A year after the Al-Aqsa flood... Is it time for evaluation?

Yesterday marked the first anniversary of Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa. This historic, founding event, after which everything will be different from what came before it, and the question that arises again is: Is it time to evaluate and draw lessons and morals?

Answer: Evaluation is a constant need for any event to improve performance during war, and to ensure victory or at least not defeat, so how about an event of the size and impact of October 7?

After the flood and the war of extermination against our people in the Gaza Strip, the priority was to put out the fire inside the house, and not to be preoccupied with who started it and blame him for starting it. This is a matter that has its time, and the evaluation has become more necessary now after the war has lasted longer than it should have, and after it entered the third stage and the northern front was opened up more widely, and is a candidate for turning into an open regional war, in order to ensure that we come out of it with the best results.

History will record that the Al-Aqsa Flood is a qualitative military achievement, regardless of the final results, which may not be as political as the military achievement, due to the severe imbalance in the balance of power and the full American partnership in the war alongside the occupying state. However, the war has not ended or been decided definitively yet, and is likely to continue for several months at least.

What happened was a strategic failure for the occupying state, which appeared in a state of shock and surprise, was paralyzed for several hours, the deterrent power collapsed, and it became clear that Israel was vulnerable to defeat and needed the support of the United States and other Western countries to be able to defend itself. It also faced a reverse migration and suffered economic, moral, military and human losses - according to some Israeli sources - many times those announced.

Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa also provided evidence of the ability of the Palestinian resistance, specifically Hamas, to engage in strategic deception, strategic planning, and implementation, neutralize technological progress, and penetrate the surveillance system, walls, and highly advanced equipment.

On the other hand, the Al-Aqsa flood pushed the conflict to a decision at an inappropriate time for the Palestinians, as they are not capable of a decision, which poses a great risk that the occupation will be able to decide, and the decision does not mean a victory by a knockout blow, but by points, as a popular movement cannot be defeated in a crushing defeat.

The operation was also marred by miscalculations and major mistakes, regardless of who (from the Qassam Brigades or from other brigades or armed individuals and families who entered the line, as it was necessary to prepare for all possibilities), such as targeting some civilians and Thai foreigners. The biggest loophole in the great achievement represented by the Al-Aqsa Flood is that the goals focused on releasing prisoners, protecting Al-Aqsa, lifting the siege and great dreams, and did not set the goal of ending the occupation and independence as a basic, organizing goal that is commensurate with the size of the battle and the heroism and sacrifices that were made in it.

In order for the assessment to be correct, it must be noted that the size of the Israeli collapse and the Palestinian achievement were much greater than what was planned, and thus the size of the Israeli aggression and response was much greater than what was expected and what was prepared to confront it. However, it was possible to develop all scenarios and prepare for all possibilities when planning to carry out an action of this size.

Despite the great preparations and the legendary and continuing heroic resistance for the second year, which is no less important than October 7, we must see the reality as it is in order to work on it and be able to change it. As it appeared in the available data, there were no estimates that the occupation would continue its aggression throughout this period and wage a war of extermination. This was something that was supposed to be expected, and it can be explained by the fact that the far-right government considered this a fateful existential war, and an opportunity that must not be wasted, and that failure to win it would raise big question marks regarding Israel’s existence, role, future, and strategic position in the region.

There were estimates that Israel would not be able to endure a long war that would extend to its home front and incur various losses, especially human losses, and that there would be no ground war, especially at the beginning of the war, and that a temporary exchange and calm deal would be reached leading to a cessation of the war, in addition to an estimate that the response of the West Bank and 48 would be much greater than what happened, and the response of the Arab world, including the Arab peoples, would be much greater than what happened, while Arab helplessness and collusion were apparent, with the exception of the support fronts and some demonstrations witnessed in some Arab capitals, and sometimes it even reached the participation of some Arab parties in defending the aggression and facilitating the arrival of its needs.

There was also an apparently false perception that the change taking place at the global level and the overall world reaction, with the exception of the strong solidarity movements and the actions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, including the response and support of the axis of resistance and the internal Israeli differences and contradictions, was capable of restricting the Israeli government, which found in what happened, with American support and partnership and Western support, a historic opportunity to implement its plan to resolve the conflict, liquidate the Palestinian issue, eliminate the axis of resistance and change the Middle East.

It is true that the war has not been decided yet, and that the war of extermination has not achieved its declared goals. The resistance has not been eliminated, nor have all prisoners and detainees been released, nor has the Gaza Strip ceased to pose a threat, nor have the Israeli refugees in the Gaza Strip and the north returned to their homes. However, the bad scenario is ahead of the other scenarios, and a major humanitarian catastrophe has been achieved against our people in the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Strip has been largely occupied and made an area uninhabitable for humans, and plans are underway to shape its future in isolation from the Palestinians.

Despite the failure to displace the people of the Strip, more than 120,000 have left the Gaza Strip, and many of the people of the Strip are forced to leave it, even temporarily, if the circumstances do not change and the crossing or any other passageway is not opened until it returns to being a livable area.

On the northern front, the occupation forces were able to deal a major blow to Hezbollah as punishment for supporting the Palestinian resistance, by assassinating most of its political and military leadership, headed by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, its Secretary-General and exceptional leadership figure. However, this blow did not eliminate it, and will not eliminate it, as it is an ideological party in which the influence of individuals is less than that of non-ideological political parties, as evidenced by the continuation of the resistance, the escalation of the support war, the launching of missiles, and the valiant battles on the borders, which resulted in large numbers of dead and wounded. However, the “Israeli achievements” in Lebanon cannot be discounted, but war, as they say, is a debate, one day for you and one day against you.

There is no escape from continuing steadfastness and resistance and focusing primarily on self-reliance, without neglecting the fronts and arenas of support and all forms of solidarity in the four corners of the globe that were able to increase the cost of the aggression but did not stop it, and realizing in light of the grave imbalance in the balance of power and the resounding political and moral collapse of the regional and international systems that the stage is not the stage of achieving Palestinian goals, but rather the stage of strengthening the factors of steadfastness and human survival on the land of Palestine, keeping the issue alive and reducing damage and losses, preserving what remains of the elements of strength and gains, striving to thwart the goals of the aggression and placing obstacles in its way, and continuing to work for unity on national, democratic and combative foundations that depend on the balance of power, interests, principles and what is possible, because the most dangerous thing that can happen is more fragmentation and division and opening the doors to sedition and internal fighting.

In this context, Hamas's readiness not to continue ruling the Gaza Strip, which paved the way for signing the Beijing Declaration, which included an agreement to form a national unity government with a national reference, can be considered a calculated step. As for the idea of forming an administrative committee of independent figures in the Gaza Strip, formed by consensus, and a presidential decree issued to form it, it may be a trap and a dangerous idea because it deals with the Gaza Strip in practice separately from the occupied West Bank without specifying when it will be formed, what its powers are, and what its reference is, especially with the failure to form a national consensus government that would be its reference even if the administrative committee is formed by a presidential decree and under the supervision of the current government, which is disputed, because the ones who proposed the administrative committee were the rulers of Washington and some regional parties first, and then the Arab mediators adopted it in an attempt to circumvent the Israeli opposition to the return of the authority without any guarantees of corresponding Israeli and American steps. What is proposed are only verbal American promises without any credit that its formation will end the occupation. Let us put the Biden administration to the test and provide pledges and guarantees for the return of the authority and the Israeli withdrawal, otherwise the Strip will become like the West Bank under a five-star occupation without bearing its responsibilities because there are those who pay the costs instead of it.

It should not be ignored that the Gaza Strip has been reoccupied, and there are plans to maintain Israeli control over the Rafah crossing and the Salah al-Din axis, called “Philadelphi,” and to establish buffer zones, especially in the north, and in the Martyrs’ axis, called “Netzarim,” as indicated by the generals’ plan that the Israeli government has adopted or is on its way to doing, which includes emptying the north of the hundreds of thousands who still reside there despite the hell they are living in, and it also includes placing the distribution of humanitarian aid in the hands of the occupation army to be used to create a new situation that helps the occupation to remain.

It should also not be ignored that there are voices in the Israeli government represented by Ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, and many Likud Party ministers and members of the Knesset, calling for the return of settlement to the Strip because it is the only one that provides protection for the Zionist presence.

It is understandable why Hamas and Fatah are considering the proposal to form an administrative committee, as the humanitarian situation is very stressful, in order to remove the pretexts from the hands of the occupation. However, approving this idea without even Israeli approval and before ensuring the Israeli withdrawal from the Strip or committing to the withdrawal, will grant legitimacy to the occupation, and encourage it to continue undermining the authority in the West Bank to eliminate any embodiment of a single national identity that keeps the door to embodying the state and independence open, and supports Washington’s idea of creating a renewed and effective authority; that is, one that is more responsive to the conditions of the occupation, and enables it to be a five-star occupation like the one in the West Bank, that is, one that does not bear responsibility for the occupation.

There must be a deep and not formal understanding that Washington’s talk of a two-state solution is nothing more than lip service, which does not prevent blessing it or remaining silent about what the occupation is doing. There are signs of a change in the American position from offering advice to Netanyahu’s government to admiring it and betting on its ability to shape a new Middle East, which is originally an American idea. Hasn’t Washington moved from demanding the return of the Authority to finding a renewed Authority, and from rejecting the occupation to understanding the need for a temporary occupation of the Gaza Strip? We know very well the meaning of temporary after 25 years have passed since the end of the transitional period stipulated in the Oslo Accords.