Hebrew Newspaper: Israel Escalates Confrontation with Hezbollah: Where is Iran?

By Raz Zimmt

A few days after the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in the heart of Tehran, my assessment, which I wrote in the pages of this newspaper, was that Iran was heading toward another attack on Israel. Despite my reference to the internal debate in Iran regarding the nature of the required response, and my taking into account the voices calling for refraining from a response that could drag Iran into the danger of an all-out war, I believed that Iran would not refrain from responding to Israel, even in a manner different from the previous Iranian attack on Israel, and at the appropriate time that it would determine for itself. However, the response did not come, and it seems that the Iranian leadership has backed down - at least for now - from its desire to repeat what happened in April. The increase in American forces in the region, the Israeli attack on the port of Hodeidah in Yemen, which demonstrated Israel’s ability to strike extremely sensitive economic infrastructure, and the entry of a new Iranian government in Tehran seeking to renew the nuclear talks and resolve the economic crisis, all played a role in the decision to refrain from implementing the basic plan.

The large gap between Iran’s pledges to respond forcefully to Haniyeh’s assassination and the actual implementation of these pledges raises a number of possible conclusions. First, in a highly dynamic reality, a high level of caution is required in assessing the other side’s intentions and plans, and Israel appears to be making a continuous assessment of the situation, and its decision-making is changing. Whatever the reason for the delay in implementing the promise to avenge Haniyeh’s death, it is clear that Iran is finding it difficult to implement the new equation it set months ago, when the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards pledged to respond to Israel with an attack from Iranian territory for every Israeli attack on Iranian interests, senior officials, or citizens. The constraints facing Iran, as well as Hezbollah, sometimes force the abandonment of decisions that were made in light of the changes in the situation. Secondly, the other party can be influenced, whether at the decision-making stage or afterwards. Slipping into a comprehensive war is not an inevitable process, and it is possible to curb it, or at least delay it. It can be estimated that the threats sent to Iran during August, supported by unprecedented American preparations, played an important role in the decision to examine an alternative to a direct military response. In addition, the Israeli army’s operations in recent days aimed at harming Hezbollah’s capabilities could influence the party’s response to the bombing of communications devices in Lebanon and the assassination of senior party official Ibrahim Aqil. There is no doubt that Hezbollah is obligated to respond with a crushing blow against Israel, but the blow it suffered could influence its response. It is possible that the series of bombings that occurred in Lebanon and revealed an intelligence and security breach in the party are raising great concern in Iran, which itself was surprised by the depth of the breach through the assassination of Haniyeh, attributed to Israel, in a facility protected by the Revolutionary Guards in the heart of Tehran. Third, the recent results of the battle in Gaza also affect the assessments of the situation and the methods of action of the regional parties, primarily Iran and Hezbollah. Unfortunately, it can be assumed that Israel and Hamas will not reach an agreement to release the kidnapped soldiers anytime soon, and a ceasefire in Gaza is not on the table at this stage. Israel's decision to shift its center of gravity to the north, in an attempt to impose a settlement on Hezbollah that is not linked to a ceasefire in Gaza, reveals an Israeli recognition of these developments. In Beirut and Tehran, they have come to understand in recent weeks that a ceasefire in Gaza that would allow Hezbollah to stop fighting in the north will not be achieved anytime soon. Accordingly, what is on the table now is an ongoing war of attrition that cannot be known when or how it will end...

In Iran's view, Israel's being dragged into a war of attrition with Hamas and Hezbollah is an expression of the desired historical path. However, as long as the war against Hamas is temporary, Iran and Hezbollah are prepared to squander their capabilities in order to support Hamas, based on the basic assumption that the end of the battle is only a matter of time. But when it appears that the regional battle could last longer than expected, they will be required to prepare for a long battle that will require different combat resources than in the past. In light of this reality, it is doubtful that a strong war (or one that is limited in time due to its dangerous repercussions for both sides) serves the logic of a long war of attrition that could help Iran and Hezbollah continue their support for Hamas for a long period of time, and cause Israel’s capabilities to erode. In conclusion, after nearly a year of war, the parties must reassess the basic assumptions that were the basis for the security and political decisions in the stages preceding the battle. The transition to a continuous military battle whose end is not in sight poses significant challenges not only for Israel, but also for Iran and its proxies, and requires them to reexamine their strategy, set of considerations, and methods of operation. It would be best to conduct this examination of the new reality in Jerusalem as well, and not just in Tehran and Beirut.

Source: Ynet