The Limits of a U.S.-Saudi Security Deal

By F. Gregory Gause III

For some time, the United States has worked to consolidate Saudi Arabia’s position in the American geopolitical orbit; even the war in the Gaza Strip, which has divided officials in Riyadh and Washington on the question of Palestinian governance, has not dimmed the Biden administration’s desire for a security treaty and nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia. In fact, Washington has continued to pursue those deals with Riyadh, which would also include Saudi recognition of Israel, as a potential lever to move Israel toward a political solution to the Palestinian issue. A U.S.-Saudi defense treaty and agreement on civil nuclear cooperation appears to be in the final stages. As the White House has pushed for a cozier relationship with Riyadh, it has become clear what the Biden administration is seeking to gain from the expanded U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia: not just movement toward a more stable Middle East but also the foreclosure of any possibility that China might lure the Saudis into its sphere of influence.

At a time when many countries are hedging their bets amid the emerging great-power competition among China, Russia, and the United States, why would the Saudis double down on their historic reliance on Washington? In short, they want what neither China nor Russia can provide: security. The Saudis have grave doubts about the U.S. commitment to their country and their region, and they want to nail that down as best they can through a treaty that would not change from administration to administration. The problem for Riyadh is that when the United States makes a security commitment to a country, most Americans expect that country to back Washington on the whole range of international issues—economic and political, as well as military. That is where the Saudis might disappoint. They do not want to hedge on security. They want to be part of the American team. But they also want to maintain some flexibility on the economic and political fronts given the crucial importance of China as an energy customer and Russia as an energy producer.

Both a potential Harris and a potential Trump administration will need to reckon with Riyadh’s independent ties to Beijing and Moscow should a U.S.-Saudi agreement move forward. It may prove to be a harder pill for a Democratic administration to swallow, given Trump’s embrace of autocrats the world over. But regardless, Washington should go into the final stages of negotiations with Riyadh with a full understanding of Saudi Arabia’s intentions—or it will set the relationship up for unnecessary strife.

THE VIEW FROM RIYADH

Saudi leaders, along with their counterparts in other Persian Gulf monarchies, have worried about Washington’s commitment to their security for the past three U.S. administrations. The American public’s evident weariness and frustration with the lengthy wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were manifested in a succession of presidents—Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden—who vowed to reduce the U.S. presence in the Middle East and pivot attention to East Asia in response to the rise of China. The fact that all three found themselves unable to ignore Middle Eastern upheavals—such as the fight against the Islamic State (or ISIS) in the 2010s and, more recently, the war in Gaza and Israel’s conflicts with Hezbollah and Iran—hardly quieted the Saudis’ fears.

In the eyes of the Saudis, each president made a singular decision—or nondecision—that seemed to confirm that Washington could not be counted on. Obama negotiated a nuclear deal with Iran, which the Saudis saw as their biggest threat, without consulting Riyadh and without including any measures aimed at limiting Iran’s regional influence. Trump, who in his early days in the White House had put on a splashy public embrace of Saudi Arabia, failed to act when Iran launched a missile and drone attack on Abqaiq and Khurais, two of the most important oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, in September 2019. And Biden made it clear at the outset of his administration that he intended to keep Riyadh at arm’s length.

Saudi Arabia wants what neither China nor Russia can provide: security.

Harsh geopolitical realities, however, quickly flipped the script on the Biden administration. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the concomitant rise in oil prices led to a 180-degree turn in Biden’s approach toward Riyadh. Good relations with the world’s largest oil exporter suddenly seemed much more central to U.S. interests than the concerns over authoritarianism and human rights that had fueled Biden’s earlier stance. Moreover, the administration saw the possibility of doing Trump one better in the Middle East, getting the Saudis to join the Abraham Accords by recognizing Israel. When China played mediator in the restoration of Iranian-Saudi diplomatic relations—a diplomatic coup for Beijing—in March 2023, it gave Washington the added incentive of securing Saudi Arabia on the United States’ side of the emerging U.S.-Chinese cold war.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is the kingdom’s de facto leader, had been open to diplomatic relations with Israel for some time before the war in Gaza. He has made clear to Washington that his price for this dramatic move is an end to the uncertainty about the United States’ commitment to his country’s security through a Senate-ratified defense treaty. MBS has also called for U.S. support for the development of Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear infrastructure—without the stringent limitations on the reprocessing and export of nuclear material currently required by U.S. law. Getting such agreements through Congress would be difficult given the widespread suspicion of Saudi nuclear ambitions and the distaste for the Saudi human rights record among House and Senate members. And considering the current geopolitical environment, it would require, in the view of the administration, not just Saudi recognition of Israel but also active Israeli support for Washington’s upgraded commitment to Saudi Arabia.

The war in Gaza has upped the ante for Saudi Arabia to recognize Israel. Before the conflict, there were indications that Riyadh would take that step if Israel made some concrete gestures toward improving the lives of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. But the Saudis are now demanding a firm Israeli commitment to a timetable for independent Palestinian statehood in those territories—something that the current Israeli government will not give. Momentum toward a triangular U.S.-Israeli-Saudi deal, which has been the centerpiece of Biden’s Middle East policy, has thus slowed. The regional and global power realities that underlie that momentum, however, are not going away. If and when Gaza recedes from the headlines, it is likely that the next U.S. presidential administration will seek to seal the deal.

OIL COMES FIRST

There is no guarantee, even if Gaza no longer occupied such a prominent place in the global news cycle, that the triangular deal envisaged by the Biden administration could be achieved by a successor. Israel and Saudi Arabia might not be able to find common ground on the Palestinian question. Since the onset of the war in Gaza, public support for negotiations on Palestinian statehood has cratered in Israel. Even if Israel supported the deal, Congress might not agree to the new commitments from Washington that are preconditions for Saudi participation given the long-held antipathies toward the kingdom on Capitol Hill. If, however, all the pieces did fall into place and the triangular deal was achieved, the United States would want to be clear-eyed about what it can expect from the Saudis in return. Riyadh would have no problem signing on to a monogamous marriage with Washington on military and security issues. That is what it wants. But it also wants the flexibility to deal with China and Russia and even Iran on political and economic issues of importance to Saudi Arabia. Americans generally expect their security allies to fall in line on the entire range of foreign policy issues and tend to feel ill used if allies chart their own course; in the case of Riyadh, they would need to temper this reaction.

Despite their ongoing conversations with Washington on these issues, the Saudis have already taken some distance from certain U.S. initiatives, even within the region. Riyadh, for instance, has been keen to extricate itself from its failed military intervention in Yemen, where a years-long conflict between a Saudi-backed military coalition and Houthi rebels has devolved into an intractable stalemate. As such, it has not joined the U.S. campaign against the Houthis, who continue to fire missiles and drones at commercial ships in the Red Sea and even, more recently, at Israel. Saudi Arabia has not joined the diplomatic and economic boycott of Russia orchestrated by the Biden administration in the wake of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Riyadh maintains an extensive economic relationship with China and turned to Beijing to mediate a resumption of diplomatic relations with Iran in 2023.

Saudi Arabia sees China and Russia as central to its future for one overarching reason: oil. These days, the driving force behind Saudi foreign and domestic policy is MBS’s economic development blueprint, known as Vision 2030, which emphasizes changing the Saudi economy and reducing its dependence on oil over the long term. Accomplishing the goals set out in Vision 2030, however, requires huge amounts of capital in the short term, which essentially requires maintaining relatively high oil prices now and sustaining Saudi Arabia’s share of sales in the global oil market. Russia is key to the Saudi strategy on prices; it is the world’s second-largest exporter of oil, and Moscow’s cooperation is essential to production agreements aimed at sustaining the price of oil. China, as the world’s leading importer of oil, is essential to the Saudis maintaining their market share—a position that has grown more vulnerable now that Russia is seeking a greater share of the Chinese market, having been shunned by its historic European customers. For this reason, Riyadh will be loath to hew to Washington’s political and economic policy toward the United States’ global rivals.

THE BUSINESS OF FRIENDSHIP

Beijing and Moscow are imperfect partners for Riyadh, but they are nonetheless essential to the kingdom’s economic strategy. The Saudis know that they cannot hope to keep oil prices up without Russian cooperation. That is why, at Riyadh’s insistence, the locus of international oil production negotiations has shifted from OPEC to OPEC+, which includes Russia and other non-OPEC producers. The Russians have been reluctant, though, to cut their production and potentially sacrifice some of their market share in order to raise prices. In both 2015 and 2020, Russia refused to go along with Saudi-proposed production cuts. Saudi Arabia increased production in both instances to drive oil prices down and put pressure on Russia to get on board, which Moscow eventually did. The dynamic between Russia and Saudi Arabia, at least in terms of the oil market, is fraught; the two can best be characterized as “frenemies.” But it is a relationship that Riyadh must sustain for its own self-interest.

China, on the other hand, is Riyadh’s largest customer. Sustaining Saudi Arabia’s place in the Chinese energy market is essential. Saudi Aramco has invested billions in refineries and other infrastructure in China to lock in its access there. Given the dramatic changes in world energy markets following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia has overtaken Saudi Arabia as China’s leading source of energy imports—a position Riyadh is likely desperate to reclaim. The Saudis will do what they need to do to maintain and increase their economic relationship with China.

Beijing and Moscow are imperfect but essential partners for Riyadh.

Riyadh has also sought to reduce tensions with Iran, as part of MBS’s Vision 2030 mandate to encourage greater foreign investment in the country. A Middle East constantly on the verge of regional war, even if it is not actually engulfed in one, is hardly a place conducive to foreign investment. The Saudis have thus swallowed their misgivings about Iran, which they still see as a major security threat, in an effort—so far unrealized—to reduce regional tensions.

As president, Kamala Harris would likely sustain the Biden administration’s economic pressure on Russia and its efforts to contain China through measures such as tariffs and export controls. A second Trump administration would likely ratchet up the pressure on Iran and China. Each option presents challenges to Saudi Arabia and its desire to maintain strong security ties with the United States while also extending economic relations with China and Russia and trying to ease Middle Eastern tensions. There might be a slight preference in Riyadh for a second Trump administration, given how accommodating Trump was in his first term on issues such as human rights. But memories have not faded of his inaction in the face of the Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities. Saudi Arabia is wisely staying out of U.S. domestic politics this election year, having learned a lesson from its overly public embrace of Trump earlier. The very public Saudi courting of Trump during his first term in office alienated Democrats, setting the stage for the Biden administration’s early distaste for dealing with Riyadh. The Saudis are not repeating that mistake this time.

Regardless of who is in the White House come 2025, Riyadh will be willing to sign on to an ironclad security relationship with Washington as long as the United States meets its price. The question for the United States, as it considers a new level of security commitment with Saudi Arabia, is whether it can tolerate a security ally in Riyadh that goes its own way in economic and political dealings with China, Iran, and Russia.