Is War Between Lebanon and Israel Inevitable?

The chasm separating Israel and Hezbollah’s assessments regarding the future of warfare in the region is widening in an alarming manner. Hezbollah has tied the cessation of hostilities in South Lebanon to a ceasefire in Gaza, reflecting the "unity of arenas" approach that the axis of Iran and its militias have adopted. Israel’s position has shifted in the opposite direction. It has decoupled its approaches to the arenas in Lebanon and Gaza, announcing that calm in Gaza would not immediately translate into calm in Lebanon.

This divergence highlights the broader, difficult test that the "unity of arenas" theory has been put to since the conflict in Gaza erupted following Hamas' attack on the morning of October 7, 2023. Despite the theory’s spectacular populist pretensions, it is facing immense obstacles in practice. For one thing, Iran's priority is realizing the regime's geopolitical ambitions; Palestine is not an objective in and of itself. Another problem is the complexity of the national interests of the people in these “arenas,” who bear the brunt of the destruction and chaos; a third is the flagrant disparity between the belligerents’ capabilities.

In contrast to the Iranian schema, Israel’s calculus in each of these arenas is independent of developments in the others. It deals with each arena on a case-by-case basis, based on its assessment of the risks that each of these arenas poses and its implications for Israeli security. Accordingly, Israel is using developments on the ground to undercut the theory of "unity of arenas" by exposing the practical challenges to implementing this strategy faced by Iran. Moreover, Israel seeks to portray Tehran as being self-interested and exploitative in its dealings with Hamas and the Palestinians, highlighting the gap separating its rhetoric in support of Palestinians and the feeble actions it takes to support their cause in decisive junctures, like this war.

Israel is mindful of Iran's strategic calculations in its confrontation with Hezbollah, which Iran sees as a strategic shield and the "golden bullet" it can fire at Israel should the latter decide to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. Israel understands that for Iran, safeguarding Hezbollah, its first line of defense, is non-negotiable, but Israel wants everyone else to recognize that as well.

We now know, for example - based on documents obtained by Israelis - that the military leader of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, had been certain that Iran and its militias would rush to support Gaza and turn the fronts they control into a single, unified front. However, that never actually materialized. As for the speeches of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah about the imminent battles for Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa, they are now held against him. Nasrallah has recently shied away from the podium, only making rare appearances after having given almost weekly speeches at one point.

It will be difficult to prevent this state of affairs from creating tensions among the members of the Iranian axis, especially as it becomes clear that the "unity of arenas" is little more than a slogan adopted to obscure the fact that Iran’s strategy prioritizes Iranian objectives, even if achieving them comes at the expense of Palestinians and Lebanese. If Gaza has all but been left to its fate, then Lebanon must come to terms with the fact that the strikes, attacks, assassinations, and bombings it is witnessing today have become the new normal. They will continue to be a feature of life in Lebanon, regardless of how the situation in Gaza develops.

Recognizing the significance of Hezbollah for Iran's broader strategy, Israel seeks to preemptively remove the party from the equation, in anticipation of a potential conflict with Iran in the future. Israel would feel compelled to confront Iran directly if the latter were to develop nuclear weapons or edge ever closer to developing them, as that would radically change the regional security landscape.

From its perspective, neutralizing Hezbollah weakens Iran's capacity to retaliate and shifts the strategic balance in Israel’s favor. Thus, the dynamics unfolding in Lebanon are not just fleeting skirmishes, but a reflection of Israel’s new rules of engagement. Israel is now focused on targeting and destroying Hezbollah's operational infrastructure and systematically weakening its military capabilities, thereby undermining its ability to mount an effective response to escalation. Indeed, the theoretical appeal of a deal between Hezbollah and Israel was swiftly dispelled by the realities on the ground. Political science does not offer a solution that resolves the fundamental irreconcilability between Hezbollah's ideological commitment to destroying Israel and any form of peaceful coexistence with it.

Here, it is important to note that Iran's exploitative approach to the Palestinian issue is not at odds with its genuine devotion to the destruction of Israel. Rather, they are complementary elements of its broader geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East. Iran’s claims to defending Palestinian rights and supporting factions opposed to Israel have allowed Iran to position itself as a key player in the Islamic world. As for Iran's position on the destruction of Israel, it serves ideological ends tied to the stability and continuity of the revolutionary regime.

This dual approach allows Iran to project strength, pursue its geopolitical interests, and enhance its legitimacy both domestically and among its regional allies. The fact is that to Iran and Hezbollah, reaching an agreement, as things stand, is not a step toward a durable peace but a tactical recalibration. The convergence between Hezbollah's firm ideology which is backed by Iran, and the existential fears that have taken hold of Israel since October 7, sets the stage for seemingly inevitable wars.

Asharq Alawsat