Dr. Bilal Al-Shoubaki: Israel’s success in temporarily separating the arenas does not mean that it will be permanent and will allow it to continue its hostile policies in Gaza and the West Bank

Antoine Shalhat: Israel has achieved success in disengaging from the Gaza and Lebanon arenas, but the other arenas remain open to the possibility of escalation

Dawoud Kuttab: The possibility of the agreement collapsing in the long term, and escalation may return to the forefront if real political breakthroughs are not achieved

Dr. Amr Hussein: The agreement with Lebanon increases the possibility of Israel escalating its aggression on Gaza and Netanyahu continuing his strategies towards regional hegemony

Nabhan Khreisha: Israel will escalate the war of extermination against civilians and has actually begun building infrastructure in the Strip that reflects its intention to occupy it for a long time

Majed Hadeeb: The next stage may witness transformations in the relations between Lebanon and Israel due to external pressures that may reach the point of normalization and treaties without Hezbollah’s objection

The ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon appears to reflect complex developments in the regional scene, as some consider it an Israeli attempt to sever the ties between the various resistance arenas, especially between Gaza and Lebanon, amid questions about whether the agreement will hold and be the beginning of successive solutions, or whether it will be the beginning of a rolling escalation.

Despite describing it as a strategic achievement by Israel, analysts, specialists and university professors, in separate interviews with “Y,” believe that this agreement carries many challenges and questions about its sustainability and impact on the ongoing conflict dynamics in the region, considering that the agreement will lead to reducing military pressure on Israel on the northern front, allowing it to focus on the Gaza Strip.

The agreement will lead to more pressure on Gaza.

Professor of Political Science at Hebron University, Dr. Bilal Al-Shoubaki, believes that the recent agreement between Israel and Lebanon aims to disengage the southern and northern fronts, and constitutes a strategic step from both the American and Israeli perspectives to try to weaken the Hamas movement and put double pressure on it.

According to Al-Shobaki, the agreement is presented as an Israeli achievement that reflects the disengagement between the resistance arenas in Gaza and Lebanon, which Israel considers a blow to one of Hamas’s pillars of strength, represented by the Lebanese support front.

It is believed that the United States and Israel see that Hamas has become weaker after losing the support of the Lebanese front at the current stage, and accordingly, they believe that this stage may be the most appropriate to push the movement towards making concessions, even if these concessions will not exceed a limited formula represented by a prisoner exchange deal.

Al-Shoubaki confirms that the American and Israeli talk about a deal does not include a comprehensive agreement related to the general situation in Gaza, nor does it include issues of Israeli withdrawal or ending the war permanently, but is limited to the exchange of prisoners only.

Al-Shoubaki points out that implementing this vision depends on multiple pressure tools; the first is pressure towards a prisoner exchange agreement, the second is the continuation of military operations in Gaza, and the third is intensifying international pressure on Hamas leaders abroad.

Al-Shoubaki points out that these three tactics are not new, but rather come as an extension of the pressures that have been ongoing since October 7, whether on the military level inside the Gaza Strip, or politically and internationally by targeting the movement’s leaders abroad, or through efforts to separate the arenas and reduce Hezbollah’s support for the Gaza front.

In the short term, Al-Shoubaki believes that the agreement will lead to more pressure on the resistance factions in the Gaza Strip, and perhaps to a state of frustration among some Palestinian parties. It will also allow Israel to devote itself to continuing its hostile policies in the West Bank, especially with the desire of Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich to exploit this agreement to implement his plans against the Palestinians in the West Bank.

As for the medium and long term, Al-Shoubaki confirms that the interconnectedness between the components of the axis of resistance is not only linked to the current circumstances of the war.

Al-Shoubaki says: “This connection will remain in place by virtue of reality and due to common ideological and political factors.”

Al-Shoubaki explains that Israel's success in temporarily separating the arenas does not mean that this separation will be permanent, because the nature of the conflict and the common issues between the components of the resistance make reconnection a matter of time.

Al-Shoubaki believes that the agreement signed by Israel and Lebanon includes many points that make it fragile and vulnerable to collapse. The most prominent of these points are the clauses that are open to interpretation, which were placed in a way that allows one of the parties, especially Israel, to exploit them to its advantage.

Al-Shoubaki points out that, for example, the agreement includes a clause granting both parties the right to self-defense, which raises questions about who will determine the legal justifications for either party to use this right.

Al-Shoubaki explains that this clause gives Israel cover to violate the agreement under the pretext of self-defense, which is something that has been repeated in previous agreements, such as UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which Israel did not fully adhere to. He points out that the new agreement includes the establishment of a “quintet committee” that includes the United States of America, which he considers an Israeli attempt to establish an advanced presence inside Lebanon under the cover of the agreement.

Al-Shoubaki points out that the Lebanese side may view the agreement as the “lesser of two evils,” especially in light of the great pressures the Lebanese people are facing from Israeli displacement and targeting.

The future of the Gaza Strip faces great uncertainty in light of the developments

Writer and political analyst Antoine Shalhat believes that the future of the Gaza Strip faces great ambiguity in light of regional and international developments. This ambiguity stems from the Israeli plans announced by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who considered the disengagement between the Lebanese and Gazan arenas a “great achievement.”

Shalhat points out that according to Netanyahu, this achievement enables Israel to focus on Gaza, which reflects an intention to intensify the military campaign on the Gaza Strip, and continue a “war of annihilation and comprehensive destruction” whose end does not seem imminent.

Shalhat points to two main issues that cast a shadow over the future of the war. The first concerns the fate of the Israeli prisoners held in Gaza, which is a political and security priority for Israel. The second is the absence of a political plan for the so-called “day after the war.” Despite the existence of Arab and international proposals on the management of Gaza after the fighting ends, Israel has not agreed to any of them.

Shalhat confirms that there are voices within Israel pushing for the direct reoccupation of the Gaza Strip and encouraging settlers to return to it, which increases the chances of the war continuing unless serious international pressure is exerted, especially from the United States of America.

It is believed that the ceasefire on the northern front with Hezbollah has direct effects on the Gaza Strip, as the continuation of the truce in Lebanon allows the Israeli army to transfer more of its forces to Gaza, which will increase military pressure on the Palestinian resistance.

Shalhat explains that the escalation on the northern front had contributed to reducing the number of Israeli ground forces in Gaza, but any stability in the north could open the door to a greater escalation in the Gaza Strip.

Despite the intense military pressure, Shalhat points out that the Palestinian resistance in Gaza has resorted to “partisan warfare” strategies, which inflict tangible damage on the Israeli army.

Starvation and destruction in Gaza may affect resilience

However, Shalhat warns that the systematic use of starvation weapons against the people of the Gaza Strip, in addition to the comprehensive destruction, may affect the resistance and the people’s ability to withstand in the future.

Shalhat confirms that the picture will become clearer with developments in the field and what Israel will decide regarding its military strategy in Gaza.

Shalhat believes that Israel has achieved limited success in disengaging the resistance arenas, as it has so far been able to separate Gaza and Lebanon. However, other arenas, such as Iraq and Yemen, remain open to the possibility of escalation.

Shalhat points out that there are serious questions about the nature of the Iranian response to the Israeli attacks, which makes the regional scene more complicated.

Shalhat believes that Israel and Hezbollah benefit from maintaining the ceasefire in the north. The Lebanese resistance, which has received blows described as “painful,” needs time to reorganize its ranks and strengthen its capabilities. In contrast, the Israeli military establishment is facing a crisis in human resources and a shortage of ammunition, which has prompted the army to pressure the political leadership to reach an agreement. The American and Iranian positions are additional factors in strengthening this relative calm.

Shalhat asserts that Israel’s success in disengaging the northern and southern arenas represents a temporary gain, but he stresses that the regional landscape remains full of complexities, as other arenas, including Iraq and Yemen, remain combustible, and although the Lebanon agreement may hold for a while, future developments depend on the extent to which regional and international factors influence the dynamics of the conflict.

Any ceasefire agreement contributes to enhancing the confidence of the conflicting parties.

Writer and political analyst Daoud Kuttab believes that any ceasefire agreement contributes to strengthening the confidence of the conflicting parties, and restores part of the role of the major powers, especially the United States, in managing the conflict.

Writers believe that Israel's acceptance of the ceasefire principle may accelerate the end of the war on the Gaza Strip, pointing out that the current circumstances are pushing towards calming the situation, at least in the short term.

He points out that the future of the Lebanese resistance faces increasing challenges, especially with the price it will pay in the framework of the prisoner exchange deal and the resulting problems related to the right of unofficial parties to bear arms. Despite these pressures, writers confirm that the agreement did not cancel the role of the Palestinian resistance, or end its ability to achieve its goals.

Writers explain that through this agreement, Israel was able to achieve its goal of separating the arenas between Gaza and Lebanon, but this separation came at a great cost, both on the military and political levels.

Regarding the broader axis of resistance, writers stress that Hezbollah has paid a heavy price for its attempt to maintain the cohesion of the arenas, especially in light of the difficult economic and social conditions that Lebanon is suffering from as a state.

Writers explain that the continuation of this linkage seems difficult in the long term, given the burdens Lebanon bears, which cannot be increased without threatening internal stability.

Writers believe that the current agreement will hold in the short and medium term due to the lack of desire on both sides for further escalation.

However, writers warn that there is a possibility that the agreement will collapse in the long term if real political breakthroughs are not achieved, such as reaching settlements on border demarcation or ending the war on Gaza.

Writers stress that without these steps, escalation may return to the forefront, but they expect that the agreement will continue for several months to come, given the increasing international and regional pressures on all parties to calm down, especially with the end of the US elections and the passage of a relatively long period since the beginning of the war.

Netanyahu's government is moving to consolidate the occupation in Gaza

The Egyptian writer, political analyst and specialist in international and strategic relations, Dr. Amr Hussein, believes that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, before signing the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon, faced major challenges represented by the escalation of the resistance in southern Lebanon, and the increased pace of missile launches towards the Israeli depth, where vital cities such as Haifa and Tel Aviv were targeted with strikes that he described as influential, which is one of the most prominent reasons that prompted him to accelerate the agreement.

Hussein explains that Netanyahu seeks, through the agreement, to separate the Lebanese front from Gaza, and then move towards a broader plan known as the “Generals’ Plan,” which aims to dismember the Gaza Strip and gradually reoccupy it, while imposing complete military control over it.

Hussein points out that these moves come in the context of the vision of the extreme Israeli right, which is racing against time to liquidate the Palestinian cause, especially in light of unlimited American support.

Hussein points out that the Israeli government sees the end of the current war, "the day after the war," as an opportunity to consolidate the occupation in Gaza, not to withdraw from it.

Hussein believes that the ongoing resettlement operations in northern Gaza, in addition to the strengthening of the military presence in the areas of the Netzarim and Philadelphi axes, confirm that Israel does not intend to end the war soon, but rather seeks to establish a long-term presence in the Strip.

He points out that these plans are accelerating with the approach of Donald Trump's return to the White House, as this may lead to settlements that serve the Israeli agenda, without withdrawing from the Strip.

Hussein believes that the agreement with Lebanon increases the possibility of Israel escalating its military operations against Gaza, taking advantage of the dismantling of the concept of “unity of arenas,” as Israel views this dismantling as an opportunity to intensify its targeting of the Strip and implement its plans there.

Hezbollah was forced to agree to the agreement to spare Lebanon from destruction

In contrast, Hussein believes that Hezbollah was forced to agree to the agreement to avoid comprehensive destruction in Lebanon, especially after a series of qualitative Israeli attacks that included pager device bombings, assassinations of first- and second-tier leaders in the party, and targeting the southern suburbs and Beirut.

Hussein believes the Israeli agreement with Lebanon will likely hold, as Netanyahu seeks to calm the northern front to return residents of northern settlements displaced by the escalation of shelling, and avoid further damage inflicted by Hezbollah rockets and Israeli attack aircraft over the past 14 months.

Hussein believes that the next stage will witness a new escalation, including Israel targeting other resistance fronts in Yemen, Iraq and Syria, and cutting off Hezbollah’s supplies, which reflects Netanyahu’s continuation of his strategies towards regional hegemony to achieve his political and military goals.

Israel will not be able to crush the resistance in Gaza

Journalist Nabhan Khreisha believes that the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon may open the way for the Israeli army to transfer its forces stationed on the northern front to the Gaza Strip, which would enhance military operations there.

Khreisha points to the absence of real military targets in the Gaza Strip, noting that Israel will continue to implement its plans against the Palestinian people by escalating the war of extermination, which mainly targets civilians, and includes killing, forced displacement, and home demolitions, especially in the northern Gaza Strip, to expand the buffer zone.

Khreisha asserts that Israel has actually begun to build an infrastructure in Gaza that reflects its intention to occupy the Strip for a long period, with the paving of roads and the establishment of camps, noting that these moves coincide with increasing Israeli governmental support for settlement plans, which have gone beyond being mere proposals from settlers to becoming part of the policies of the current right-wing government.

Among the most prominent projects linked to the occupation’s plans in Gaza, Khreisha points to the “Ben Gurion Canal” project, which aims to connect the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, ending at the coast of Gaza. This project, which dates back to the 1960s, has been revived today to be part of Israel’s future plans to control the Strip.

On the resistance front, Khreisha explains that the southern Lebanon front has been a support factor for Gaza since the beginning of the war, more than it is an embodiment of the “unity of arenas” strategy.

Khreisha points out that the Palestinian resistance, despite its losses, including the assassination of a number of its prominent leaders, continued to confront the Israeli aggression using guerrilla warfare, which reflects its ability to adapt to the conditions of war and the tactics of the occupation.

Khreisha believes that the impact of the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon on the resistance in Gaza will be limited, because it is adopting different combat strategies, which enables it to continue to exhaust the Israeli occupation forces for a long time.

Khreisha points out that Israel has so far succeeded in achieving its goal of separating the Lebanon front from the Gaza front, which was confirmed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and a number of military leaders.

This separation, according to Khreisha, reduces the burden on the Israeli army, which is suffering from great pressures in terms of mobilizing reserves and providing resources, and also contributes to reducing the economic damage resulting from the war on multiple fronts.

However, Khreisha believes that this separation will not achieve the greater goal of crushing the Palestinian resistance in Gaza, as the resistance is still capable of waging a long-term war of attrition.

Khreisha points out that the occupation will escalate its brutality against Palestinian civilians through killing and starvation, in an attempt to displace them and weaken the environment of popular resistance.

Khreisha expects that the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon will hold for a while, but he acknowledges the difficulty of determining the duration of this hold.

Khreisha believes that there are several factors that support the continuation of this agreement, including: the decline in Hezbollah’s power after the assassination of a number of its first and second-tier political and military leaders, in addition to the terms of the agreement that serve Israel’s interests.

The most prominent of these conditions, as Khreisha explains, is the prevention of armed attacks from Lebanese territory, with a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon within two months, and the provision of American guarantees to Israel, along with an international mechanism to monitor compliance with the terms of the agreement. The agreement also gives Israel the freedom to carry out military operations in Lebanon in the event of violations by Hezbollah.

Khreisha points out that the Iranian position is a decisive factor in the agreement’s survival, as Iran, the main supporter of Hezbollah, has strategic interests that push it to avoid escalating the confrontation with Israel. He points out that with the election of Donald Trump as US president and the escalation of his threats to Iran, Tehran may seek to make concessions to avoid harsher sanctions, and restricting its support for Hezbollah may be one of these concessions.

Differences in the objectives of the wars on Gaza and Lebanon

Writer and political analyst Majed Hadeeb believes that the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel does not have direct repercussions on the situation in the Gaza Strip, pointing out that this is primarily due to the absence of real unity between the field arenas.

Hadib explains that if there had been an effective unity of arenas that included practical and field coordination between the resistance factions in Palestine, Hezbollah, and the rest of the resistance axis, this truce could have been considered a devastating blow to the Palestinian resistance, especially the Hamas movement.

Hadib points out that the difference in the objectives of the wars on Gaza and Lebanon reinforces this separation. The war on Gaza aims to subjugate the Palestinian people and force them to accept political solutions imposed by Israel, while the war on Lebanon focuses on ending Hezbollah’s military capabilities and working to diminish its influence on the Lebanese scene in preparation for the post-war phase on Gaza and Lebanon.

He points out that the Israeli goal in Lebanon is not to destroy the Lebanese infrastructure or the capabilities of the Lebanese people as is happening in Gaza, where the capabilities of the Palestinian people were destroyed, but rather to eliminate the military capabilities of Hezbollah to prepare Lebanon for normalization with Israel.

Regarding the future of Gaza, Hadeeb stresses that the fate of the Strip is not determined by the developments of the ceasefire in Lebanon or its continuation, but rather by the main players in the scene: the American administration, Israel, and some Arab regimes.

Hadeeb believes that the Palestinians, including the resistance and Hamas, are not among the players who have a significant impact on determining the future of the Gaza Strip, due to the division and contradiction in strategies and programs, and due to the absence of an Arab incubator that seeks to protect the political rights of the Palestinians. In addition, the Arab regimes, which are well aware of the position of the Palestinians and what their conditions will become after the recent war on Gaza, play a pivotal role in this context.

The concept of "unity of arenas" has not been practically achieved.

Hadib criticizes the concept of "unity of arenas," explaining that it is a slogan that was launched after the 2021 war, but it was not practically achieved. Rather, this slogan was stillborn, due to the lack of factors for its continuation that would ensure the achievement of its goals.

Hadib points out that even during the confrontations in 2022, this unity was not embodied even at the level of the Palestinian arena, as the Islamic Jihad movement confronted Israel alone, without support or backing from Hamas, despite the existence of what was known at that time as the joint room.

Hadib believes that this term was an attempt by Iran to link its various regional arms, such as the Houthis, the Iraqi and Syrian factions, in addition to the Hamas and Islamic Jihad movements.

Hadeeb stresses that Israel, for its part, does not pay attention to such slogans, but rather works according to clear strategies aimed at ensuring its national security and the safety of its settlers, whether in the north or the south.

Hadeeb stresses that Israel's priorities lie in eliminating any threat that affects its settlements or destabilizes its security.

Regarding the ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel, Hadib expects that it will hold, pointing out that Lebanon in the next stage will not be the same as it was when Hassan Nasrallah was at the head of Hezbollah.

Hadib explains that Hezbollah, under the leadership of its current Secretary-General, is going through a phase of gathering its cards internally and externally, whether from a military, political or social perspective.

He believes that the current Secretary-General of Hezbollah faces different challenges compared to his predecessor, although the general strategies have not changed. Among these challenges is rebuilding the party’s position in the Lebanese political scene, as Hezbollah was one of the most prominent players influencing the country’s domestic and foreign policy before the war on Lebanon.

Hadib points out that Hezbollah is now forced to make concessions on multiple levels, including resolving the pending crises related to the prime minister and the Lebanese republic.

Hadib points out that the next stage may witness transformations in relations between Lebanon and Israel under external pressures that may reach the point of normalization and signing treaties without objection from Hezbollah, as Saudi Arabia will return, with the United States’ push, to formulate political balances in Lebanon by reconsidering the Taif Agreement that Saudi Arabia had previously formulated according to the equations of party power at that time, as Saudi Arabia will work to formulate a new agreement for Lebanon, in which there is no place for Hezbollah’s power.

Hadib points out that Lebanon, in the post-Hassan Nasrallah era, will become closer to the American and Gulf spheres, in light of international and regional attempts to reformulate the political scene in Lebanon in line with these trends.

Hadib asserts that Hezbollah's declining role will leave a vacuum that will be filled by regional and international powers seeking to rearrange the situation in a way that serves their interests, away from Iranian influence, which has declined with the absence of Hassan Nasrallah as one of Iran's most important arms in the region.