Israeli security doctrine classifies the Palestinians of Gaza as “enemy people” 
 Civilian facilities and institutions “an internal front for the enemy army” 
 General Giora Eiland: We must cause a humanitarian catastrophe for the people of Gaza because it will win us the war 
 Convincing Israelis, under the shock of existential fears, that they have a strong army capable of protecting them

After Israel's war on the Gaza Strip (2008-2009), which it called "Shooted Lead," Israeli theorists saturated that war with research and discussion, to formulate the goals of the next war. Among the most prominent participants in the strategic discussions organized by the National Security Institute at the time were the former head of the Israeli National Security Council, Major General Reserve Uzi Dayan, and Major General Reserve Giora Eiland, head of the Operations Division of the Israeli army, who also served as head of the National Security Council.

One who examines the lengthy lectures given by Dayan, Eiland, and others at the Israeli National Security Institute finds similar advice, first in terms of methodological description, and the need to stop describing the confrontations with Hamas in Gaza as “military operations,” but rather in terms of war, given that Hamas is in Gaza.” It has become an army,” and also stop describing “the Palestinians in Gaza as civilians, but rather the people of an enemy state.” The Palestinian Authority in Gaza has become a state ruled by Hamas, and its people are supportive of Hamas. Accordingly, a theory of war must be built, by targeting the people as an “enemy” that constitutes the human reservoir. For the Hamas army in Gaza, it is necessary to radically destroy the infrastructure, as it is the “internal front of the enemy’s army.”

In the subsequent wars on the Gaza Strip, the strategic proposals that Dayan and Eiland participated in formulating, and which were reviewed in the presence of the then senior political and military leaders in Israel, along with former senior officials, were not implemented for many considerations, including the lack of preparedness of the Israeli army to enter into a prolonged confrontation with Hamas, and other variables. It is related to the international arena, especially the fragility of the ruling systems in the surrounding Arab countries before the Arab Spring, and to internal Israeli considerations related to Benjamin Netanyahu’s desire to strengthen Israel’s power as a superpower in the field of high-tech and the “security calm” that this requires.

Extrapolating the data on the course of the current war taking place in the Gaza Strip leaves no room for doubt that the Israeli security doctrine classifies the Palestinians in Gaza not as civilians, but as an enemy people, and their civilian facilities and institutions are an “inner front for the enemy army,” which can only be eliminated by striking the people and their institutions, as stated. At the heart of Dayan and Eiland's proposal.

Before armies usually begin their wars, they must determine the enemy’s “center of gravity,” which is a military concept that means the most important point in any military or security challenge. It gives it balance, which is the condition for its survival, and striking it is necessary to eliminate it or cause serious harm to it. The center of gravity in the event of Gaza is the people and civil institutions, and based on that, the actual goals and stages of the Israeli war were formulated.

Many speakers in the Israeli media prefer to explain the facts of the war and its developments from the perspective of the goals announced by the Israeli War Council, such as eliminating Hamas and recovering the captured soldiers detained by it. Quickly by adopting this methodology, it is concluded that the occupation army has not achieved any of its goals, and this may be getting closer. The interpretation is correct to some degrees, and may be far from it to other degrees, but it must not be assumed that the declared goals are the same as the actual goals. For example, the American war on Iraq had the declared goal of “destroying weapons of mass destruction and spreading democracy,” but the goal that was achieved on the ground was different. .

Entering Gaza into a humanitarian catastrophe 

Since the first days of the war on the Gaza Strip, Giora Eiland and a number of other Israeli military experts have continued to call for putting Gaza into an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe as quickly as possible in order to exploit American and European sympathy for Israel.

After regaining his psychological and nervous balance days after October 7, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was keen to hold meetings with senior generals in Israel and listen to their proposals, in addition to reviewing the proposed backup plans of his army.

After the formation of the “War Council,” the goals and stages of the war were determined, and early on it was clear the extent of the contradiction between the declared goals, stages, and tools for military action. One does not need to be a military expert to realize that the intense aerial bombardment of civilian buildings and facilities means that whoever is doing this does not care about him. The lives of his captured soldiers. This bombing will inevitably lead to the death of a large number of prisoners.

The goal of liberating prisoners contradicts the stages of war 

The war's declared goal of liberating prisoners contradicts all stages of the war, starting with the first stage, which lasted several weeks and was characterized by violent aerial bombardment that spared nothing in the Gaza Strip. The actual goal of that stage was to convince the Israelis, who were under the horror of the shock that overwhelmed them with existential fears, that they had a strong army capable of protecting them and destroying Gaza, in addition to giving the army an opportunity to mobilize its ranks, especially reserve soldiers, raise its readiness, mobilize its stores, and take advantage of American and Western sympathy. To achieve the principle of striking the “center of gravity,” which is the “enemy people” and the “home front of the Hamas army,” which is represented by the “civilian institutions,” as war theorists in Israel believe.

As for the second phase of the war, it is a hybrid battle that combines intense aerial and artillery bombardment that paves the way for armored vehicles and ground operations. This phase began from the north of the Gaza Strip to its south, and is actually scheduled to end within two weeks, according to estimates announced by the occupation army.

In this second phase, the Israeli army said that it succeeded in destroying the basic military installations of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, especially tunnels and weapons factories, and dismantling combat brigades from the north to Rafah, but this claim was denied by Amit Halevy, a member of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee for the ruling Likud Party. , based on the reports he has access to by virtue of his membership in the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, and also based on the testimonies of officers and soldiers participating in the Gaza battles.

Also, Major General Reserve, former head of military schools in the occupation army, Isaac Brik, considered that talk of dismantling Hamas battalions and brigades was not accurate, while Giora Eiland confirmed that the facts on the ground indicate that Hamas has a rapid ability to recover in the places that the Israeli army leaves.

On the ground, in the second phase, the Netzarim military corridor was opened, which is a buffer zone between the north, center, and south of the Gaza Strip. The length of the corridor is about 8 kilometers, and extends between the Karni crossing to the Mediterranean Sea, passing through Salah al-Din Road and Al-Rashid Road, and control rooms are spread along it. And control, reconnaissance, and armored positions ready to carry out lightning operations on both sides of the corridor.

A buffer zone was also created along the border with Gaza, with a width of 800 meters after the destruction of agricultural areas and the demolition of hundreds of homes and infrastructure. This effectively means confiscating 16 percent of the total area of Gaza. In the third stage, Gaza residents will be prohibited from returning to this area, and whoever returns will be shot.

The most important thing that distinguishes the third phase, according to the occupation army, is that it has no time limit, and is based on the Israeli forces launching, under cover of air and artillery bombardment, in lightning raid operations based on intelligence information deep inside residential communities, that is, replicating the security reality of the West Bank in Gaza, through military operations. Continuous, starting from the Netzarim axis and the buffer zone, and from the Philadelphia axis separating the Palestinian Rafah from the Egyptian Rafah.

Granting Hezbollah a ladder to climb down from the tree 

Like all stages of the war, in addition to the declared goals, there are undeclared goals, for the second stage, the first of which is to suggest to the international community that the war is over, provided that every attack on any residential community is justified as a “limited operation” aimed at “neutralizing emerging threats,” and as they think. In Israel, this stage means giving Hezbollah a ladder to climb down from the tree, and stopping the process of supporting Hamas in preparation for the return of the settlers to the settlements in the north adjacent to the border with Lebanon.

The stages of the war, its goals, and its continuation are, so far, almost unanimous in Israel, and there is no party, whether in the opposition or the coalition, that offers an alternative based on stopping it. The only disagreement in this revolves around what is described in Israel as “the next day,” that is, the party that aspires to Israel to hand over power in Gaza.

A strategic dilemma threatens the continuation of the third phase 

The strategic dilemma that threatens the continuation of the Israeli third phase is Hezbollah’s continuation of the battle for support for the Palestinian factions in Gaza, which was announced on October 8, and Hamas’s insistence on linking the issue of captured soldiers to stopping the war and complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and the popular assessment in Israel in This framework believes that Yahya Sinwar and Hassan Nasrallah will not back down from the demand to end the war.

It must not be forgotten that what is announced by Israel regarding the third phase of the war, regarding its continuation for years, may be linked to negotiations aimed at reaching a prisoner exchange deal, and this means that hinting at this may be part of the negotiation game, and that concessions may be made, such as stopping the war. .

The third stage of the war is that it has no time limit, and is based on the Israeli forces launching, under cover of bombardment, lightning raid operations based on intelligence information deep into residential areas.

Early on, it was clear the extent of the contradiction between the declared goals of the war, its three stages, and the tools of military action. Whoever carries out intense aerial bombardment of civilian buildings and facilities means that he does not care about the lives of his captured soldiers.