Confronting the Israeli Negotiation Tactic

Walid Abdul-Hay

A historical review of the declared and secret Arab-Israeli negotiations (which were later revealed) indicates that the backbone of the Israeli negotiation is based on the idea of "fragmentation" in three aspects: the subject, time, and parties, as follows:

First: The subject:

When I review all the cases of negotiation between Israel and any Arab party, they divide the subject into parts, then each part is divided into sub-parts, and negotiations are conducted on each sub-part, and work to achieve the greatest amount of gains in each sub-part, which leads to the sum of the partial gains exceeding the value of the gains of negotiating the "whole" subject. The Israeli party in the Palestinian issue has applied this completely in all its negotiations since the armistice agreements in 1949 until now. In Oslo, for example, it divided it into the subjects of land and population, then divided the land into areas A, B, and C, then military areas and natural reserve areas, then Jerusalem, and divided Jerusalem into municipal borders and holy places, then divided the holy places into Jewish, Islamic, and Christian places in the entire West Bank...and did The same thing applies to water, electricity, etc.

The danger in dividing the issue is that concessions in the minor part seem acceptable to Arab society, but the accumulation of partial gains reveals a valuable catch, and the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (holism).

An academic study in business says that the "total" profits of retailers exceed the profits of wholesalers for the same goods and the same quantity..

Second: Time:

Time in Israeli negotiations is divided into two parts: immediate issues, then postponed issues (or what they call final solution issues). Israel works to delay final solution issues for the longest possible period, while focusing on immediate issues that are of urgent importance to it and not to the other party. Security is almost the most important immediate issue for Israel, which is noted in the fact that Arab recognition of Israel and normalization with it occurred without implementing a single clause of the Oslo Accords, despite the fact that the length of the first stage of Israel's commitment to the remaining Oslo Accords was five years, and here it is that more than 31 years have passed on the postponed issues.

Third: The parties:

Israel does not tend to negotiate with an “Arab bloc,” but rather with each party alone. In fact, it does not see any harm in negotiating with sub-structures in one party. It does not hesitate to communicate even with representatives of some minorities in Arab countries in the East and West. It is certain that individual negotiation with each country makes the impact of the balance of power greater than the results of negotiating with a bloc. It has negotiated with the normalization countries, each alone and without the slightest participation or even coordination with another party, because unilateral negotiation makes the results of the balance of power yield better fruits than negotiating with a group. In the current circumstances, Israel wants to:

1- Divide the Gaza issue into the following topics: An alternative authority to Hamas, the presence of an international, Arab or joint force, disarming Gaza, the issue of aid entry, the relationship between completing normalization and the solution in Gaza, the issue of canceling the UNRWA, the buffer zone in the northern Gaza Strip (the generals’ plan), the issue of monitoring the Egyptian-Israeli border, the issue of hostages... It seeks to put the important issues first, which are the issue of hostages, destroying the resistance, and separating the Gaza path from the Lebanese, Yemeni or even Iraqi path - security is its first priority - then it will discuss the rest of the topics according to its schedule.

2- Divide time: This is clear in that it only agrees to a ceasefire for short periods (such as the last Egyptian proposal for two days) and in each short period it achieves results to return to war again to achieve a new ceasefire and new gains, and so on...etc., then the entry of aid will be postponed until the end of the time period so that the siege can do its job in pressuring the resistance, and to invest any subsequent developments in Israel’s favor or to determine its plans according to those future changes such as the American elections and others.

3- Dividing the parties: Israel is aware of the latent sensitivity between Egypt and Qatar, so it was enthusiastic about the presence of two Arab parties in the negotiating team, but both parties harbor dormant concerns for each other that can be awakened at the right moment, and it tries to invest in the relations of each country from the two negotiating parties (Egyptian and Qatari) to communicate with other parties, then it tries to employ the normalization parties so that each of them plays its role in direct negotiations (negotiating table) or indirect negotiations by providing facilities by the normalization parties that help Israel to stifle the resistance, so the goal is achieved through this indirect negotiation, as it divides the Arabs into the negotiating team, the normalization team, the opponents team, and the team that is neither in the donkey nor in the mobilization, and manages the relationship with each one separately.

Conclusion:

I think that it is necessary for the resistance in any negotiations to avoid all of the above and insist on the interconnection and synchronization of three issues: a permanent ceasefire, a complete withdrawal from Gaza, and the simultaneous opening of aid crossings, and to consider this as a basis for discussing the issue of hostages and not the opposite.

On the other hand, I see that the most important test for the axis of resistance and the extent of its commitment is in the coming weeks, especially after the American elections, and the necessity of confirming the inseparable link between the axis’ fronts. Israel will work to return to the tactic of fragmentation by saying to cease fire in Lebanon and then discuss the issue of Gaza, and it will work to raise issues that may be a subject of disagreement between the resistance in Gaza and the security coordination authority in Ramallah, or between the resistance factions themselves or with some Arabs or the negotiation team... etc. Fragmentation is the dominant idea in the mind of the Israeli negotiator... while the strategy of the Palestinian negotiator must be: unity, synchronization and interconnectedness of the issue for the axis of resistance, without that preventing some negotiation camouflage tactics, provided that the negotiation strategy is preserved, which is unity, synchronization and interconnectedness.

Source: Sahat Al Tahreer