Dr. Ahmed Rafiq Awad: The ceasefire in Lebanon is the beginning of a temporary calm, but it does not represent a strategic shift.

Sari Arabi: The agreement with Lebanon will give Israel a chance to catch its breath and rearrange its priorities.

Talal Okal: Netanyahu may head towards another escalation in the West Bank after the agreement to achieve the declaration of sovereignty

Muhannad Abdul Hamid: Gaza will experience betrayal after an agreement in Lebanon, leaving it alone to face the war of extermination.

Adnan Al-Sabah: Any new paths without just solutions to the Palestinian issue will be temporary and unsustainable

Firas Yaghi: Netanyahu may exploit the truce with Lebanon to achieve greater political gains, such as imposing sovereignty over parts of the West Bank

All eyes are on Lebanon regarding the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah, which raises questions about the possibility of Israel succeeding in separating the resistance arenas between the Lebanese and Gaza fronts, and whether that means additional isolation and deepening of Gaza’s suffering.

In separate interviews with “I”, writers and political analysts believe that Lebanon as a state is completely different from Gaza in terms of political reality and different circumstances, and Hezbollah is facing great internal pressures, which could push towards concluding the agreement without Gaza, but the question is raised about the extent of Israel’s success in implementing the strategy of separating the arenas.

Some analysts point out that the agreement with Lebanon will only be a temporary ceasefire, and does not necessarily mean a strategic shift in the conflict.

Some analysts believe that the agreement with Lebanon may provide Israel with an opportunity to catch its breath and rearrange its military and political priorities. This agreement may be used as an opportunity to pressure Hezbollah and exploit internal tensions in Lebanon to achieve greater gains. Meanwhile, others believe that the possibility of separating the arenas may lead to an escalation of the situation in Gaza, as Israel seeks to strengthen its military presence in the Strip and direct pressure towards Hamas.

It is too early to talk about Israel's success in separating the fronts

The writer and political analyst, Dr. Ahmed Rafiq Awad, believes that it is too early to talk about Israel’s success in separating the fronts, as not many statements have been issued by Hezbollah or the Lebanese side, which makes it impossible to assert Israel’s success in separating the arenas.

Awad explains that there are several reasons that led to talk about an agreement with Lebanon, starting with the special circumstances of Hezbollah, which has suffered great losses, in addition to the pressures it is exposed to from the environment that supports it as well as from the Lebanese government.

Awad addresses Iranian pressure, or at least the tacit silence of Iran, which expressed its support for implementing Resolution 1701, in addition to the possibility that this is part of its calculations with the next US administration headed by Trump. All of these factors prompted Hezbollah to coordinate with the Lebanese government, and through Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, to conduct negotiations in its name.

Awad points out that Israel continues to emphasize that the agreement is essentially a ceasefire and not a comprehensive agreement, and that this agreement gives Israel the freedom to respond at any time, and may last for a period ranging from two days to two years.

Awad points out that at the same time, Israel believes that this agreement allows it to rearrange its military reserves and store ammunition, and is considered a step towards separating the Lebanese arena from Gaza.

Awad believes that American pressure, whether from the current or upcoming administration, as well as internal pressure from the Israeli public, are among the factors pushing Israel to agree to a ceasefire.

Although this agreement may lead to a temporary cessation of fighting, Awad does not believe that this represents a major strategic change. Strategic change is represented by agreements that include withdrawals and the signing of comprehensive agreements or security and political arrangements that would permanently change the features of the region.

As for the future, Awad believes that the ceasefire in Lebanon may be the beginning of a temporary calm, but it does not represent a strategic shift.

Awad points out that this agreement may last a few days or perhaps years, but the tensions lurking beneath the surface still exist.

More pressure on the Gaza Strip

As for the Gaza Strip, Awad believes that the agreement with Lebanon will lead to more pressure on the Gaza Strip, as it is expected that Israel will seek to strengthen its military presence in Gaza and pressure Hamas, with the aim of pushing it towards signing an agreement or releasing the detained prisoners.

Therefore, according to Awad, a ceasefire in Lebanon could lead to a disengagement between the Lebanese and Gazan arenas, which means that Israel will be able to pressure Gaza unilaterally, which could exacerbate the situation in the Strip.

The regional scene: a state of fluidity and continuous changes

Writer and political analyst Sari Arabi believes that achieving the possibility of separating the resistance fronts between Lebanon and the Gaza Strip carries important strategic implications, pointing out that this separation was one of the Israeli goals in expanding its aggression against Lebanon, as Israel sought to transfer the weight of its military effort from the Gaza Strip to the southern Lebanese front to achieve broader military and political gains.

Arabi points out that the Lebanese situation is radically different from Gaza in terms of objective and regional circumstances, as Lebanon is a sovereign state recognized internationally, which makes international pressure on Israel to stop the aggression greater and more influential. Lebanon is also characterized by its diverse sects and political forces, some of which take a hostile stance toward Hezbollah, and the Israeli occupation is betting on exploiting these internal divisions to besiege the party politically.

On the other hand, Arabi explains that the Gaza Strip suffers from completely different circumstances, as the Palestinian people in Gaza live under direct Israeli occupation, and Israeli ambitions in the Strip are deep and historical. Since the occupation of Gaza in 1967, there have been Israeli projects, even from leftist forces, to completely annex the Strip. These ambitions, in addition to Hamas’s rule of the Strip and the events of October 7, make Gaza a primary and direct target for the ongoing Israeli aggression.

Arabi explains that the internal disputes in Lebanon and the sharp polarization between its political components, in addition to the absence of a minimum national consensus to support Hezbollah, are reflected in the party’s capabilities in confronting the occupation. In addition, the deep Israeli military strikes that targeted the party’s leaders from the first and second ranks, whether at the political or military levels, have undermined part of the party’s capabilities.

Arabi points out that the freedom of air movement enjoyed by the occupation over Lebanon allows it to carry out raids that affect Hezbollah’s social and civil incubator, as the Israelis claim that they were able to destroy the party’s strategic stockpile of important missiles and cut off supply lines coming from Syria, which provides a mutual basis for discussing an agreement that may aim to stop the escalation.

Regarding the possibility that the agreement with Lebanon could be a strategic turning point, Arabi stresses that the regional scene is still in a state of fluidity and continuous changes, as the next US administration may rearrange priorities, while the war on Gaza continues and Israeli goals towards the West Bank and the Iranian nuclear project are strongly on the agenda of the Netanyahu government.

Arabi explains that the agreement with Lebanon will give Israel a chance to catch its breath and rearrange its priorities. At the same time, this agreement may reopen the debate about the strength of the axis of resistance and the levels of support and backing among its components, which raises questions about the future of the conflict in the region.

Regarding Gaza, Arabi believes that the situation there is more complicated than in Lebanon, as the war in the Strip will continue, but at a slower pace than in the past period. However, the complexities of the situation in Gaza, whether from a humanitarian or political perspective, make reaching permanent solutions more difficult.

Arabi points out that the general scene in the region is still unstable, and that the upcoming transformations depend largely on the field and political conditions, whether in Lebanon or Gaza or at the regional and international levels.

Hezbollah has been working since the beginning of the war to reduce the cost of intervention in it.

Writer and political analyst Talal Okal explains that Hezbollah, which from the beginning adopted a strategy of supporting the Palestinian resistance without being drawn into a direct, comprehensive confrontation, has worked since the beginning of the war to reduce the cost of Lebanese intervention in the war, in order to preserve the cohesion of the Lebanese internal front, while Israel pushed Lebanon into the equation of the regional conflict, trying to double the pressure on the party by directly targeting border areas and military targets, which reflects the complexity of the calculations that are taking place behind the scenes.

Awkal points out that talk of strategic changes in the near term remains premature, as Netanyahu has at least two additional months to maneuver politically and militarily, and during this period, he will not be forced to make any substantial concessions to the administration of US President Joe Biden, especially since Netanyahu is considering the possibilities of the near future, including the return of Donald Trump to the White House.

Awkal points out that Netanyahu is still betting on the possibility of striking the Iranian nuclear project, especially with the opportunities that Trump's arrival to power may provide him.

Awkal points out that Trump, known for his populist approach, may seek to achieve major political gains by igniting new wars to present himself as a peacemaker later, which would enhance his achievements and open the door for America to impose heavy prices on countries involved in regional conflicts.

Awkal believes that the agreement will lead to stopping the war on the northern front, but Netanyahu will continue his escalation in the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu may also, after the agreement, move towards another escalation in the West Bank, exploiting the political climate to achieve his strategic goals, including declaring sovereignty over large parts of the West Bank and activating the plan for the forced displacement of Palestinians from strategic areas, as part of a large colonial settlement project that aims to change the demographic and political reality in the region.

Awkal stresses that the current scene reflects a great complexity in political and military calculations, as the various parties seek to achieve long-term gains at the expense of regional stability, and in the absence of any serious initiatives, all possibilities remain open to continued escalation that may change the equations of the entire region.

After October 7, the idea of unity of the squares practically declined.

Journalist Muhannad Abdul Hamid explains that before October 7, the Iranian-led axis of resistance was promoting the unity of the arenas, as meetings were held in Beirut and Tehran, which issued statements and declarations that stressed the need for solidarity between all parties in confronting Israel.

Abdul Hamid points out that following the surprise attack carried out by the Palestinian resistance in Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” on October 7, 2023, the idea of unity of the arenas practically declined, and despite everyone’s support for the operation, the freedom to participate was left to each party.

Abdul Hamid explains that this stage proved that the participation was limited, as the support operations were limited to symbolic operations by Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq. These participations, despite their symbolic importance, were not sufficient to stop the Israeli war machine that was intent on destroying Gaza and killing its residents.

What is noteworthy, according to Abdul Hamid, is that Hezbollah linked the ceasefire in Lebanon to reaching an agreement for a ceasefire in Gaza, but Iran, the leader of the axis, did not participate practically except through two operations in response to assassinations targeting sites in Damascus, Tehran and Beirut.

Abdul Hamid points out that Iran itself was the first to agree to separate the ceasefire in Lebanon from Gaza, and today, it seems as if it is confirming this separation, which is in line with the Israeli strategy based on isolating each party separately, whether in war or negotiations. The unity of the arenas that was promoted did not go beyond formalities and slogans, because it did not express a real unification of the countries and their peoples in the axis.

Abdul Hamid points out that there is a close link between the ceasefire deal in Lebanon and the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701, and Iran’s negotiations with the current Biden administration and perhaps with the next Trump administration regarding its nuclear program.

Abdul Hamid points out that it seems that Iran is seeking to obtain a price in return for its commitment not to produce a nuclear weapon, but it does not want to engage in a direct confrontation with Israel and the United States, as it realizes that such a war could destroy its structure and regional project.

Abdul Hamid believes that Iran does not want to be a false witness to the destruction of Hezbollah’s military, economic and social infrastructure, but rather seeks to preserve its position in Lebanon to ensure its continued influence. On the other hand, Iran believes that its loss of Gaza as a resistance base makes investment in the sector pointless, especially in light of the ferocity of the Israeli aggression.

Abdul Hamid believes that this Iranian position reflects a strategic contradiction, as Iran supports the Palestinian resistance in its rhetoric, but fails it in times of decision, which raises questions about its credibility.

On the other hand, Abdul Hamid believes that the agreement with Lebanon may constitute the beginning of changes that may be positive, as Iranian influence in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and Syria may diminish, thus paving the way for the peoples of these countries to restore their sovereignty and unity.

In Lebanon, Abdel Hamid points out, this could lead to the state restoring its basic functions, ending the power of militias that have deepened divisions, and more broadly, it could open the door to uniting the peoples and countries of the region around empowering the Palestinian people to determine their fate and ending the brutal Israeli occupation that threatens the stability of the entire region.

Abdul Hamid points out that Gaza, after the agreement with Lebanon, will continue to feel betrayed, as it is left alone to face the war of extermination without sufficient international or Arab attention.

Abdul Hamid stresses that the continuation of this situation could create a serious crisis, as the international community seems unable to stop the crimes committed by the occupation against an entire people.

Abdul Hamid stresses that this situation calls for urgent Palestinian action through a clear initiative supported by the Arab world and the world, aiming to stop the massacres and protect what remains of the Gazan society that is facing genocide.

Unity of arenas is not only in waging joint combat

Writer and political analyst Adnan Al-Sabah believes that Israel has not yet succeeded in breaking the unity of the arenas or achieving separation between them, pointing out that the agreement with the Lebanese arena confirms that we must not forget that Lebanon, despite its complex economic and political circumstances, has remained for 14 months an arena of support for the Palestinian cause, where Lebanese blood was mixed with Palestinian blood in a clear embodiment of the legendary steadfastness alongside the Palestinian people and their struggle.

Al-Sabah explains that the internal circumstances in Lebanon, including political divisions and economic crises, make it impossible for it to become a direct party in a long war. Despite this, Hezbollah and the rest of the resistance forces in Lebanon have remained supportive of the Palestinian cause and the people of Gaza, but they have avoided engaging in a direct war that would expose Lebanon to further risks.

Al-Sabah points out that the constitutional vacuum, the currency crisis, and the deterioration of vital sectors such as electricity, food, and medicine make the situation in Lebanon extremely difficult, which requires understanding the priorities of the Lebanese resistance in maintaining internal balance.

Al-Sabah stresses that the unity of the arenas is not necessarily in waging joint combat only, but rather it is a long-term battle based on cooperation and mutual support between peoples and resistance forces.

Al-Sabah believes that this unity between the arenas has not and will not be broken, because its roots are based on an ongoing struggle that goes beyond the present moment.

Speaking of the agreement with Lebanon, Al-Sabah indicates that it may bring a strategic change, but it may go in two different directions. On the one hand, the agreement may lead to a state of relative relaxation in the region, and on the other hand, it will always be remembered that the Palestinian resistance, and with it the Palestinian cause, will remain a fundamental factor that cannot be ignored in any political arrangements.

Al-Sabah stresses that any new paths without real and just solutions to the Palestinian issue will be temporary and unsustainable.

Al-Sabah reminds us that the Palestinian issue is the main key to peace in the Middle East, something that the United States and Israel realize.

Al-Sabah stresses that any attempt to end the Palestinian conflict by ignoring the rights of the Palestinian people will not succeed, as history has proven that the will of peoples cannot be crushed.

Regarding Gaza, Al-Sabah believes that the continuation of the war and the occupation's massacres are completely unjustified, especially in light of the high cost that Israel is bearing.

Al-Sabah indicates that the Israeli establishment and the next US administration will likely seek to find a solution that mitigates the occupation's losses.

Al-Sabah points out that Israeli officers and officials have acknowledged the costs of continuing the war, which makes it likely that there will be some kind of solution in the Gaza Strip.

Despite the possibility of an end to the aggression on Gaza, Al-Sabah stresses that the Palestinian people face serious challenges that require leadership capable of responding to the effects and consequences of the war.

Al-Sabah stresses that what happened in Gaza and what is happening now is not just a passing crisis, but a historical milestone that requires the mobilization of Palestinian energies at all levels, stressing that the Palestinian people need new strategies that enhance their steadfastness and open up horizons for a just and sustainable solution.

Al-Sabah points out that the Palestinians' battle is not just a military confrontation with the occupation, but rather an ongoing struggle for national rights. It is a long struggle that may take generations to achieve, but the Palestinian people have proven repeatedly that they are capable of persevering no matter how great the challenges.

Truce with Lebanon will eventually end the war on Gaza

Writer and political analyst Firas Yaghi believes that talk about separating the fronts by reaching an agreement between Lebanon and Israel is still premature.

Yaghi points out that what is being talked about now is not a complete ceasefire, but rather a 60-day truce, which is a test period during which it can be verified whether this ceasefire can continue or whether there are any violations.

In this context, Yaghi expresses his belief that this truce will ultimately lead to an end to the war in the Gaza Strip, which seems to be consistent with the Israeli security perception of the possible outcome of this development.

Militarily, Yaghi explains, the Israeli army is severely exhausted and is considered unable to continue military operations in Lebanon or the Gaza Strip. This situation reflects a state of fatigue and pressure on the Israeli military establishment, which does not want to be responsible for providing humanitarian aid in Gaza or continuing the war.

According to Yagi, the Israeli army prefers to find alternative solutions to control the situation in the Gaza Strip and find a way to end the war without its forces suffering further losses.

In this context, Yaghi points out that the Israeli army is pressuring at the political level to end the conflict in Lebanon and Gaza.

But the political issue seems more complicated, according to Yagi, as the Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu faces major internal challenges, the most prominent of which is that any solution in Gaza could lead to the disintegration of the Israeli government itself, as there may not be internal consensus on ending the war on the Gaza Strip.

Yaghi believes that the first step taken by Netanyahu is related to an attempt to put an end to the wars in the region, and raises an important question about whether this approach reflects an implementation of US President Donald Trump’s slogan aimed at ending the wars in the region, or is it the beginning of another escalation, and it is clear that this answer will become clear in the coming days as events develop.

Yaghi believes that there are several reasons that push Israel to move towards an agreement with Lebanon, including that the Israeli army is in a very difficult situation, as it suffers from exhaustion and cannot continue in a war on multiple fronts, especially in Lebanon. According to what Yair Golan, head of the Israel Democracy Party, who was deputy chief of staff, indicated, the military situation in the Israeli army has become extremely difficult due to the large losses in lives and injuries, to the point that the Golani Brigade is in dire need of reorganizing its ranks.

Yaghi explains that the Israeli army directly asked the Israeli political level to end the war in Lebanon, because continuing these wars could have disastrous consequences for the military establishment.

Another reason to push for a deal with Lebanon, Yaghi believes, is that there is international pressure pushing Israel towards calm, as it seems that US President Donald Trump played a role in pushing Israel to take this step, as Trump made contacts with US envoy Hochstein in order to push towards reaching a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon.

On the other hand, according to Yaghi, there are also internal pressures facing Netanyahu, including the scandals of security leaks from his office, which may expose him to the risk of investigations and perhaps a trial before the Supreme Court if his involvement in leaking security information is proven, which would mean the end of his term.

As for the strategic aspect, Yaghi believes that Netanyahu may take the ceasefire in Lebanon as a step to present a gift to Trump, as he may seek to trade between the ceasefire in Lebanon and American support in the West Bank and Iran files.

Yaghi believes that Netanyahu may seek to exploit this truce as a means to achieve greater political gains, such as imposing sovereignty over parts of the West Bank or escalating against Iran.

In this context, Yaghi believes that what is happening in Lebanon is just the beginning of the next stage of escalation, as he expects Netanyahu to move towards breaching the truce with Hezbollah in the coming days, accusing the party of being responsible for that.

Regarding the Gaza Strip, Yaghi confirms that the situation in the Strip is still complicated, as there are no real indications of a halt to the massacres or the Israeli escalation, despite the support provided by Hezbollah on the support front, but this front did not prevent the continuation of the Israeli aggression on Gaza.

Yaghi believes that the Gaza Strip will remain far from the military balances in Lebanon, pointing out that Israel aimed through its war in Gaza to destroy Hamas and the resistance in a comprehensive manner, while its goals in Lebanon were related to removing Hezbollah beyond the Litani River, which is very similar to the ceasefire agreement that was reached in 2006.

Yaghi believes that Gaza will remain isolated from Israeli interactions in Lebanon, as Israel will try to impose a new reality in the northern Gaza Strip while the Palestinian resistance continues, while Yaghi confirms that no deals will take place without ending the war and the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.