreement was concluded, Rantawi points out that it succeeded in regaining the initiative and leadership, despite the severe blows it suffered, both in Gaza and abroad.

Al-Rantawi points out that Hamas may witness new leadership arrangements in the coming months, in light of the decline in support from Iran and Hezbollah, as Hamas is working to compensate for this decline by strengthening its relations with Turkey and other countries that support Islamic movements in the region.

Al-Rantawi confirms that the Turkish role, despite its different nature from Iranian support, constitutes an important political weight for Hamas, in addition to the growing role of Qatar.

Al-Rantawi points out that Hamas is trying to build relations with Syria in light of the regional political transformations, as it seeks to invest in the rise of Islamic movements there and its relationship with them in an attempt to strengthen its position, especially since its relationship with Bashar al-Assad’s regime has not made a major breakthrough.

Rantawi stresses that the continuation of the war in Gaza has become absurd, and that all parties, including Hamas and international mediators, realize the necessity of putting an end to this war.

Unresolved details prevent comprehensive agreement

Writer, political analyst and specialist in Israeli affairs, Nihad Abu Ghosh, believes that there are initial indications from various parties regarding the approach of reaching a possible deal that includes a temporary ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, in addition to agreeing on the broad outlines of the mechanisms of the next stage. However, some pending details still prevent reaching a comprehensive agreement, most notably the names of the Palestinian prisoners who may be included in the deal, their type, in addition to the scope of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

Abu Ghosh points out that Israel is still insisting on a partial withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, while working to establish a new reality on the ground by establishing military sites inside Gaza, in addition to calls by settlers to resettle inside the Strip.

Abu Ghosh points out that this approach reflects Israeli intentions aimed at dismembering Gaza and decoupling it from a cohesive geographical unit.

Regarding the administration of the Gaza Strip, Abu Ghosh confirms that this issue remains one of the most complex issues in the ongoing negotiations, as Israel categorically opposes the continued rule of Hamas in Gaza, which raises questions about who will take over the administration of the Strip if an agreement is reached.

Although there are still thorny issues pending regarding reaching an agreement and concluding a deal in the Gaza Strip, Abu Ghosh points out that international pressure, especially from the United States led by the administration of President Donald Trump, plays an important role in pushing Israel towards concluding a deal and a ceasefire, similar to what happened in the Lebanese agreement.

Abu Ghosh explains that these pressures come in light of the presence of external factors pushing towards achieving a temporary calm that may pave the way for a permanent agreement, as the mediators are counting on the fact that a temporary ceasefire may be an entry point to achieving a comprehensive and permanent calm.

Regarding the post-agreement outcomes related to Hamas, Abu Ghosh explains that estimates indicate that the movement cannot be eliminated, and that Hamas does not cling to power in Gaza as an ultimate goal, which means that it may be prepared to give up some of its authoritarian roles and maintain its role as an organization.

This time, talk of a deal comes in a different context than before.

Writer and political analyst Suleiman Basharat believes that this time the talk about a prisoner exchange deal in Gaza comes in a different context than before, given the rapid changes in Palestine, Israel, the region and the world.

These variables, according to Basharat, create an environment that may be conducive to reaching a preliminary agreement on prisoner exchange, but he rules out that this deal will be comprehensive or final.

Basharat points out that current indicators indicate that the expected deal may constitute the first stage in a broader framework that extends over time, similar to previous experiences such as the Lebanon agreements, where initial understandings are reached followed by a period of calm during which negotiations are intensified.

This scenario, according to Basharat's assessment, may later lead to the drawing of the features of a new political phase, but it is not the end of the existing conflict.

On the Israeli side, Basharat believes that Benjamin Netanyahu may have an opportunity to pass the deal and convince the Israeli public, both supporters and opponents, that it achieves interim goals, as Netanyahu relies on a discourse that confirms the continuation of the war but justifies the “temporary calm period” as a necessary stage to achieve strategic gains.

Basharat points out that this speech seeks to present the deal as an achievement that contributes to strengthening Israel's position after it was able, according to his claim, to weaken the capabilities of the Palestinian resistance.

From the Palestinian resistance's perspective, Basharat explains that the current circumstances are pushing it to rearrange its priorities. With the continuation of the war and the depletion of capabilities, it has become necessary to break the current cycle of conflict in order to achieve gains with the least possible losses.

This conviction of the resistance, according to Basharat, comes in light of regional and international data indicating that the next stage may be more difficult for the Palestinian cause, and therefore, the resistance may be forced to accept understandings that were not proposed in the past.

At the regional level, Turkey's entry as a mediator in the negotiations stands out, as Basharat points out that this role enhances the chances of reaching an agreement, as Turkish mediation adds momentum to the efforts being made and brings greater seriousness to the discussions, which may contribute to bringing the viewpoints of the different parties closer together.

On the international level, Basharat asserts that the next US administration, headed by Donald Trump, is throwing its weight around at this stage to ensure relative stability before officially assuming its duties. This effort aims to prepare the ground for a comprehensive US vision for the region, which includes a new vision for the Palestinian cause.

Basharat believes that these efforts come within the framework of Trump’s efforts to start from a stable foundation that will enable him to implement his upcoming policies effectively and enter the White House with a period of calm.

According to Basharat, it is too early to talk about a comprehensive cessation of the war, but he believes that the return to confrontations in the future will not be on the same scale as today. The scenario currently proposed talks about a period of 60 days, during which the Israeli occupation forces will partially withdraw from some sites in Gaza, with their redeployment. This situation may keep the possibility of confrontation alive, but in a limited way and linked to changes on the ground.

Three possible scenarios for the future of the Gaza Strip

Basharat points to three possible scenarios for the future of the Gaza Strip, the first being a partial Israeli withdrawal, such that Gaza could turn into an area similar to the West Bank, and resistance operations and Israeli targeting operations would continue in a mutual manner.

The second scenario, according to Basharat, is the conclusion of a comprehensive political deal. An American vision may emerge based on a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in exchange for the annexation of parts of the West Bank to Israel, while giving the Palestinians the opportunity to establish an independent political entity in Gaza, which will be developed as part of a future Palestinian political system.

Basharat points out that the third scenario is a long-term transitional phase, in which the transformations may extend until 2026, a period that may witness the crystallization of a new political system based on successive “political deals,” during which the situation in the region will be re-arranged.

Basharat believes that the options before Hamas and the Palestinians in general have become very limited. Hamas may be forced to change its discourse and its principles to reduce the extent of losses and attrition. This approach is based on a comprehensive assessment of what happened during the past year, taking into account the regional and international variables that give the Israeli occupation a relative advantage at the current stage.

Basharat points out that the Middle East is going through a phase of rapid transformations, and that the coming months will be decisive in determining the features of the political and field map in the region. With the continuation of regional and international changes, the future of Gaza and the Palestinian cause remains open to multiple scenarios that depend on the parties’ ability to adapt to the new reality.

External pressures are the main reason for completing the deal.

Dr. Saad Nimr, a professor of political science at Birzeit University, believes that there are strong indications that a deal is close to being reached in the Gaza Strip based on the Egyptian proposal.

Nimr points out that this time there may be fundamental differences from previous attempts to conclude a deal, driven by a number of reasons that make ending this file an urgent priority on both the Israeli domestic and international levels.

Dr. Nimr explains that external pressures are at the forefront of the reasons pushing towards completing the deal, and the most prominent of these pressures are the statements of the US President-elect Donald Trump in which he called for ending the open files in the Middle East, most notably the Gaza file, after closing the Lebanon file.

Nimr points out that the next US administration, led by Trump, will focus on two main issues: the Ukrainian-Russian war and relations with China, and therefore, any ongoing crises in the Middle East may hinder this trend.

Nimr points out that the American desire to calm the situation in the Middle East falls within the framework of neutralizing the region from the priorities of the new American administration, and this requires direct pressure on the Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, who is also facing internal challenges.

On the domestic front, Nimr points out that the families of the Israeli detainees in Gaza have become a strong pressure front on Netanyahu’s government. This issue, which has gained great momentum in Israeli public opinion, has pushed towards accelerating negotiations on the deal.

The Israeli military establishment itself, according to Nimr, is now putting pressure on the political leadership, as senior officers in the Israeli army complain about the lack of achievable strategic goals in Gaza, and military operations are limited to destroying infrastructure and killing civilians, while the Palestinian resistance is draining the Israeli army on a daily basis, and this drain has prompted the Israeli army to acknowledge the need to end the status quo through a political solution.

Dr. Nimr believes that the conditions are now favorable for reaching a deal, and that the Egyptian initiative has been accepted by the concerned parties, as the ongoing negotiations are focusing on details, which is a crucial stage that may hinder reaching a final agreement.

According to Nimr, the most prominent features of the deal include the release of Israelis held in Gaza, especially the elderly, women and the sick, and a 60-day truce. In return, Israel will release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, including those serving long sentences and life sentences. The deal also includes a partial withdrawal from the Philadelphi corridor, the reopening of the crossings, and the entry of humanitarian aid into northern Gaza.

Nimr points out that this step represents a concession from Hamas, which agreed to divide the deal into two stages in exchange for stopping the war, after it had wanted a complete and more comprehensive deal that included the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

Despite Netanyahu's statements affirming Israel's right to continue military operations, Nimr believes that the expected truce may allow mediators additional time to reach a comprehensive agreement.

Nimr explains that Hamas realizes that its management of the Gaza Strip is no longer possible as it was in the past, especially in light of Netanyahu’s categorical rejection of its continued rule of the Strip. It seems that the agreement reached between the Fatah and Hamas movements regarding the management of Gaza may pave the way for the formation of a community committee that will oversee the management of the Strip’s daily affairs, with Hamas as a part of it.

Nimr stressed that the priority for Hamas during the truce period will be the reconstruction of Gaza and securing humanitarian aid, especially in the northern areas of the Strip that were subjected to massive destruction.

Nimr confirms that Hamas has two main goals in mind: ending the Israeli occupation completely, and releasing Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons.

Major challenges will be faced by the parties involved after the deal is concluded.

Nimr points out that the challenges that the parties concerned will face after concluding the deal will be great, and these challenges include rebuilding the destroyed areas, securing humanitarian aid, and releasing Palestinian prisoners.

Nimr believes that the success of the deal will depend largely on the ability of international mediators to ensure that commitments are implemented by both sides, especially in light of the complexities of the details associated with each stage of the agreement.

Nimr explains that the deal, if implemented, could constitute an important turning point in the course of the Palestinian cause, but it will remain subject to developments in regional and international situations, and the ability of the various parties to overcome their obstacles.

The lack of real progress reflects Netanyahu's desire to buy time.

Writer and political analyst Muhammad Hawash believes that talk of a prisoner exchange deal in Gaza comes in the context of intense international and regional pressures, but Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements may be part of a maneuver to buy time and prolong the war, which poses serious challenges to the mediators.

Hawash points out that the administration of US President-elect Donald Trump is pressuring Israel to expedite the conclusion of the deal before it officially takes over the White House, as the next Republican administration wants to enter power and for the Israeli hostage file not to remain within the context of the ongoing war in Gaza.

Hawash points out that intensive contacts are taking place between the concerned parties, but the lack of actual progress reflects Netanyahu's desire to gain time. The Israeli side realizes that Netanyahu has a long record of lying, maneuvering, and procrastination, which makes the mediators deal with his statements with extreme caution.

Hawash focuses on the fact that Netanyahu realizes that stopping the war could lead to the disintegration of his government and open the door to holding him accountable for his responsibility for the failure of October 7. Therefore, he seeks to prolong the war to gain time and avoid political and popular accountability, in light of the escalating criticism within Israeli society.

However, Hawash believes that Netanyahu's maneuvers may turn into pressure from the US administration led by Trump that will force Netanyahu to conclude the deal against his will.

If the deal is completed, Hawash believes that this could lead to the dismantling of the government coalition in Israel and holding new elections, and thus Netanyahu would lose the tools to escape accountability for the failure on October 7, and from the corruption charges pending against him in Israeli courts.

According to Hawash, developments in the talk about the deal’s proximity indicate that the incoming Trump administration is seeking to achieve quick achievements in the Middle East, in line with Trump’s promises to end the war in Gaza as well as in Ukraine. Therefore, Washington is placing great weight on achieving a temporary calm that could turn into a permanent ceasefire.

Hawash believes that these pressures also aim to avoid any new tension with the arrival of the administration to the White House, as the Gaza file and the hostage crisis represent a major security and political challenge.

Hawash believes that the shift from maneuvers to concluding a prisoner exchange deal may pave the way for a phase of temporary calm, which can be built upon to achieve a permanent ceasefire. However, all options remain subject to the ability of mediators to overcome Netanyahu’s obstacles and ensure the achievement of international and regional consensus that pushes the parties toward a solution.

Hawash stresses that the equation is complex, as the internal Israeli situation intersects with international pressures and limited Palestinian options, which places the future of Gaza and the Palestinian cause at a critical turning point in the next stage.

Hawash talks about the limited options available to Hamas in light of the current war and its repercussions, as he believes that the movement is facing a complex dilemma represented by the need to adapt to the political transformations that may be imposed by the results of the war.

Hawash believes that Hamas has two basic options: either to merge into the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization in a way that rearranges the Palestinian political scene, or to hand over to the organization the responsibility of negotiating on behalf of the Palestinian people due to the rejection by Israel, the United States of America, and the international community of any role for Hamas in governing the Gaza Strip after the war.

However, Hawash points out that Hamas is striving to establish its presence in Gaza after the war ends, which contradicts the Palestinian Basic Law and raises questions about its violation of the foundations of the Palestinian political system as a whole.

Hawash asserts that the current war represents an existential threat to Hamas, as the movement faces the responsibility of being burdened with great burdens due to the continuation of the war and the delay in reaching solutions to the Palestinian issue, coinciding with the movement facing enormous pressures due to the Israeli “war of extermination,” which makes its options more complex and difficult in the coming stage.

Variables indicate the readiness of both parties to accept a truce, even if it is short.

Writer and historian Hussam Abu Al-Nasr, head of the Beit Al-Quds Foundation for Palestinian Studies and Research, believes that local, regional and international conditions are ripe for reaching a temporary truce agreement in the Gaza Strip, but that does not necessarily mean a complete cessation of the war.

Abu Al-Nasr explains that the current changes, whether from within Israel or from the regional and international scene, indicate the readiness of both parties to accept a truce, even if it is short-term.

Abu Al-Nasr points out that internal pressure on the Israeli government, especially from the families of Israeli detainees held by the Palestinian resistance, plays a pivotal role in pushing Benjamin Netanyahu to respond to the truce efforts.

Abu Al-Nasr says: “After a whole year of continuous war and the depletion of its forces, Israel is now facing major challenges on the international level, especially in light of the arrest warrants targeting its leaders and the growing international criticism of its behavior in the Gaza Strip. It has found itself facing conditions conducive to concluding a truce agreement.”

Regarding the field situation, Abu Al-Nasr stressed that Israel will not repeat what happened in 2005 when Ariel Sharon withdrew from the settlements in the Gaza Strip.

Abu Al-Nasr explains that "Israel believes that its previous withdrawal led to the strengthening of the Palestinian resistance and the increase in the influence of the armed factions. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine its withdrawal from strategic axes such as the Netzarim Axis, which divides the Strip geographically, or the Philadelphi Axis, which extends along the border with Egypt."

Abu Al-Nasr points out that Israel's repositioning around the Rafah crossing may be opened in a limited manner without a complete withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor. Through its military presence, Israel aims to clip the wings of the resistance by continuing the aggression, striking the infrastructure, and destroying 80% of the Strip.

Abu Al-Nasr believes that the Israeli aggression on Gaza is part of a series of repeated wars since the Al-Aqsa Intifada, through the wars of 2008, 2012, 2014, and up to the current war.

Regarding the most prominent challenges facing the success of any truce, Abu al-Nasr says: “There are two basic points that will determine the fate of any agreement. The first is Israel’s commitment to a complete withdrawal from the Strip, which constitutes a real test of Israel’s intentions towards peace, and the second is implementing the promises of reconstruction, which is a file that failed previously after the 2014 war and led to the situation exploding again.”

Abu Al-Nasr confirms that "Israel has historically proven its lack of commitment to the truce agreements, and this makes the possibility of the failure of any future agreement very likely."

Abu Al-Nasr believes that Israel's continued presence in the Gaza Strip necessarily means the continuation of resistance, which makes achieving a lasting peace out of reach under current strategies.

Abu Al-Nasr believes that the Israeli aggression will continue as long as Israel continues to undermine any attempt to reach radical solutions to the conflict in Gaza.

Regarding Hamas's options, Abu Al-Nasr explains that they have become more narrow compared to previous periods.

Abu Al-Nasr says: “The current war has inflicted heavy losses on Hamas on several levels, from the loss of leadership and strategic positions to the decline in support from the Palestinian street. These changes make the movement less stubborn in its positions and more inclined to accept solutions that are in line with its minimum aspirations.”

Abu Al-Nasr points out that the ceiling of Hamas's ambitions has been greatly reduced, which makes it more willing to accept limited participation in the management of the Gaza Strip through joint committees, such as the Community Support Committee.

Abu Al-Nasr believes that Hamas realizes that its sole rule over Gaza is no longer an option, but it seeks to remain part of the political scene in one way or another.